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THE "NEW" COLORADO STATE LAND BOARD
CHARLES E. BEDFORD*

INTRODUCTION

During the decade preceding the constitutional overhaul of trust
land management in Colorado through the passage of Amendment 16' in
1996, the Colorado State Board of Land Commissioners (hereinafter the
"Board" or the "Land Board") entered into numerous real estate transactions that opened the Board to a high level of public exposure and a great
deal of criticism. These deals ultimately led to the demise of the old way
of doing business for the Land Board. This article is a discussion of five
of these controversial transactions and their political impact. These transactions set the stage for a discussion of the solutions to the historical
problems and the possible future direction of the Land Board.
I. HISTORY OF THE COLORADO STATE LAND BOARD UP TO 1996
When Colorado entered the Union in 1876, the federal government
gave the state approximately 4.6 million acres of federal lands. 2 The federal government granted the largest portion of these lands for the support
of common schools (the "school lands").3 Today, the state still owns
about 3 million of those acres, as well as an additional 1.5 million acres
of mineral rights in which the state does not own the surface land.4 The
Board manages all these lands to benefit the School Trust and seven
smaller trusts, and the Board has a "fiduciary" responsibility to these
beneficiaries.5 Before the passage of Amendment 16, the Board consisted
of three full-time salaried commissioners. 6 Although neither the Colorado Constitution nor state statutes specifically directed the Board to
"maximize revenue," courts had interpreted a phrase in the Constitution,
which dealt with land sales and directed the Board to receive the "maxi*. Formerly Director of Colorado State Board of Land Commissioners. The views of the
author do not necessarily represent the views of the Colorado State Board of Land Commissioners.
I.
Colo. Dept. of State, Digest of Initiated and Referred Constitutional Amendments and
Laws
Voted Upon
by the
Electorate of Colorado
from
1964 to Present,
http://www.state.co.us/gov-dir/leg-dir/Icsstaff/research/constnl.htm. Amendment 16, which passed
in 1996, was a citizen-initiated amendment to the Colorado Constitution.
2. Sally K. Fairfax, Jon A. Souder, and Gretta Goldenman, The School Trust Lands: A Fresh
Look at Conventional Wisdom, 22 ENvTL. L. 797, 833 fig. 1 (1992).
3.
COLO. CONST. ENABLING Acr, § I (hereinafter ENABLING ACT). See also Colo. State
Land Bd., Answers to Frequently Asked Questions, http://trustlands.state.co.us/general-faq.html.
4. Fairfax, supra note 2.
5.
Colo. State Land Bd., supra note 3.
6.
Colorado
State
Land
Bd.,
Amendment
16:
An
Overview,
http://trustlands.state.co.us/amendmentI 6.html.
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mum possible amount" for acres sold, as meaning that the Board had to
obtain the highest price possible on each individual transaction. Efforts
to increase revenue for the School Trust and other beneficiaries, coupled
with a belief that-as constitutional trustees-the Board did not need to
heed the Governor, the Legislature or the citizens of Colorado, but only
its beneficiaries, led the Board into numerous highly controversial land
deals in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
A. Seven Utes
Governor Roy Romer received more letters from opponents of the
proposed Seven Utes Ski Resort in Jackson County than from any other
single issue that arose during his 12-year term as governor.7 Without
significant public process or notice, Land Board Commissioners (the
Governor's appointees) entered negotiations with a California developer
to develop a ski resort on trust land in a mountainous area in northern
Colorado, located near the top of Cameron Pass along Highway 14 between Fort Collins and Walden in an area also known as the State
Forest.8 Fred Sauer, the developer, approached the Land Board with a
plan to develop a ski resort with a large base area. 9 The Land Board pursued a deal to create ski runs and develop a base area.' 0 When the deal
came to light in the press and public pressure began to mount, the Board
scheduled public meetings; the comments overwhelmingly opposed the
deal.
Opponents of the development cited a number of concerns; speculation and insufficiency of the promised economic return to the School
Trust, high environmental degradation, and greatly diminished future
opportunities for the land due to preference for a present-day development scheme. Proponents argued that the income stream was significant
and that the project stood to have a spin-off benefit to the depressed
economy of Jackson County." The developer planned to locate the ski
area on the border between economically distressed Jackson County, a
county of less than 1,500 people, and Larimer County, a populous and
booming northern Front Range county. Many residents of Jackson
County perceived the development as an economic opportunity. 12 The
residents of Larimer County viewed the development as a destruction of
a natural resource without reasonable due diligence and public comment.

7.
Interview with Doug Young, Environmental Policy Director for Governor Roy Romer in
Denver, Colorado (January 20, 1998).
8.

See Gould North Park Ski Proposal, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Aug. 19, 1993, at 10A.

9.

See Kevin McCullen, Resort Proposal Stirs Fears, ROCKY MTN.NEWS, Aug. 30, 1993, at

10A.

10.
11.

See id.
See Robert Baun, North Park Ski Resort Could Get Another Lift,FORT COLLINS

1, 1997, at A3.
See Baun, supra note 11.

COLORADOAN, Feb.

12.
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In December 1994, due to a massive letter-writing campaign and the
Governor's intervention, the Board rejected the development scheme but
not without causing an uproar about the Board's lack of public process
and behind-closed-doors deal making, as well as concern that the Board
had sacrificed long-term stewardship of state lands for short-term and
speculative gain. The opponents of the ski area proved to be major activists in the campaign to reform the State Land Board through Amendment 16.
B. Rangeview
The Land Board received the former Lowry Bombing Range, a
24,000-acre parcel adjacent to metropolitan Denver, from the Department of Defense in exchange for many small parcels of land outside of
Colorado Springs in the early 1960s. 3 The Lowry Bombing Range parcel was considered suitable for development, and the Board contracted
with land planners and water developers to pursue the maximization of
value for this asset.' 4 One of the contracts into which the Board entered
allowed for the provision of water and sewer services for the entire parcel of land.' 5 Investors created the Rangeview Metropolitan District to
provide those services. 6 However, the Board later determined that the
contract undervalued the hydrologic asset that Rangeview Metropolitan
District intended to exploit. People also criticized the Board for its lack
of sophistication and poor business judgment for embarking on the project. A series of scathing newspaper articles critical of the Board's business practices ensued and resulted in a public black eye for the old Land
Board. 8
C. Hogs
In 1989, the Land Board entered into a 50-year commercial lease
with a company called National Hog Farms for 5,500 acres of agricultural ground outside of Kersey, Colorado. The Board did not place any
environmental remediation or environmental technology restrictions on
National Hog Farms as part of the lease. At the time the parties signed
the lease, the hog farm was the largest commercial confined hog-feeding
operation in the United States. Controversy about the operation came to
the forefront because of a growing awareness, including a citizen initiative, in Colorado about environmental effects of large-scale commercial

13.
at 5A.
14.

See Dan Luzadder, Water Deal No Deal For Public, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Dec. 27, 1994,
See id.

15.

See id.

16.

See id.

17.

See generally Luzadder, supra note 13.

18.

See generally id.
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hog farms. 19 Proponents of the initiative asserted that the hog farms had
recently immigrated to Colorado since other states had begun to regulate
the farms' activities aggressively, while Colorado's law had remained
fairly silent on environmental regulation of hog-fanning activities. Additionally, National Hog Farms' site along the South Platte River was located next door to the hunting lodge of prominent Denver businessperson
Phil Anschutz. Anschutz has supported regulation of confined animalfeeding operations since the mid-1990s and has requested that the Board
take aggressive action to prevent degradation of the property on which
National Hog Farms operates.
Anschutz questioned whether the original lease was obtained
fraudulently and why the Board would choose to allow such intensive
uses on its land without close monitoring. Anschutz was the main backer
of a successful citizen initiative in 1998 to regulate hog farms. This conflict between a neighbor of Land Board land and a lessee of state trust
lands for commercial hog farming will continue to be a problem for the
Land Board.
D. 35-Acre Developments
In 1995, the Land Board entered into a contract with a developer to
subdivide the 640-acre "McCoy" parcel, in mountainous southern Routt
County, into 35-acre ranchettes. The standard reason that developers
divide tracts into 35-acre or larger parcels is to avoid local government
oversight and input into their development plans.2 ° While this avoidance
might be appropriate for private developers, the Routt County Commissioners were understandably disturbed that a state agency would undertake such an action without consulting the local government in charge of
land use and planning. Growth issues have been at the forefront in Colorado in the 1990s, and public concern with sprawl development was
heightened. In this political climate, the Land Board entered into a
contract to divest itself of a high-value property. Because of this action,
the Land Board alienated the Routt County Commissioners, as well as
many northwest Colorado citizens.
E. Eagle County
In October 1996, three weeks before the election in which Amendment 16 passed, the Land Board entered into a complicated three-way
exchange proposal to divest itself of nearly all of its lands in the state's,
and perhaps the nation's, most expensive real estate market, the Vail

19.
Colo. Gen. Assembly, Legis. Council, Colo. Gen. Assembly 1996 Ballot Proposals,
Amendment
14,
Regulation
of
Commercial
Hog
Facilities,
http://www.state.co.us/gov-dir/leg-dirlcsstaff/ballotltext- 14.htm.
20. COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-28-101(10)(c)(VII) (2001).
21. See Letters to the Post, DENV. POST, Feb. 19, 1996, at B07.
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Valley. The Land Board proposed giving complete development control
of 6,000 acres in and around the county's ski resort area to a private developer and in return receive a set dollar figure for all of its interests. The
developer received this option to develop 6,000 acres for $5,000. The
option was given to the developer by Board decision at a public meeting,
but, without any published notification of a pending transaction, it
seemed to be the crowning blow to the old Land Board's credibility. Extensive newspaper articles ran both before and after the election, contributing to the public distaste for Board process. Since that time, a similar
transaction did not survive district or appellate court review. The Colorado state courts struck down various parts of that deal as being prima
facie unconstitutional.22
F. Tension Between Communities and the fiduciary
The above examples of the historical problems that the old Land
Board encountered are examples of the tensions that can arise between
communities and a public agency that manages an asset or resource upon
which that community relies. It is tempting to chalk this up to an inherent
legal tension between a fiduciary and an indirect beneficiary or nonbeneficiary such as a local government.
In truth, however, that tension is the same whether the land or asset
is owned by a private party or by a state or federal agency. In both cases
the disposition and use of the land is, to a great extent, controlled by
valid local land use plans. Also, in both cases the developer or public
landowner must enter into a partnership with local government in order
to achieve their respective goals. The partnership, as with all partnerships, contains many tensions and will undergo transformation over time,
but it is a mandatory partnership. The partnership should be structured to
accomplish the goals of both parties: the developer or public landowner
must be treated fairly and be able to receive fair market value for the
asset should she want to dispose of it; and local governments and communities must be able to influence the project for aesthetic reasons, infrastructure issues, traffic and pollution concerns, and cultural and neighborhood character issues.
It is incorrect to say that there is a difference between a developer
and the State Land Board in the context of extracting value from assets
adjacent to or inside a community. The Land Board has a fiduciary obligation to generate income for its beneficiaries and a developer or private
landowner has a similar obligation to his or her family, stockholders, and

22.
See, e.g., E. Creek Ranch v. Brotman, 998 P.2d 46 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999) rev'd Brotman
v. E. Creek Ranch, 31 P.3d 886 (Colo. 2001). However, at press time, the State Supreme Court
ruled that the plaintiff, an owner of the Denver Post and neighbor of the subject parcel did not have
standing. Brotman, 31 P.3d. 886. The Govenor has indicated that he will use a little known statute
to condemn the property into general government ownership.
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partners. More and more, developers are engaged with local governments
because they find it easier to work in cooperation with, rather than in
opposition to, local government land use authority.
The true tension arises because of the Board's status as a public
agency and arm of state government. The Board is subject to "good government" laws that statutorily require open meetings and open records.23
In contrast, private real estate developers do not have to divulge any of
their planning activities to the public, interested parties, or competitors.
Additionally, the Board's budget is set by the Legislature.24 Statutes and
custom require annual reports to the legislature about Board activities.25
Again, private landowners may make intelligent business decisions without legislative oversight or approval of those decisions.
If the Board begins to perceive itself as a private landowner, it runs
the risk of violating principles of open government and public accountability. If the Board's self-perception shifts to a classical "public" landowner, it may not be fulfilling its responsibility to the trust beneficiaries.
The spectrum of land ownership in the United States runs from a private
land developer on one end to the National Park Service on the other. By
trying to find the fine line between its two roles, the Board inevitably
fails to meet expectations of either the public or the beneficiaries, or
both. But, by law, the Board must satisfy both of these constituencies. 26
This seemingly impossible problem caused the pre-1996 Board to overemphasize its developer role to the exclusion of good government. The
1996 constitutional amendment attempted to .correct this imbalance.27
The next several sections of this article attempt to explore that amendment, its structure, and possibilities for dealing with the tension between
the Board's two roles.
H. AMENDMENT 16 TO THE COLORADO CONSTITUTION
A. Campaignto Save Our Trust Land
Governor Romer asked his staff and the Executive Director of the
Department of Natural Resources, Jim Lochhead, to come up with a solution for the above-mentioned woes. Amendment 16 was born. The
campaign to Save Our Trust Land won a difficult campaign by a slim
margin. 8 The likely reasons for the slim win are that 1) this was a very
complicated constitutional amendment and 2) there were a great many
misperceptions about what it would and would not do. In the next several
23. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-6-402, 24-72-101 et seq. (2001).
24. COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 9(4).
25. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 36-1-148(4) (2001).
26. COLO. CONST. art IX § 10(1).
27. Amendment 16, supra note 1.
28.
See
Colo.
Dept.
of
State,
http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/main.htm.

Elections

Center,
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sections, I will attempt to outline the fundamental changes that Amendment 16 made, the misperceptions during the campaigns that continue
today about Amendment 16, and finally what Amendment 16 contributes
to the debate about land management and land use in the West.
B. OverridingRequirementsfor Management of State Trust Lands
The Colorado Constitution designates the State Land Board as the
entity responsible for receiving all lands granted to the state by the federal government. 29 The Constitution provides that the Board
shall serve as the trustee for the lands granted to the state in public
trust by the federal government, lands acquired in lieu thereof, and
additional lands held by the board in public trust. It shall have the
duty to manage, control, and dispose of such lands in accordance with
the purposes for which said grants of land were made and section 10
of this article IX ....30

Consistent with the Colorado Enabling Act under which the federal government granted lands to Colorado at statehood, 3' the Colorado Constitution and the statutory direction for these and other lands granted prior
to statehood, the State Land Board serves as trustee for eight separate
land trusts with specific beneficiaries as follows:
School Trust: section 16 and 36 in every township "for the support
of common schools" with the proceeds of any sales of such lands deposited into "a permanent school fund, the interest of which [must] be expended in the support of common schools., 32 Current acres: 2,640,368
surface and mineral; 1,007,385 mineral only. 33 The State Treasurer manages money currently amounting to approximately $299 million
from the
34
sale of land and from royalties from mineral development.
Public Building Trust: "[F]ifty entire sections of the unappropriated public lands .... selected and located by

. .

. the legislature for the

purpose of erectingpublic buildings at the capital ... for legislative and
judicial purposes."- Current acres: 935 surface and mineral; 12 mineral
only.36

29.
30.

COLO. CONST. art IX § 9.
Id.

31.
ENABLING ACT, supra note 3, § 1.
32.
Id. at §§ 7, 14.
33.
COLO. STATE LAND BD., STRATEGIC PLAN (June 1998),
http://trustlands.state.co.us/strategic.htm (hereinafter "STRATEGIC PLAN").
34.
COLO.
STATE
LAND
BD.,
2000
ANNUAL
REPORT,

http://trustlands.state.co.us/2000%20Annual%20Report/charts-graphs.htm

available at
available

(hereinafter

at

"2000

ANNUAL REPORT")

35.

ENABLING ACT, supra note 3, § 8.

36.
Interview with Margret Goebel, Land Record Custodian, Colorado State Land Board, in
Denver, Colo. (Jan. 20, 1998).
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Penitentiary Trust: "[F]ifty other entire sections of land ... selected and located [by the legislature], ... for the purpose of erecting a
suitable building for a penitentiary or state prison." 37 Current acres:
7,805 surface and mineral; 1,548 mineral only.3
University of Colorado Trust: Seventy-two sections of land, selected and located by the legislature, to "be set apart and reserved for the
use and support of a state university." 39 Current-acres: 3,681 surface and
mineral; 8,023 mineral only.g°
Saline Trust: "[A]ll salt springs ... not exceeding twelve in number, with six sections of land adjoining, and as contiguous as may be to
each .... selected by the governor" and not vested in any individual(s),
for use by the state, the cash receipts from which "shall be credited to the
parks and outdoor recreation cash fund." 4 1 Current acres: 16,583 surface
and mineral; 457 mineral only.42
Internal Improvements Trust: Five percent "of the proceeds of
the sales of agricultural public lands [in Colorado sold by the federal
government] shall be paid to [Colorado] for the purpose of making...
internal improvements," the cash receipts from which "shall be credited
to the parks and outdoor recreation cash fund. 4 3 Current acres: 130,019
surface and mineral; 85,627 mineral only. 44
Colorado State University Trust: Congressional grant of 1862,
"[an Act to apply a portion of the proceeds of the public lands to the
more complete endowment and support of the colleges for the benefit of
agriculture and the mechanic arts,"4 "for the use and benefit of Colorado
state university. 4 6 Current acres: 20,299 surface and mineral; 22,383
mineral only.47
Hesperus Trust: "[T]he property formerly known as the 'Fort
Lewis school' granted... to... Colorado [in 1910], as modified by an
act of congress [in 1916] ...The income from [both the land and mineral
rights] shall be appropriated by the general assembly and used by the
state board of agriculture first for tuition waivers at Fort Lewis college
for qualified Indian pupils . . ." with any remaining amount to be appro-

41.
42.
43.
44.

ENABLING ACT, supra note 3, § 9.
STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 33.
ENABLING ACT, supra note 3, § 10.
STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 33.
ENABLING ACT, supra note 3, § 11; COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-10-11 (2001).
STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 33.
ENABLING ACT, supra note 3, § 12; COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-10-11 (2001).
STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 33.

45.
46.

COLO. REV. STAT. § 23-32-101 (2001).
Id. § 23-32-102.

47.

STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 33.

37.
38.
39.

40.
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priated by the board of agriculture subject to legislative approval. 48 Current acres: 6,270 surface and mineral.49

The Colorado State Forest in Jackson County is the result of a land
trade with the federal government made during the early 1930s. 50 Each of
the above trusts, except Hesperus, holds an undivided percentage interest
in the whole forest acreage of approximately 71,000 acres. 5' Additionally, a separate statute imposes some additional conditions on management or disposition of the forest. 52 Finally, Jackson County School District receives
a yearly portion of the income generated from activities on
53
the forest.
The Constitution also authorizes the board to "undertake nonsimultaneous exchanges of land" provided that the purchase of lands to
complete the exchange is finished within two years of the initial sale or
disposition.54
With specific reference to state school lands, the Constitution now
provides that these lands are an "endowment of land assets. 55 The section further states that this endowment is to be "held in a perpetual, intergenerational public trust for the su6pport of public schools, which should
not be significantly diminished.",5 It further provides "that the disposition and use of [state school] lands should therefore benefit public
schools including local school districts. ",57 Through this section, the people of Colorado have expressed their will that the state lands should be
managed on a long-term basis for current and future generations.
With respect to all state trust lands, both those that are designated as
state school lands and those that are managed for other, smaller trusts,
the Constitution states "that the economic productivity of [these lands] is
dependent on sound stewardship, including protecting and enhancing the
beauty, natural values, open space and wildlife habitat" of these lands
now and for future generations.58 This provision recognizes that taking
good care of the land enhances its economic value.
The fiduciary responsibility of the Board in its role as trustee is
further defined as producing "reasonable and consistent income over

48.
49.
50.
51.

COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 23-30-114, 115 (2001).
STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 33.
Id.
Id.

52.
53.

COLO. REV. STAT. § 36-7-201 (2001).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-29-101 (2001).

54.

COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 9(7).

55.

Id. § 10.

56.
57.
58.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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time.,, 59 This provision proves that it is prudent for the board to develop a
long-term strategy for managing its trust assets. Although the Board may
be required to forego immediate short-term income opportunities that
might compromise future income streams and enhanced future value, the
provision will provide some level of certainty to trust beneficiaries that
they will receive a reliable level of income into the future.
C. The Stewardship Trust
The new Colorado Constitution directs the Land Board to establish
and maintain a long-term Stewardship Trust of 295,000 to 300,000
acres. 6° The Stewardship Trust builds upon the overall direction outlined
above. By recognizing the perpetual, intergenerational nature of the trust,
the constitutional provision acknowledges that immediate development
may not always be appropriate for all lands. In addition, the Constitution
recognizes that it is prudent to set aside a portion of the state trust lands,
in this case, about 10 percent for the future. This is similar to what most
individuals do in establishing a savings or retirement account or in estate
planning. The Stewardship Trust represents a judgment by the people of
Colorado that certain lands may be more valuable in the future through
appreciation, if both the land and the natural resources on the land are
well maintained for future use rather than sold immediately for shortterm gain.
In order for land to be designated into the Stewardship Trust, the
Board must determine "through a statewide public nomination process"
that such land is "valuable primarily to preserve long-term benefits and
returns to the state.",6 1 The amendment further provides that lands within
the Stewardship Trust will be "managed to maximize options for continued stewardship, public use, or further disposition" by protecting and
enhancing "the beauty, natural values, open space, and wildlife habitat"
on these lands.62
The Stewardship Trust operates within the general mandate to "produce reasonable and consistent income [for trust beneficiaries] over
time. 63 Therefore, the Trust is set up to preserve a valuable land base for
the future. 64 The Trust, however, is not intended to set land aside to preserve it forever in a pristine condition nor solely for open space or public
access uses. 65 The land in the Stewardship Trust will likely still generate
income, including existing uses such as grazing, crop production and

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 10.
Id. § 10(1)(b)(I).
Id.
Id.
COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 10(1).
See id. § 10(1)(b).

65.

See id.
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mineral development, to the extent that such uses can be managed in
ways that are compatible with long-term protection of the land's natural
resource values. In fact, many uses of state trust land, such as sound agriculture or wildlife recreation provided through the State Land Board's
public access program with the Division of Wildlife, seem compatible
with Stewardship Trust management goals.
D. Misperceptions
In political campaigns, the saying goes, there are a few rare moments
when the truth actually slips out. Amendment 16 should have been an
exception to that piece of political folk wisdom. There should not have
been any controversy about it. There was no effect on any existing contracts that the Land Board had issued, no rates were raised for any uses
on any Land Board lands, and there were no specific changes in use for
state lands. 66 So, the question remains. Why was there a close vote, a
great deal of controversy, and a campaign fraught with inaccuracy?
The campaigns for and against Amendment 16 tended to fix a number of misperceptions in the minds of voters, lessees and public officials.
The opponents of the amendment characterized it as: immediate free
public access to all state trust lands, instant and permanent open space
designation for all 3 million acres of trust land, a revocation of all existing leases on state trust lands-and a plunge of revenues from $24 million to $0, forcing schoolchildren to do their homework on slates by the
light of coal oil lanterns. 67 Amendment 16 backers, especially at the
grassroots level, tended to echo the first two of those scenarios-free
public access and permanent open space designation for all trust lands.68
Governor Romer, who was the main backer, fundraiser and cheerleader
for Amendment 16, was quite painstaking in his explanation of the
amendment, 69 but his voice was drowned out by the need for the proponents' campaign to convince the state's voters that Amendment 16 was a
good idea. The public debate had very little to do with the reality of
Amendment 16. This brings me to the heart of this article.
E. Legal Tensions Within the Amendment
It is apparent from the language of the Constitution that the drafters
of Amendment 16 were concerned with addressing many of the issues
brought up in Section 2 above. Additionally, they drafted an amendment
that comes close to the line of identifying other values and other benefi-

66.

See Amendment 16, supra note 1.

67.

Chris Roberts, Amendment 16 Would Change School Trust Land Management, BOULDER

DAILY-CAMERA, Oct. 14, 1996, at IC.
68.
See generally, Letters to the Post, DENV. POST, Feb. 19, 1996.

69.

Mark Louden, Report Card: Land Board Needs Reform, STEAMBOAT PILOT, May 16,
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ciaries than those enumerated by the Enabling Act. 70 Judge Ebel in his
legal opinion regarding the validity of Amendment 16 stated:
[i]n enacting Amendment 16, Colorado's voters sought to rewrite the
management principles underlying their state's school land trust,
shifting the state away from its prior focus on short-term profit
maximization toward a more sustainable approach focusing on the
long-term yields of the trust lands. We cannot say as a matter of law
that this change in management philosophy necessarily will lead to a
breach of Colorado's solemn fiduciary obligations 71arising out of the
federal trust enacted by the Colorado Enabling Act.
Additionally, the court found that reasonable and consistent income over
time is an appropriate way to define the goals of the State Land Board.7 2
The Attorney General's office in their briefs to the court made the case
an equation:
that the new language of the Constitution is essentially
73
sound stewardship equals economic productivity:
Rather than reading this provision [Section 10(1)(C)] as charging the
exclusive purpose of the school lands trust, as the plaintiffs argue, we
believe that the 'sound stewardship' principle merely announces a new
management approach for the land trust. The trust obligation, after
all, is unlimited in time and a long-range vision of how best to preserve the value and productivity of the trust assets may very well include attention to preserving the beauty and natural values of the
property.

74

What these statements from the legal authorities do not take into account
is that the total trust asset of 3 million acres is likely to be valued between $3 and $5 billion, given land values in Colorado.75 The annual
return in income, not including appreciation, is approximately $20 million, thus the return on investment on an annual basis, again not including appreciation, is between .4 and .66 percent.76 Such a calculus almost
inevitably leads to a conclusion in many peoples' minds that a better disposition of State trust lands would be their immediate sale and reinvestment into higher yielding investments such as stocks, bonds, other higher

70. Sen. Wayne Allard and Reps. Mark Udall and Scott McInnis have proposed bills which
change the statehood enabling act to align it with the Colorado Constitution. H.R. 2584, 107th
Cong.; S. 1146, 10th Cong. These bills, should they pass, will go a long way toward eliminating
some of the tensions internal to the land board.
71.
Branson Sch. Dist. v. Romer, 161 F.3d. 619, 643 (10th Cir. 1998) (hereinafter "Branson
i").
72.
73.
74.
75.

1998.
76.

Branson H, 161 F.3d at 640.
Appellee's Answer Brief at 31-34, Branson II (No. 96-B-2969).
Branson H, 161 F.3d at 638.
Interview with John Brejcha, Deputy Director of Colorado State Land Board, January 20,
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producing land assets. This is where the most cognitive dissonance occurs with respect to the land.
For a number of reasons, previous Land Boards have not been inclined to sell land over the last 120 years. When confronted with the rate
of return on an asset so absurdly small, the previous and current Boards
both point to a set of considerations that, while not necessarily economically quantifiable, certainly have an impact on the economics of such a
decision. First, the lessees of the many state lands are well organized and
have considerable political clout. The Legislature controls the Board's
annual budget and has established procedures that the Board must follow. 77 These two factors taken together lead to an obvious internal problem should such a "sell it all" scheme ever be attempted. Secondly, the
State Land Board has never been a true land management agency in the
sense of actively managing its lands. It has been a lease management
agency that relies upon lessees to conduct management activities such as
fencing, weed control, trespass control and other improvements to the
property. 78 Related to this is long-term reliance upon the ability to use
state lands as lessees use their own private lands that are adjacent to state
lands. Over 120 years a system has developed without challenge that has
created interdependency between the State Land Board and its lessees. A
destruction of this partnership would require enormous increases in staff
at the Land Board to manage the land actively.
Ill. AMENDMENT 16's ROLE IN CONSERVATION AND PRESERVATION OF
OPEN SPACE, WILDLIFE HABITAT, NATURAL VALUES AND NATURAL

BEAUTY

Each of the changes that Amendment 16 made has the potential to
positively impact natural resource values on State Trust land in Colorado. Amendment 16 changed the structure of the State Land Board,
added a set of provisions benefiting public schools, gave land banking
authority to the Board, changed its economic mandate, created a Stewardship Trust, and created a new program to encourage good stewardship
on State Trust lands.79 I'd like to discuss each of these changes, starting
with the changes that might not appear to have an obvious impact on the
preservation and conservation of natural resource values. By natural resource values, I mean the long-term health of the State Trust lands,
77.
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 36-101 et seq. (2001).
78.
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ CRS 35-5.5-110 (2001)(state agencies must control
noxious weeds on lands under their jurisdictions) and 35-5-112 (2001)(state agencies must control
pests and noxious weeds on lands under their jurisdictions); Board of Land Commissioners, Policy
2000-1 (June 16, 2000), available at http://trustlands.state.co.us/policies/policy-weed-mgt.htm
("[L]essees will be directed to aggressively control noxious weeds on all state trust lands" and "Staff

will oversee weed control efforts and educate lessees about their responsibilities to prevent
and manage noxious weed problems, and the types of assistance that are available from the
SLB and others.").
79.

See Amendment 16, supra note 1; see also COLO. CONST. art. LX, §§ 9, 10.
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which is indicated by its wildlife habitat, open space, beauty and other
natural values. Amendment 16 equates this measurement of land health
with the ability of that land to generate a reasonable income for beneficiaries in perpetuity. 80
A. Structure
The structure of the State Land Board changed from three full-time
paid "manager" commissioners to a five-person volunteer Board. 81 The
problem with the previous structure was that the Board members were
project managers first and policy experts second. As project managers,
they tended to get vested in their projects. Each Board member would
have his or her own portfolio, and the other two tended to defer to that
one person as a professional courtesy when the time came for the Board
to act in its fiduciary role as an adjudicatory body. The result was no
independent review of deals that were brought to the whole Board by one
of their co-Board members. This collegial deference may have overcome
the fiduciary responsibility in a number of cases. This decision-making
dynamic overstressed land sales and development schemes, as developers would shop their ideas to each Commissioner until they found a taker
or patron who could shepherd them through the Board process. And
Commissioners, acting as project managers, tended to measure their success by the number of deals done, rather than by the independent judgment they might exercise as a deliberative fiduciary body.
Amendment 16's solution to this difficulty was a five-person board
that meets once a month to approve larger projects and to set the bounds
within which staff may act and create policies, rules and regulations.82
The new organization functions like a Board of Directors of a corporation would. The new organization is one where the staff presents information to the Board and makes a recommendation based on that information, where proponents and opponents of a particular deal have a
chance to speak, and where the Board acts based on that record.83 Plans
to cut up rural landscapes to the benefit of the developers but not necessarily to the benefit of the school children, take a backseat when a sophisticated policy board, without a vested interest in the project, reviews
those schemes before the Land Board staff implements them.

80.

81.
82.
83.
Seeking

Id.

COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 9(1).
Id. at § 9(), (4).
Colo. State Land Bd., Board Policy No. 00-5, Policy Concerning Appeal of Decisions and
Board,
available
at
Redress
from
the

http://www.trustlands.state.co.us/policies/policy-redress.htm.

401 et seq. (2001).

See also COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-6-
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B. Education
A number of provisions in Amendment 16 benefit education
directly. 84 One problem local school districts faced under the old Board
was that they were not able to use state lands either for outdoor education
or for siting schools. 85 The old Land Board thought that to favor one district by allowing "free" activities on state land would diminish the income returns to all the districts. New provisions in the law allow the
Land Board to sell a site to a school district for the purpose of placing a
school on it at no more than fair market value and in a cooperative and
collaborative process. 86 Additionally, the Constitution now provides specifically for the Land Board to collaborate in outdoor education activities
with local school districts to provide them access to conduct their educational activities on Land Board land.87 These new provisions encourage
the Board to enter into educational siting and use agreements on lands
under their control, which will enrich education as well as provide an
additional use that relies on and pays for those natural values. This double benefit is crucial to the Board's ongoing compliance with its Enabling Act and Constitutional mandates. Although Amendment 16
changed some of the subsidiary considerations and part of the underlying
philosophy of the Board, it must still look at every transaction to ensure
that it is in the best interest (both directly, through monetary return, and
indirectly, through valuable use) of the beneficiaries.8 8
C. Non-Simultaneous Exchanges
The Constitution now grants the Land Board authority to do nonsimultaneous land exchanges, or "land banking." 89 The old Board assumed that it had this authority, but this assumption was never legally
tested or proven. It typically tried to develop valuable mountain lands in
order to purchase higher yielding assets, such as parking lots. The new
Board does not appear to be moving quickly to liquidate i's most valuable holdings; rather, it is seeking to consolidate land holdings to increase both the yield on those lands and the efficiency of management. 90
Using the tool of non-simultaneous land exchanges, this new Board will
be able to create large, economically viable blocks of land upon which
multiple uses can occur and a greater revenue stream can emanate over
time. This consolidation also offers obvious advantages to environ-

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 10(l)(a), (1)(d), (l)(e).
Amendment 16 Enhances Public-LandsStewardship, DAILY SENTINEL, Oct. 14, 1996.
COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 10 (l)(e).
Id. § 1(d).
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 36-1-101.5(6) (2001).
COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 9 (7).
Mark Louden, Report Card: Land Board Needs Reform, DENV. POST, May 16, 1996.
Id.
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mental health, since large blocks of land can sustain healthier wildlife
and plant populations and provide more open space.
Additionally, the Board's area of expertise has historically been agriculture. 92 It would make little sense to disregard this expertise; therefore,
the new Board has indicated an interest in purchasing working ranches
and leasing them to operators.93 The return on their investment for intact
ranches may be higher than the return for scattered parcels. In addition, it
believes that this will accomplish the other objectives of the Constitution:
community stability, sound stewardship, public use and protection of the
beauty, natural values, and open space, and wildlife habitat.94
D. Economics
Amendment 16 also changes the new Board's economic mandate
from a directive to obtain the "maximum possible amount therefore" to a
directive to achieve "reasonable and consistent income [from the Land
Board lands] over time. 95 This may not appear to be a legally significant
change, because under trust law, the classic "reasonable person" standards govern the Board. However, the practical effect of the change is
more dramatic and illustrates the power of the predatory nature of
Amendment 16 changes. The old Board appeared to feel the mandate to
maximize revenue required it to consider selling land to whoever walked
in the door at any time. It felt that maximizing revenue meant achieving a
market rate whenever someone offered to buy that land. The new Board
seems to have taken notice that land appreciates over time dramatically,
and has always been a good, long-term investment. The new Board has
taken the view that achieving reasonable and consistent revenue over
time allows it to care for the health of the land, and, in doing so, increase
its economic productivity and value over time.96 This, combined with its
ability to do land banking, positions the Board to be the owner of large
tracts of land containing high natural values while also producing betterthan-historic levels of income.
External forces drove the old Board's actions. Its long-range plan
seemed to consist of a strategy of "let's see how much more we can get
above this guy's initial offer. 97 The Board's recent past president, Tom
Swanson, likened the old Board to the proprietor of a candy store open
from 9-5; the busy hours are after school when the kids come in and say,

92.
93.
94.

Amendment 16 Enhances Public-LandsStewardship, DAILY SENTINEL, Oct. 14, 1996.
Id.
Id.

95.

A Yes on 16 Saves Trust Lands, DAILY CAMERA; COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 10(1).

96. A Yes on 16 Saves Trust Lands, DAILY CAMERA.
97. Preserve Colorado's lands, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Aug. 16, 1996 (stating that the
old land board had to "sell to the highest bidder.").

2001]

THE "NEW" COLORADO STATE LAND BOARD

363

"I'll have one of those, 2 of these and 7 of them." 98 Partly because of the
change in mandate language and partly because the new appointees come
from sophisticated financial backgrounds, the new Board now views
itself as investment managers with the duty to manage for the extremely
long term. It must manage values that may not return economically today, but may in the next 200 to 500 years. The Board can now be proactive rather than reactive in deciding their priorities. This takes the pressure to do transactions "on demand" off the Board and also allows it to
postpone and preserve its options on specific properties while managing
the whole portfolio of assets for reasonably increasing revenue.
E. Stewardship
Another Amendment 16 provision requires the Board to modify its
leasing structure to give incentives to persons who conduct their activities on Land Board land with great environmental sensitivity. 99 The program, Stewardship Incentives Program, aims to sustain and increase the
environmental health and natural values present on Land Board land.1 °
Until 1996, if a lessee was careful about his grazing practices and conducted his operation in a way which improved and sustained the health of
Land Board land and its carrying capacity for cattle grazing, the old
Board responding by looking at the land as though it had increased in
value, and rent should be raised. In effect, the old Board punished good
stewards of State Land Board land by raising their rent. This created a
disincentive to make improvements to leased land, or to treat it well.
Amendment 16 regards land management as an explicit equation: Sound
stewardship equals economic productivity.' 0' A corollary to this equation
is that sound stewardship also improves natural values on trust lands.
Finally, the most highly touted new Constitutional provision is
Amendment 16's Stewardship Trust.10 2 Amendment 16 directs the Land
Board to place 300,000 acres of land into a special Stewardship Trust
which it will manage for long-term productivity and to improve and en-3
hance wildlife habitat, natural beauty, natural values and open space.1
This provision anticipates continuing existing, non-conflicting uses on
Land Board land while engaging in more aggressive management to improve and manage that land's health. 1°4 Essentially, the Stewardship

98.

Interview with Tom Swanson,

former President, Colorado State Board of Land

Commissioners, Evergreen, Co., January 20, 1998.
99.
COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 10(l)(b)(fI).
100.
A Yes Vote Benefits Children, Open Space, DENV. POST, Nov. 3, 1996.
101.
Id.
102.
Id.
103.
COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 10(l)(b)(I).
104.
A Yes Vote Benefits Children, Open Space, DENV. POST, Nov. 3, 1996.
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Trust recognizes that state land105has high natural values and management
needs to enhance these values.
F. Public Process
From the above discussion about the specific incidences and transactions that motivated Amendment 16's proponents, the reader can infer
that public relations was an organizationally disregarded area for the
former Board. Amendment 16 and its accompanying legislation were
specifically designed to open up the process by which the State Land
Board makes its decisions. The old Board, in addition to receiving exparte comments on a daily basis, conducted its monthly meetings in a
very peculiar way. On the day preceding the official meeting, the old
Board conducted what it called a workshop. The workshop was actually
an unrecorded, dress rehearsal for the meeting the following day. All the
analysis, weighing and balancing the issues, and other relevant information was presented to the Board by staff during the workshop. The Board
typically discussed issues and proposals at length and then held a shorter,
more stilted, discussion during the public meeting. Thus, those not in
attendance at the workshop never fully knew on what the Board was
basing its decisions, nor were they allowed to interact with the Board
during the true decision-making process.
An excellent example of how open public process can help to preserve open space and wildlife was the Seven Utes issue mentioned
above. The Board was rapidly moving towards creating a new ski area
and large base area development with very little public input. When light
was finally shown on the process, and the public was notified, over 500
people showed up at the public meeting in Fort Collins to debate
the
10 6
merits of a ski area proposal and the Board reversed its course.
Vigorous public debate is now used to define the contours of the
Board's public issues. Even though the Board must consider, first and
foremost, the beneficiaries of the trust, those beneficiaries will benefit if
the public is educated about the Board's responsibilities and can focus on
helping the Board achieve those responsibilities while purely public values such as open space, wildlife habitat, beauty and other natural values
are advanced.
G. Tensions Between Amendment 16's New Programsand the Fiduciary
Role of the Board
The plaintiffs in the case against Amendment 16 asserted that the new
structure of the Land Board, five volunteer commissioners, was not suf-

105.
PreserveColorado's Lands, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Aug. 16, 1996.
106. Interview with Doug Young, former policy advisor to Governor Roy Romer, in Boulder,
Colo. (Oct. 9, 2001).
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ficient to protect the interests of the beneficiaries.'0 7 They asserted this
because the Amendment directed that one of each of the commissioners
have expertise in certain areas of importance to the Board.10 8 The opponents to Amendment 16 made the claim that those areas of expertise essentially gave the constituents/customers and groups a seat on the Board
with which to protect those constituent group's interests. 1°9 Judge Babcock was not convinced by this argument because the language of
Amendment 16 states that a Board member is merely to have expertise in
a particular area, and not to represent the constituent group interests related to those areas. 1o
The use and sale of lands to school districts for educational purposes,
provided for in the Amendment, is a new program that could cause legal
tension. Curiously, this program revisits a long-ago arrangement in
which the Land Board gave land for free to local school districts so that
they might place a school on the land. Most of the historic country
schoolhouses in Colorado may still be found on the comers of a section
16 or 36. The new constitutional directive mandates that the Board allow
school districts to purchase (at no more than fair market value) lands that
they require for educational purposes."' Additionally it requires the Land
Board to provide outdoor education opportunities to local schools."' The
tension here is that the State equalization formulas are designed to correct imbalances between districts with high assets and income and districts that have low assets and low income from year to year. 13 It would
be very difficult to add the value of a school district's use of State Land
Board land into that equalization formula. Additionally, many school
districts do not have Land Board lands within their district at all and
some have none that they could choose to take advantage of under these
programs. So the application of this program will almost certainly be
disparate across the school districts. How this is squared with the State's
funding scheme remains to be seen. 14 Additionally, outside the scope of
the funding scheme, traditional trust law would not have a fiduciary
trustee favor one set of beneficiaries over another. Perhaps one way of

107.

Branson H at 631.

108. Branson 1 at 642; Branson Sch. Dist. v. Romer, 958 F.Supp. 1501, 1518 (D. Colo. 1997)
(hereinafter "Branson ").
109. Branson H at 642; Branson I. at 1518.
110.
111.
112.

Branson lat 1518.
COLO. CONST. art. X, § 10(l)(e).
COLO. CONST. art. X, § 10(l)(d).

113. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-54-102 (2001).
114. Branson I at 1522.
Plaintiffs argue that the phrase 'which shall not exceed the appraised fair market value'
should be enjoined because the Board, as trustee, should never accept any less than fair
market value. First, I am not convinced that schools, as beneficiaries of the trust, cannot
be given a better price than other buyers or lessees of school lands. I need not decide that
question, however, as nothing in this section requires the Board to accept any less than
the most money it determines it can garner for a particular tract of school lands.
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calming this tension is to make the program available to all and to work
equally with all those who choose to avail themselves of it.
The Stewardship Incentives program offers another set of quandaries
for the new commissioners. Currently, the fee schedule for grazing lessees is set by multiplying the carrying capacity of a piece of land in
numbers of cattle by the regional average of the price of an animal unit
months as determined by a survey conducted by the State Department of
Agriculture.' 1 5 Then the Board discounts this rate by 35% as a credit for
the cost of management of the land. 1 6 Management activities are to include weed abatement, fencing, water development, and any other improvements needed to make the parcel productive. 1 7 The Constitution
now directs the Board to create a Stewardship Incentives Program that
will reward agricultural lessees for good stewardship by structuring the
lease and changing terms such as rate, length and other conditions to
encourage continued high levels of stewardship on state trust land."' The
Board's lessees have requested a rate structure that would give them
more of a management credit for higher levels of stewardship on state
trust land. Many worry that this is essentially giving something away for
nothing and therefore violates the fiduciary responsibility to generate
income. On the other hand, the Board does not currently differentiate
between good and bad stewards of its land. In fact, the Board penalizes
good stewards for their stewardship when the carrying capacity of their
land increases due to good stewardship by then charging the stewards a
higher rate.
Amendment 16, while it solves many problems of the Board, does not
dismiss all of the tensions that are inherent in land management. The
provisions of Amendment 16 were written in a way to push the envelope
on state trust land fiduciary law. As written, and on their face, they appear to be constitutional and have been upheld as such by the Federal
District Court and the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals." 9 Their application
will prove to be the true test of Amendment 16's constitutionality and its
practicality.
IV. IMPACTS ON MANAGING TRUST LANDS

Through the above examination of some of the problems that gave
rise to the solution embedded in Amendment 16, the examination of
Amendment 16 itself, and the explanation of Amendment 16's role in
See Colo. State Land Bd., News Release: Land Board to Consider Grazing Rate
115.
at
available
9,
1999
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Increases,
http://www.dnr.state.co.us/cdnrnews/land/1999111010013.html.
116.
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Interview with John Brejcha, Deputy Director, Colorado State Land Board, in Denver,
117.
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conservation and preservation, it may be possible to speculate on some of
the impacts that Amendment 16 may have on the practice of trust land
management. Possibly the most productive way of doing this would be to
examine several of the projects the new Board has undertaken in the 4
years since the passage of Amendment 16. From these projects, one can
discern an ethical and practical sea change in the way that the Board does
its work. The methodologies that will be discussed in this section may be
applicable to other private, public and trust land management practices
across the west. It would be presumptuous to say that these methodologies are not currently in use in land use and land management in various
ways in various agencies across the west; specifically, one can look at
the Resource Advisory Council process and various ecosystem and watershed scale management partnerships among federal, state and local
governments. However, the methodologies may prove useful to other
agencies and private individuals as people in the west struggle to come to
grips with issues such as sprawl, air and water pollution, disappearing
agricultural lands, and decreasing wildlife habitat.
This section will review three specific cases on which the Board is
currently working, discuss the philosophy of the Board in each of these
cases, reveal how that philosophy is borne out in practice and predict
what the result of each of these issues could be for both public values as
well as the trusts' interest. The three areas of initiative are: the Colorado
State Forest planning process as it unfolds after the Seven Utes controversy, the Emerald Mountain working group proposal to the Board, and
the Chico Basin Regional Ecosystem management process.
A. Colorado State Forest
1. Background
The Colorado State Forest, created in 1936 by act of the state legislature, 1 0 is about 71,000 acres of land on the east side of North Park in
Jackson County, Colorado.12 It has received heavy logging pressure over
the last fifty years, at one time being the location of the largest logging
operation in the state.122 Since the late 1950s, the State Forest has been
managed primarily for sustainable timber and grazing.123 Since the improvement of Highway 14 across Cameron Pass from a seasonal dirt road
to a year-round paved road in the 1970s, North Park and especially the
Colorado State Forest have become destinations for recreational tourism.
120.
121.

COLO. REV. STAT. § 36-7-201 (2001).
COLO. STATE LAND BD., COLORADO STATE FOREST INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT PLAN 1

(2001), available at http://trustlands.state.co.us/State%20Forest%20Pan/state-forest-plan-intro.htm
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Since the mid-1980s, the Land Board has contracted with Colorado State
Parks to manage recreational activity on the State Forest. Currently loggers, ranchers, hunters, mountain bikers, hikers, fishermen, cross-country
skiers, and wildlife enthusiasts use the State Forest.
The State Parks and the Colorado State Forest Service jointly manage the State Forest.124 Additionally, the Land Board's Northwest District Manager closely monitors activities on the forest. Following the
Seven Utes controversy described earlier, the Board created the Colorado
State Forest Advisory Committee which is comprised of twelve members, one each from the four interested agencies (State Parks, Colorado
Forest Service, State Land Board and the Division of Wildlife) and eight
Forest.
additional members from the community and users of the State
2. Board Philosophy and Direction
The Board directed the State Forest Advisory Committee to work
with all of the stakeholders and interested parties in the State Forest to
come up with a plan that would give some certainty to those parties
about future activities and longer range plans for the State Forest. Additionally, the Committee was charged with determining the appropriate
and sustainable level of revenue that the State Forest could generate for
the Board's trust beneficiaries. In essence, the Board recognized that the
State Forest was a unique large landscape for which there existed a great
deal of experience and expertise that had not been tapped during previous planning processes for the parcel. The Board created a collaborative
decision-making group comprised of parties with high levels of experience and expertise on the State Forest and directed them to come up with
a plan using that collaborative process. In 1997, the State Forest Advisory Committee, using the services of a consultant, embarked on a process of creating a master plan for the State Forest.
3. Result and Lessons
By creating a collaborative atmosphere and placing trust in a set of
experts and local stakeholders, the State Land Board has become the
recipient of a highly detailed, extremely responsible long-range management plan for the Colorado State Forest.126 This success came out of
the ashes of a breakdown of public process and rational discourse in the
Seven Utes case. The contrast between the top-down, non-consultative,
edict-style of management that characterized the Seven Utes controversy
and the bottom-up, collaborative, locally-invested process that the Advisory Committee uses cannot be more stark. On the one hand, the result
was a high-profile public failure for an embattled board that further de124.

INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 121.
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creased its credibility and engendered a radical change to its operation. In
the other case, the result so far has been a workable, sustainable, longrange multiple-use plan with buy-in from all interested parties, both into
the result and into the process that generated that result. The Colorado
State Forest Advisory Committee process may become a model to be
duplicated in other large landscape management decisions in the State
Trust lands context. It must work hard, however, to avoid the trap of becoming a captive of the interest groups that are represented on it, and to
maintain an independent and creative organic mindset about opportunities for future uses of the State Forest.
B. Emerald Mountain
1. Background
Emerald Mountain is approximately 7,000 acres of land immediately
adjacent to the town of Steamboat Springs in Routt County, Colorado, in
the northwest part of the state.127 Three or four lessees have leased this
parcel for grazing purposes for the last eighty or ninety years with no
public access to Emerald Mountain over those years. Emerald Mountain
provides the scenic mountain backdrop for the resort town. The citizens
of Routt County had always viewed Emerald Mountain as a local asset
for its agricultural operators, as well as a permanently preserved mountain backdrop to the city.
Because of escalating real estate values in and around Colorado's ski
towns, the value of Emerald Mountain for development purposes rose
dramatically during the 1980s and early 90s. With the rising real estate
values, the Board in the early 1990s felt compelled to examine the possibilities of developing residential home sites on the parcel. In order to
avert what Routt County felt would be a disaster if Emerald Mountain
was developed, the Routt County Commissioners and citizens of Routt
County adopted two strategies. The first was to support enthusiastically
Amendment 16 to the Colorado Constitution in the hope that Emerald
Mountain might become a part of the newly conceived Stewardship
Trust. The second was for Routt County to secure a planning lease with
the State Land Board to engage in a citizen participation planning process to determine appropriate uses for Emerald Mountain.
The Routt County Commissioners, and especially Commissioner
Ben Beall, convened a citizen working group to explore the various possibilities for land uses on Emerald Mountain. Routt County has a very
sophisticated geographic information system in place and was able to
generate very illustrative maps detailing forage, topography, existing
uses, and other important considerations. The planning process resulted
in the Emerald Mountain Land Use Plan, which was presented to the
127.

2000 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 34.
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Colorado State Land Board in January 1998.28 The Board felt that the
plan was deficient in a number of respects as it failed to fully and realistically address the Board's need to make economic decisions about the
parcel of land. Specifically, while the plan included some income
streams, the plan did not recognize the development value of the land. It
only off-handedly planned for the purchase of a conservation easement
and did not provide for any realistic funding source for this purchase.
The local working group went back to the drawing board and came
up with a plan to purchase Emerald Mountain in segments over a fiveyear period. 129 The possibility of a locally sponsored limited development arrangement to raise funds for the project as well as other funding
sources convinced the Board to accept the proposal.
2. Board Philosophy and Direction
When the Board agreed to the planning lease for Emerald Mountain
the directive to Routt County was not clear that the development value of
the parcel of land needed to be taken into account. Routt County also
believed that Amendment 16's Stewardship Trust provided an off-ramp
for the Board to take instead of continuing to focus on some of its economic requirements. After the passage of Amendment 16, the Board reaffirmed its fiduciary requirement to generate a reasonable amount of
income that reflected the true value of the parcel. After much back and
forth, Routt County agreed to move to a higher level of specificity on the
economic part of the land use plan for Emerald Mountain. The Board
also directed staff and Routt County to work with real estate and conservation professionals to try to achieve a creative solution to some of the
problems raised by Routt County's proposal.
3. Result and Lessons
The result of this process has been that the working group began to
understand the Board's fiduciary responsibility to generate income while
at the same time searching for creative solutions to the problems. Last
year, the working group successfully bid on and acquired the lease and
an option to purchase the property over a five-year period. The jury is
still out on Emerald Mountain, but with the greater level of understanding by the working group of the Board's responsibilities and through
creative professional input to a local citizen planning process, the result
is likely to be a far better one than before. The difficulties in making a
local activist group understand the Board's fiduciary responsibility to
generate income while at the same time searching for creative solutions
to the problems, especially after Amendment 16's campaign, make this
128.

Interview with Ben Beall, Routt County Commissioner and Chair of Working Group, in

Steamboat Springs, Colo. (Jan. 9, 1998).
129.

Id.
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process very long and arduous. The alternative is gridlock through political missteps and confrontational tactics.
C. Chico Basin
1. Background
The Chico Basin is an assemblage of parcels of State Trust land in
northeastern Pueblo County and southeast El Paso County on the southern Front Range in Colorado. 130 The total acreage owned by the State
Land Board in Chico Basin is approximately 150,000 acres. 131 In 1994,
the old Board issued a request for proposals on one of the larger parcels
of the Chico Basin in which it required a successful bidder to create a
management plan for the parcel. The successful bidder on the Chico Basin RFP of 1994 was a consortium of three individuals. The consortium
failed to live up to the requirement of completing a management plan.
The Board terminated the long-term lease, but allowed them to stay on
the ground on a year-to-year basis until a new management arrangement
could be developed.
2. Board Philosophy and Direction
In late 1997, the new State Land Board began to focus on the Chico
Basin as a chance to experiment with large landscape management and
planning. Additionally, the Board purchased an adjacent large ranch
from a long-time rancher through The Nature Conservancy ("TNC"). As
a condition of the purchase of the ranch, the Board leased it back to TNC
for 25 years, which subleased it to the long-time ranch manager. At the
time they acquired the additional parcel, the Board also asked the staff to
draft a goals statement for management of all parcels within the Chico
Basin management area. Additionally, it directed staff to work with local
residents and land use and resource experts to generate a landscape management plan for the Chico Basin. The central tenets of the goals document were: to take advantage of existing expertise and local knowledge
of the parcel, to plan for long-term sustainable multiple-use and reasonable income generation from the parcel, and to incorporate outdoor education and recreation as elements into a long-term landscape plan.
3. Result and Lessons
The Chico Basin management advisory committee met intensively
during the spring of 1998 and returned with a document detailing a set of
goals, objectives and tasks for the Chico Basin, which the Board ap-

130.
Interview with John Brejcha, Deputy Director, Colorado State Land Board, in Denver,
Colo. (May 20, 1999).
131.

Id.
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proved in August 1998.132 These goals, objectives and tasks addressed all
of the Board's goals and formed the basis for an RFP for the next manager of the Chico Basin landscape. The overlapping goal of both the
Board and the management advisory committee has been to take advantage of efficiency of management of such a large landscape and, through
the use of creative land management, to enhance the value of the property. The successful proponent for the parcel, Duke Philips, is now in his
third year of managing the Chico Basin ranch.
CONCLUSION

Amendment 16 is a fascinating departure from previous Land Board
management schemes. It has given the Board the opportunity to value
stewardship, the environment and educational opportunities on a par with
their requirement to generate revenues. It anticipates moving to another
level of land management where the health of the land and public input
are strong players in decisions. Isolated approaches rooted in a stubborn
adherence to strict fiduciary principles should be rejected in favor of
collaborative, cooperative processes. A delicate balancing act among
divergent interests may be achieved through heightened local input into
the management process. These approaches stand a greater chance of
returning benefits, current income as well as natural resource and educational values, to the trust beneficiaries by avoiding the costly and counter-productive snarls of litigation and political backlash. The eyes of the
Board's beneficiaries, the legislature, local government, lessees, and the
people of Colorado-not to mention other states' land boards and other
public land managers throughout the west-are on the State Land Board
as it implements Amendment 16 and manages Colorado's state trust
lands in the 21st century.

132.

Id.

AN EXAMINATION OF COURT OPINIONS ON THE
ENFORCEMENT AND DEFENSE OF CONSERVATION
EASEMENTS AND OTHER CONSERVATION AND
PRESERVATION TOOLS: THEMES AND APPROACHES To
DATE
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INTRODUCTION

This article surveys conservation easement enforcement and defense
decisions to date, and examines those decisions under the rubric of several general themes. The article focuses on themes influencing or driving
the opinions of courts in conservation easement enforcement and defense
actions across jurisdictional lines. These themes include issues of standing, ambiguity and the role of intent in judicial decision-making on issues of conservation easement enforcement and defense, judicial attitudes towards restrictive servitudes, the role of common law rules of real
property and contract construction and interpretation, and cost-benefit
analyses.
Part I of this article provides an overview and survey of the cases
reviewed. Part II examines the issue of standing and participation. Part
III looks at the roles of intent, common law rules of real property and
contract construction, the merger doctrine, and cost-benefit analyses in a
series of defense and enforcement opinions. Part III also includes an
analysis of a unique line of case involving the Foundation for Preservation of Historic Georgetown. In conclusion, we advise land trusts to anticipate confronting most or all of the issues raised to date in cases involving conservation easement enforcement and defense.
I. OVERVIEW AND SURVEY OF ENFORCEMENT AND DEFENSE CASES TO
DATE

For purposes of this article, we examine nineteen published opinions, the group of which resulted from an exhaustive search for enforcement and defense cases in jurisdictions throughout the United States.'

I. Friends of the Shawangunks, Inc. v. Clark, 754 F.2d 446 (2nd Cir. 1985); Nebraska v.
Rural Electrification Admin., 23 F.3d 1336 (8th Cir. 1994); Racine v. United States, 858 F.2d 506
(9th Cir. 1988); Madden v. The Nature Conservancy, 823 F. Supp. 815 (D. Mont. 1992); Gallaway
v. Idaho Forest Indus., Inc., No. 94-36-M-CCL, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21636 (D. Mont. April 22,
1996); Gallaway v. Idaho Forest Indus., Inc., No. 94-36-M-CCL, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16645 (D.
Mont. March 25, 1997); Friends of the Shawangunks, Inc. v. Clark, 585 F. Supp. 195 (N.D.N.Y.
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Our analysis also includes a minimum number of unpublished decisions,
or cases subject to appellate review. The majority of cases surveyed here
occurred in the East: New York (two), New Jersey (one), the District of
Columbia (four), Massachusetts (three), Connecticut (three), New Hampshire (one), Vermont (one), and Pennsylvania (one).2 This finding is
logical because landowners and land trusts in the East have been using
conservation easements for a longer period of time than any other part of
the country. 3 Of the cases brought in the Midwest/West, three examined
take place in federal court.4 Only two of the Eastern cases analyzed occurred in federal court,5 and Natale was brought only after after the landowners lost soundly in state court in Pennsylvania after a decade of proceedings.6 In Madden and Gallaway, Montana state law applied to the
claims at issue, and while the Natale case ostensibly posed some federal
questions, the court rejected those claims.7
Landowners trying to invalidate the deed restrictions or servitudes
on their property initiated three of the cases reviewed; we refer to these
as defense cases because the grantee of the deed restriction is defending

1984); Natale v. Schwartz, No. 98-3298, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18933 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 1999);
Sagalyn v. Found. for the Pres. of Historic Georgetown, 691 A.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Bagley v.
Found. for the Pres. of Historic Georgetown, 647 A.2d 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Found. for the Pres. of
Historic Georgetown v. Arnold, 651 A.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Acheson v. Sheaffer, 520 A.2d 318
(D.C. Cir. 1987); Southbury Land Trust, Inc. v. Andricovich, 757 A.2d 1263 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000);
Burgess v. Breakell, No. 95-0068033, 1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2290 (Conn. Aug. 7, 1995); Harris
v. Pease, 66 A.2d 590 (Conn. 1949); Goldmuntz v. Chilmark, 651 N.E.2d 864 (Mass. App. Ct.
1995); Knowles v. Codex Corp., 426 N.E.2d 734 (Mass. Ct. App. 1981); Bennett v. Comm'r of Food
and Agric., 576 N.E.2d 1365 (Mass. 1991); New Hampshire v. Rattee, 761 A.2d 1076 (N.H. 2000);
Redwood Constr. Corp. v. Doombosch, 670 N.Y.S.2d 560 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); Redwood Constr.
Corp. v. Doornbosch, 655 N.Y.S.2d 655 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997); Friends of the Shawangunks, Inc. v.
Knowlton, 64 N.Y.2d 387 (N.Y. 1985); Friends of the Shawangunks, Inc. v. Knowlton, 475
N.Y.S.2d 910 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984); Smith v. United States, 979 F. Supp. 279 (D. VT 1997).
2. Id.
3.
See Julie Ann Gustanski, Protecting the Land: Conservation Easements, Voluntary
Actions, and Private Lands, in PROTECTING THE LAND: CONSERVATION EASEMENTS PAST, PRESENT

AND FUTURE 9, 17-21 (Julie Ann Gustanski and Roderick H. Squires, eds., 2000) [hereinafter,
PROTECTING THE LAND].

4.

Madden, 823 F. Supp. 815; Gallaway, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16645; Clark, 754 F.2d

446.
5. Natale, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18933, Smith, 979 F. Supp. 279.
6. Natale is a famous case involving the French & Pickering Creeks Conservation Trust. At
the state level, the Trust succeeded in obtaining court orders for the demolition of a house that
violated the conservation easement at issue in the case. The landowners refused to remove the house
so the Trust made the necessary arrangements and bulldozed the residence. Thereafter, the
lanowners filed a number of scattershot constitutional and state law claims in federal court. The
state court decisions preceding Natale are not published and the authors could not obtain the ten
years of court documents in time to include an analysis of the case in this paper.
7.
See Madden, 823 F. Supp. 815; Gallaway, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16645; Natale, 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18933.
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that tool against attack and attempting to uphold its validity. Two of the
three landowners failed to invalidate the deed restriction; one succeeded. 8
With the exception of two, in all of the cases examined, second (or
later) generation landowners owning property already encumbered by
some form of deed restriction or conservation easement initiated or defended the actions. 9 In Burgess, a neighbor brought a claim against another landowner for failing to adhere to the terms of a conservation
easement on the landowner's property; the court found the neighbor
lacked standing.' 0 In Acheson, residents and voters of a town attempted
to sue a developer for executing a development plan different from the
one they voted to approve, but the court ruled that they too lacked
standing to bring the action."
In the enforcement cases, or those in which land trusts or the creators of conservation easements, restrictive covenants, or deed restrictions
filed actions against landowners to force them to comply with the terms
of restrictions encumbering their property, the violations at issue include
construction of new dwellings on property (four),' 2 adding to existing
dwelling on property (four) 13 , subdividing property (two) 14 , logging on
property (two) 15, changing density or proposing development on property
(two) 16, creating a right-of-way across property (one) 17 , and building a
pool.' 8 In one case from the West, a landowner brought suit to determine
whether the "scenic easement" on his property precluded construction of
dude ranching facilities.' 9
It is important to note that not all of the cases involve conservation
easements per se. Some involve deed restrictions (Madden, Gallaway,
Harris),20 others agricultural restrictions or easements created by statute
(Rattee, Bennett), ' and still others involve preservation servitudes

8.

Madden, 823 F. Supp. 815; Harris, 66 A.2d 590, Gallaway, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

16645.

9. Burgess, 1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2290; Acheson, 520 A.2d 318.
10. Burgess, 1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2290.
11. Acheson, 520 A.2d 318.
Natale, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18933; Southbury Land Trust, Inc., 757 A.2d 1263;
12.
Bennett, 576 N.E.2d 1365; Rattee, 761 A.2d 1076.
Sagalyn, 691 A.2d 107; Arnold, 651 A.2d 794; Bagley, 647 A.2d 1110; Acheson, 520
13.
A.2d 318.
14.

Sagalyn, 691 A.2d 107; Acheson, 520 A.2d 318.

15.
16.
17.

Burgess, 1995 Conn. Super, LEXIS 2290; Knowles, 426 N.E.2d 734.
Harris,66 A.2d 590; Friends,754 F.2d 446.
Redwood Constr. Corp., 670 N.Y.S.2d 560.

18.

Goldmuntz, 651 N.E.2d 864.

19.
20.

Racine, 858 F.2d at 506.
Madden, 823 F. Supp. 815, Gallaway, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16645; Harris, 66 A.2d

21.

Rattee, 761 A.2d 1076; Bennett, 576 N.E.2d 1365.

590.
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(Acheson, Bagley, Arnold, Sagalyn).22 The balance of the cases involve
conservation easements (Southbury, Redwood, Clark, Goldmuntz),23 but
all concern a conservation or preservation instrument of some type.
II. STANDING AND PARTICIPATION IN DEFENSE AND ENFORCEMENT
CASES

A. Third Party Standing
When evaluating the issues of conservation and historic preservation
easements, courts have addressed in litigation the question of who can
24
participate in such actions repeatedly. In at least one case, the court
examines in detail whether a neighbor had standing to argue that the
landowner of property next door to him violated the terms of the easement to which the landowner/grantor was subject. 25 In another case, the
court determines that residents and voters harmed by misrepresentations
concerning the conservation easement agreed to by a developer lacked
standing to challenge alleged violations of the easement.
In Burgess v. Breakell, a third-party neighbor brought an action to
enforce a conservation restriction. Burgess alleged that Breakell was
violating the terms of the conservation restriction at issue by engaging in
commercial logging on the property. 27 The conservation restriction on
Breakell's land required the property to be maintained as an area of
"wild, natural, and semi-natural open space for scientific, educational,
scenic, environmental, aesthetic and cultural purposes, for the preservation of its natural features.,, 28 Breakell argued the court should dismiss
Burgess's complaint for lack of standing because the Connecticut Conservation Commission, and not Burgess, held the restriction at issue on
his property. 29
The court agreed with Breakell, finding that Burgess did not have
standing to bring the action, and pointed to Connecticut's conservation
22.
Acheson, 520 A.2d 318; Bagley, 647 A.2d 1110; Arnold, 651 A.2d 794; Sagalyn, 691
A.2d 107.
23.
Southbury, 757 A.2d 1263; Redwood, 670 N.Y.S.2d 560; Clark, 754 F.2d 446;
Goldmuntz, 651 N.E.2d 864.
24.
For example, in Redwood Construction v. Doornbosch, the court recognized the standing
rights of a contract-vendee to challenge a conservation restriction. Redwood Constr. Corp. v.
Doombosch, 248 A.D.2d 698 (1998). Doornbosch involved the holder of a conservation easement
across property with an easement of fight of way, which Redwood Construction sought to purchase
and utilize. See id. The court recognized that Redwood, as the contract-vendee, had standing to
challenge the construction and application of the conservation easement to the easement right-of-

way. See id.
25.

Burgess, 1995 Conn. Super LEXIS 2290.

26.

See id. at *1.

27.

See id.

28.
29.

Id.
See id. at *2-*3.
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restriction statutes. 30 The court expressly acknowledged that "the question of who may enforce a conservation restriction is not clearly resolved
by statutory language., 3 1 Thus, the court could have reached a much different conclusion on the issue of standing in Burgess. The court stated
that while the Connecticut legislature chose to abrogate certain common
law doctrines governing conservation restrictions, it did not specifically
abrogate an ownership requirement for standing in an easement dispute.
The language of the statutes, asserted the court, shows that the legislature, "while recognizing the public benefit that such [conservation] restrictions provide, intended to limit the enforceability of conservation
restrictions to the holder or owner of the restriction. 3 3 The court relied
on statements b' the Massachusetts Supreme Court to interpret Connecticut statutes.
In the face of unclear statutory language, the court could have looked
to federal environmental laws and cases for guidance on the issue of
standing, rather than the laws of Massachusetts. For example, the same
principles expressed in Sierra Club v. Morton and Sierra Club v. SCRAP,
wherein third-party citizens with an interest that could be harmed or impaired by the outcomes in the cases were granted standing, could have
provided the Connecticut court with an alternative approach to the
standing question in Burgess, an approach more consistent with the express purposes of the conservation restrictions at issue under Connecticut's General Statutes.35 There is little doubt that adjacent landowners
like Burgess were harmed by Breakell's commercial logging venture;
their property values were adversely affected by the activity. Further, the
logging operation likely impaired the conservation restriction's public
benefit, which was reflected in the "scenic, environmental, aesthetic and
cultural" values served by the restriction.36
One published decision, at the time of writing this article, cites
Morton to confirm standing in a suit by a third party in interest. In
Friends of the Shawangunks, Inc. v. Clark, discussed at length below in
section Ill(B), the United States District Court for the Northern District
of New York relied upon allegations in the Friends of the Shawangunks'
complaint concerning its mission statement and the adverse effects of the
proposed development at issue to conclude that the organization did have
standing to bring the action. 3 Friends of the Shawangunks asserted that

See id. at *6-*7.
30.
31.
Burgess, 1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2290 at *5.
See id. at *7.
32.
Id. at *7.
33.
See id. at *6.
34.
35.
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
36.
Burgess, 1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2290, at *1.
37.
585 F. Supp. 195, 199 (N.D.N.Y. 1984).
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it had been formed "to ensure the preservation and prudent development
of the Shawangunk Mountains" and that the development slated for land
subject to a conservation easement would "adversely affect" the use and
enjoyment
of the land by many members of the Friends of the Shawan38
gunks.
In contrast to Friends, in Knowles v. Codex Corp., the court essentially ignored the Morton and SCRAP principles altogether. In Knowles,
the court examined whether residents and voters had standing to sue a
corporation for misrepresenting its plans for a proposed development,
which also included a conservation easement, in a brochure it distributed
to all the voters of Canton, Massachusetts prior to a town meeting on the
development. 39 After voters agreed to permit development, Codex executed and recorded a plan different from that circulated to the townspeople. 40 The court found that the residents/voters failed to state a claim
against Codex or the town's conservation commission (which was joined
as a defendant) because the plaintiffs lacked standing to seek an invalidation of the town vote or an injunction for compliance with the original
plan. 41 The court stated that none of the residents or voters had standing
to pursue their claims because they did not qualify as private individuals
litigating questions of public nuisance or the wrongful use of public or
private iands under state statutes. 42
The court asserted that the specific statute establishing a conservation commission to manage and control the public's interests in the land
subject to conservation easements safeguarded the town's rights.43 The
court did not address individual resident's rights, but noted in cursory
fashion that the court in Morton and SCRAP relied upon "adversely affected or aggrieved" language in 5 U.S.C. 702. 44 The court's reference to
Morton and SCRAP is so brief that it belies the importance and relevance
of the principles in those two cases to the standing issues in cases like
Knowles. In Knowles, it is difficult to skirt the fact that the plaintiffs'
interests were adversely affected, not only by the changed development
plans, but also by the developer's conduct.4 In light of the number of
cases that we reviewed wherein courts interpret unclear state statutes
conservatively, and either ignore or avoid the standing principles set
forth in federal environmental cases, it appears state courts may fear
opening a floodgate of litigation by conferring standing on plaintiffs traditionally excluded from enforcement rights, or it may be that courts are
38.
39.
40.

Id.
See Knowles, at 735-37.
See id. at 735-36.

41.

See id. at 738.

42.
43.
44.
45.

See id. at 737.
See id. at 737-38.
Knowles, 426 N.E.2d at 738, n.13.
Id. at 735-36.
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simply reluctant to depart-from conventional common law rules holding
that only record holders of interests in land have standing to bring actions
related to those interests.
One of the noteworthy aspects of Knowles is that it appears from the
face of the court's published opinion that the defendant-developer pulled
a fast one on the community, with the tacit approval of the town's conservation commission. The defendant furnished a development map to
voters that was not adhered to upon commencement of the office park,
and demolished several historical farm buildings contra to representations made or implied in meetings with townspeople. The court addressed the defendant's back-handed actions in a footnote only:
An observant student of the plan might have concluded that at least
one of the existing buildings lay in the path of a proposed access road
to the 'campus.' An observant student of the formal instrument might
have concluded that nothing therein obligated Codex to maintain or
preserve any of the existing buildings.47
Apparently, the court expected the community to be an "observant
student" with regard to the precise language of the areement, notwithstanding Codex' s representations at town meetings. One outstanding
question in the case, which cannot be determined from the court's opinion, is why the conservation commission itself declined to challenge the
defendant's actions. The reason may be because the commission had
reviewed the agreement and understood its implications, contrary to the
perceptions and desires of community residents.
B. Ways that Land Trusts Participatein Civil Actions as Third Parties
Whether a neighboring landowner or town residents and voters have
standing to sue in a lawsuit is a different inquiry from whether a land
trust may participate in litigation, within the scope of its trust documents,
by intervening in a case to which it is not already a party. The court addresses the question of whether the trustees of a land trust have authority
under their Trust Declaration to49 engage in litigation in Nebraska v. Rural
ElectrificationAdministration.
In Rural, the court debated whether to limit the participation of the
Platte River Whooping Crane Maintenance Trust in environmental litigation involving the Grayrocks Dam and Reservoir in Wyoming and the
Missouri Basin Power Project.50 The Trust was established as part of a
settlement agreement reached in prior litigation that gave one of the par-

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 736.

Id. at 736, n.8.
Id.
Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Admin., 23 F.3d 1336 (8th Cir. 1994).
See id. at 1338.
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ties in the action an exemption to the Endangered Species Act and permitted construction of the dam and reservoir at issue in Rural.5 In its
review of whether the Trust could participate in relicensing proceedings
for Grayrock, and more broadly in proceedings related to other dams and
legal cases, the court examined the purposes set forth in the Trust Declaration. That document stated as the Trust's purpose: "to finance programs, activities, and acquisitions to protect and maintain the migratory
bird habitat in the so-called Big Bend area of the Platte River between
Overton and Chapman, Nebraska., 53 As noted by the court, the Trust
Declaration also stated that:
programs, activities, and acquisitions . shall be formulated to protect and maintain, consistent with the provisions hereof, the physical,
hydrological, and biological integrity of the Big Bend area so that it
may continue to function as a life-support system54 for the whooping
crane and other migratory species which utilize it.
The court found that the Trust Declaration did not conflict with the
specific directives, also contained in the Declaration, against participation by the Trust in influencing legislation, political campaigns, or any
litigation
other than litigation directly related to the administration of the
5
Trust.y
The court's reliance on, and deference to, the Trust Declaration underscores the importance of clear, well-defined purpose statements for
land trusts. The Rural court concluded that participation in litigation by
the Trust that bore directly on the supply of water flowing to critical
crane habitat was within the powers, duties, and administration of the
Trust. 56 The court read the Trust Declaration as clearly authorizing the
Trustees "to counteract through litigation the depletion and degradation
of the critical habitat" of the endangered whooping crane.57
When land trusts seek to participate in lawsuits, the trust's purpose
or declaration may become an issue, as in Rural, along with rules of
standing. In Smith v. United States, the court rejected the Vermont Land
Trust's (VLT) bid to intervene as a matter of right or by permission in a
lawsuit concerning a taxpayer's action for a refund of the taxes that both
the taxpayer and VLT felt were unwarranted. 8 Smith disputed the tax on
his property and the resulting refund because, he argued, the IRS failed
to recognize a reduction in the value of his property that resulted from
51.
52.
53.

See id. at 1337.
See id.
Id. at 1338.

54.

Id.

55.
56.
57.
58.

See id at 1338, 1340.
See id. at 1340.
See id.
Smith v. United States, 95 CV 195, slip. op. at 3 (D. Vt. Sept. 19, 1997).
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the imposition of the conservation easement that he had donated to
VLT.59 While VLT argued that it should be permitted to participate on
Smith's behalf because of its interest in the recognition and valuation of
the conservation easement,6 ° the court allowed VLT to participate in the
action only as a friend of the court, or amicus curiae. The court found
that VLT had neglected to address the sovereign immunity of the U.S.
government and acquire the waiver necessary for intervention.
Permitting VLT to participate as an amicus curiae in the action was
the court's way of allowing VLT to voice its position on the issues, without being a party. The court offered, "[I]n many cases, appearance as
amicus can be as effective as formal intervention. '6 2 The court made
clear that it valued the land trust's involvement by asserting, "VLT has
demonstrated to the Court both a genuine interest in the subject matter at
hand as well as expertise in the area of development rights and conservation easements. VLT63 will therefore be granted the opportunity to be
heard by this Court.,

In Smith, the court not only allowed VLT's participation, but endorsed it and specifically noted the potential value of the land trust's
contribution to the case. Land trusts should be encouraged by the court's
decision in Smith. Even if a land trust cannot intervene as a party in an
action by right or by permission, it may still be able to participate in a
meaningful way as a resource for the court as an amicus curiae.
III. THE ROLE

OF INTENT IN ENFORCEMENT AND DEFENSE CASES

Once courts resolve issues of standing and participation, they turn
next to the focal point of the dispute, often the meaning and interpretation of the documents at issue. In enforcement and defense cases concerned with the validity and/or construction of particular conservation
easements or restrictions, courts have looked beyond the plain language
in the easement or restriction at issue and, when faced with what they
characterize as an ambiguity, attempted to discern the parties' intent at
the time the parties entered into the agreement. This type of analysis appears repeatedly in opinions involving conservation documents and,

when combined with other analyses such as cost-benefit evaluations and
the role of common law rules, has a marked impact on judicial decisionmaking.

59.
See id.
60.
See id.; Motion to Intervene (Paper #6), Smith v. United States. 95 CV 195 (D. Vt. Sept.
19, 1997).
61.
See Smith v. United States, 95 CV 195, slip. op. at 1,4.
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63.

See id. at 5.
See id.
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A. Defense and Validity Actions
Courts have searched for conservation easement drafters' intent in a
trio of cases in which the parties opposed to the easement challenge the
validity and enforceability of the conservation restrictions prior owners
placed on property. 64 These are cases in which a prior or current landowner or land trust is forced to defend the validity and enforceability of
the easement or restriction on the property while the parties opposed to
the restrictions, here all second (or later) generation landowners, hope to
do away with the restrictions altogether by arguing that the original intent was not to create such a restriction in the first place.
In the first of the three, Madden v. The Nature Conservancy, the
owners of the Shining Mountain Ranch sought a declaratory judgment in
hopes of invalidating the restrictions placed on the property by The Nature Conservancy. 65 After a determination that a reservation under Montana law can create conservation servitudes, the court examined the actual language of the deed transferring the property from The Nature Conservancy to the Maddens' predecessor to determine the intent of the parties who created the original restrictions. 66
The court looked to two specific clauses in the covenants and servitudes incorporated into the deed from The Nature Conservancy. The first
stated: "It]he rights retained by the Grantor by the covenants are the following .... ,,67 and the second stated: "[a]fter title to the surface of the
land has been conveyed to a third party, then the Grantor shall retain the
68
same rights of enforcement, with the same privileges and discretions.,
The Maddens argued that conflict between the uses of the word "retain"
in the two clauses made it impossible for the second clause to have reserved conservation rights.
Avoiding what it referred to as an "overly technical interpretation of
words" to ascertain the parties' intent, the court found that "retain"
means "reserve," and that The Nature Conservancy had reserved property restrictions in its conveyance to the Maddens' predecessor, which
rights and reservations were still in effect when the deed was subsequently conveyed to the Maddens. 69 The court ruled, therefore, that The
Nature Conservancy held a valid servitude on the Shining Mountain
Ranch, which was enforceable against the Maddens.7 ° One notable aspect

64.

Madden, 823 F. Supp. 815; Harris, 66 A.2d 590; Gallaway, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

16645.

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Madden, 823 F. Supp. at 816.
See id. at 817.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 818.
See id. at 819.
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of Madden, which contrasts the case to others discussed infra, is that the
court specifically reviewed the entire document at issue to determine the
intent of the parties, and not just isolated phrases or sections.
In a second validity case, Gallaway,7 1 the parties cross-motioned for
summary judgment on the issue of whether restrictions on the subject
property were valid and enforceable. 72 Van Hook co-owned 125 acres in
Montana, which he and his co-owners sold to Gallaway and Ritter in
1975 by way of a contract that contained restrictive covenants limiting
natural resource development, specifically timber harvesting.7 3 Although
the contract for purchase contained express restrictions, the warranty
deed transferring the property did not.74 Hasstedt purchased the property
from Gallaway and Ritter in 1991, also by a contract containing restrictive language, and a deed that did not.75 Hasstedt assigned his contract
for deed to the Merritts by quitclaim deed, made subject to the express
restrictions in the contract. The Merritts sold the property to defendant
Idaho Forest Industries, Inc. ("IFI") in 1992 by a warranty deed that
stated the property was free from encumbrances except for those of record.77 IFI admitted having knowledge of the timber harvest restrictions,
but after purchasing the land promptly notified the plaintiffs that it considered the restrictions unenforceable.
Gallaway and Van Hook argued that the restrictions were valid conservation servitudes reserved pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. § 70-17102(7) 79 and, as such, could be held "in gross" in order to allow the burden on the property to run with the land even though the benefit did not
touch or concern any land. 80 IFI argued that Gallaway and Van Hook
failed to reserve such an interest in the property.8' In the alternative, IFI
asserted that any restrictions reserved by the plaintiffs were extinguished
owned the land at the same time that the
by merger because the plaintiffs
82
restrictions were placed on it.

71.
72.
73.
74.

Gallaway, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16645; Gallaway, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21636.
Gallaway, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16645, at *2.
See id. at *2.
See id. at *3.

75.

See id.

76. See id.
77. See id
78. See id.
79. The court takes pains to point out, though, that Gallaway and Van Hook originally argued
that the restrictions were restrictive covenants running with the land under §§ 70-17-201, et seq., but
that the plaintiffs subsequently conceded that the restrictions, called "restrictive covenants", failed to
place a benefit on the land at issue, or any of the tract of land that touched or concerned the property,
and so only imposed a burden on the property that did not run with the land.
80. See Gallaway, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16645, at *3-4.
See id. at *4.
81.
82. See id.
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The court concluded that the intent of the parties was to restrict logging on the property only until the purchase price for the property was
paid, and not perpetually. 3 The court found support for this position by
citing the absence of restrictive language in the warranty deed (even
though such language appeared in the contract for purchase and subsequent buyers took notice of the restrictions), which it referred to as a key
fact in the case. 84 Because the court found that a warranty deed controls
questions about the extent and nature of parties' rights after a contract for
deed terminates, and that the warranty deeds at issue contained no limiting language, the court found it to be a matter offact that the parties did
not intend the restriction on logging to run with the land.85 The court
reached this conclusion in spite of Gallaway's and Van Hook's assertions
that it was their intention to preserve the natural integrity of the property
by limiting natural resource development, timber harvesting in particular.86 Even with the original parties to the contract explaining their intent,
the court justified a contrary finding regarding the parties' intent through
the absence of limiting language in the warranty deed.87 The court stated
further that even if the warranty deed had possessed such restricting language, it would have
found the restrictions therein to be unenforceable
88
by way of merger.
Gallaway represents an instance where the court appears to determine the proper outcome of the case, and then subsequently devises the
intent of the parties in a way that supports and justifies its findings. The
court never references the actual language in the restrictions in the conveyance documents. This omission, combined with specific language in
the court's opinion, disclose the possible underlying reason for the outcome in Gallaway: loss of economic value. A "let's not lose this valuable timber" undercurrent in the magistrate's recommendation in the case
is overt; the presence of that concern in the district court's opinion is
more subtle.
U.S. Magistrate Judge Holter explained in a footnote:
These restrictions are, in substance, timber reservations designed to
prevent the harvesting of trees from the land in question. This court
recognizes that a contract reserving timber rights may be so made as
to ... reserve to the grantor a perpetual right to have the timber remain on the land .... However, because the creation of an unlimited
interest in all existing timber and all the timber to be grown in the
future severely curtails the use of the soil itself and greatly diminishes

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

See id. at * 10.
See id.
Id, at *2.
See Gallaway, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16645, at *2.
See id at *2-3.
See id. at *10.
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its value, the intention to create89 such an extensive timber interest
must be very clearly manifested.
So what Magistrate Holter appears to aver is while it is clear that Gallaway and Van Hook intended to create timber harvesting restrictions, and
IFI purchased the land with notice of those limitations, the court will not
uphold them. The magistrate relies on the merger doctrine to justify extinguishing the conservation restriction. 90 But under the circumstances,
the merger doctrine's applicability is suspect at best. The court applies
that doctrine in spite of the fact that one of IFI's predecessors entered
into a contract to purchase the land from the plaintiffs under certain
terms and conditions, a contract that called for transfer of the deed two
years from the date of the contract subject to certain reserved rights (including the restriction). 9' One explanation for the magistrate's strained
opinion on intent and the applicability of the merger doctrine is a possible underlying proverbial thorn in his side: a cost-benefit perspective on
the perceived loss of a heavily-forested parcel.92
The district court makes reference to the heavily-forested nature of
the land at issue in Gallaway.93 The court then goes on to rely on the
warranty deeds to determine "as a matter of fact that the intention of the
parties was to restrict logging only until the purchase price was paid." 94
The court so finds in spite of express language in the original conveyance
documents that it was the express intention of the parties to protect the
land's natural character and that all vegetation on the property was to
"remain undisturbed by forces other than nature." 95 The conveyance
document also conferred standing on the plaintiffs and any of plaintiffs'
heirs or assigns to bring an action for any violation of the restrictive
covenants. 96 How, then, can the district court characterize the restrictive
documents as a "temporary security device?, 97 It does so based on an
appears to be free and reasonunderlying set of values, the first of which
98
able land use, e.g. timber harvesting.
With respect to Madden and Gallaway, it is worthwhile to comment
on the merger doctrine to which the courts refer in those opinions. The
doctrine of merger operates in situations where a dominant estate benefits from, and a servient estate is bound by, a servitude. If the owner of
the dominant estate acquires title to the servient estate, the two estates
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Gallaway, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, 21636, at *20, n.8 (citations omitted).
See id. at *19.
Seeid. at*15-16.
Gallaway, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16645, at*2.
Id. at *2.

94.

Id. at *10.

95.
96.
97.
98.

Gallaway, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21636,at*3.
Id. at *2-3.
Gallaway, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16645, at *10.
Id.at*11.
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merge and the servitude is extinguished. 99 The merger doctrine is of particular importance when considering the law of conservation easements
because although a conservation easement may be imposed on a piece of
property "in gross," or without a dominant estate,10 0 some courts hold
that if the owner of an easement acquires the fee title to the eased property, the easement is extinguished.' 0 '
In addition to a common law doctrine of merger, several states provide for the extinguishment of conservation easements by merger in their
state conservation easement statutes. 0 2 Colorado and Utah are two such
states.l°3 By contrast, Mississippi and New York specifically prohibit the
extinguishment of conservation easements by merger. 10 Land trusts and
landowners in states without statutory language either specifically permitting or prohibiting termination of conservation restrictions by merger
may find themselves the vagaries of courts applying traditional common
law rules like the doctrine of merger to eradicate intended conservation
tools.10
The federal court in Montana has twice examined the validity and
enforceability of conservation restrictions in the context of Montana's
statutory merger doctrine. 1 6 Montana recognizes conservation easements
in the form of conservation servitudes reserved pursuant to Mont. Code
Ann. § 70-17-102(7). ° 7 It also recognizes, however, the doctrine of
merger in Mont. Code. Ann. § 70-17-105, which states "[a] servitude
thereon cannot be held by the owner of the servient tenement," and §
70-17-111, which states that "[a] servitude is extinguished by the vesting
of the right to 10the
servitude and the right to the servient tenement in the
8
same person."'

99. Gallaway, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21636, at * 15.
100. A servitude in gross allows the burden to run even if the benefit side does not touch or
concern any land.
101.

Gallaway, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21636; Madden, 823 F. Supp. 815.

102.

Todd D. Mayo, A Holistic Examination of the Law of Conservation Easements, in
supra note 5, at 46. For more information on merger, Mayo cites William
R. Ginsberg, The Destructibility of Conservation Easements through Merger, THE BACK FORTY,
August 1991, at 5-8, and Paul Doscher and Sylvia Bates, Merging Ownership of Conservation
Easements with Fee Interests: The Experience of the Society for the Protection of New Hampshire
Forests, THE BACK FORTY, August 1991, at 1-4. Id.
103. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-30.5-107 (2000); Utah Code Ann. § 57-18-5 (2000).
104.
See Todd D. Mayo, A Holistic Examination of the Law of Conservation Easements, in
PROTECTING THE LAND,

PROTECTING THE LAND, supra note 5, at 46.

105. See id.
at 47.
106. Gallaway, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21636; Madden, 823 F. Supp. 815.
107. The section of the code provides that "the following land burdens or servitudes upon land
may be granted and held though not attached to land ...(7) the right of conserving open space to
preserve park, recreational, historic, aesthetic, cultural and natural values on or related to land."
Mont. Code Ann. § 70-17-102(7) (2000).
108. Gallaway, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21636 at *15.
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In Madden, the landowner argued that The Nature Conservancy reserved a conservation easement on the Shining Mountain Ranch before
conveying the property and, therefore, actually granted the servitude to
itself. As a result, argued Madden, the conservation easement was extinguished by merger.109
The court disagreed. 1 ° It focused on timing and concluded that at
no time did The Nature Conservancy hold fee title and the conservation
restriction together because it "clearly" conveyed the fee to Shining
Mountain
Ranch
and reserved
the conservation
easement
simultaneously.' 11
While the court in Madden recognized a simultaneous conveyance
of restriction and fee, the court in Gallaway did not. 1 2 Although the
same court again examined the timing of the reservation of the easement
and the conveyance of fee title, in Gallaway it agreed with the

purchaser. 113

The doctrine of merger is important to note because, according to
the two federal Montana cases, if the owner of a property reserves a conservation easement in a deed prior to selling the property, the easement
may merge with the dominant estate." 4 Similarly, if a land trust, as the
holder of a conservation easement, acquires fee title to eased property,
that easement runs the risk of being extinguished, particularly in states
with statutes like Montana's, or in states where statutes are silent and
courts apply the common law doctrine of merger.'15
Following Madden and Galloway, Harris v. Pease, an early 1949
case, is the last in the trio of cases that we examined in which courts have
looked to the intent of the parties to determine a conservation restriction's validity. 1 6 There, Harris filed a declaratory judgment action 11to7
determine the validity and enforceability of a development restriction.
Harris' predecessor-in-interest, Doyle, had restricted development on

109. Madden, 823 F. Supp. 815.
110.
Gallaway, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 21636.
111.
The court states:
Clearly, if the court is to follow the dictates of the Montana Supreme Court and 'ascertain
the intent of the grantor from a consideration of the entire instrument,' it must conclude
that the reservation was made contemporaneously with the passing of title and that title to
the conservation rights and the fee estate have never been merged.
Madden, 823 F. Supp. at 816.
112.
Gallaway, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21636.
113. See discussion supra notes 70-100 and accompanying text.
114. See discussion supra notes 70-100 and accompanying text.
115.
See Todd D. Mayo, A Holistic Examination of the Law of Conservation Easements, in
PROTECTING THE LAND, supra note 5, at 46.
116. See Harrisv. Pease, 66 A.2d 590 (Conn. 1949).
117. See Harris,66 A.2d at 590.
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eight of the fifty-one acres that Harris purchased.' 1 8 Harris acquired the
land with actual knowledge of the restriction. " 9
Before Harris bought property from Doyle, Pease purchased land
from Doyle directly across from the restricted property and paid more for
20
it because of the restriction, which was of great value to her property.
The court asserted that Harris' proposed development of the eight acres
"would result in serious damage to [Pease] by interfering with the view
' 12
from her property and disturbing her privacy and quiet."
Harris argued that the restriction against building on the eight-acre
tract should not extend beyond the life of, or twenty-one years after the
death of, the grantee. 122 The court ruled against Harris, and explained that
the restriction against building in the original deed created a servitude in
the nature of an easement for the benefit of the grantee's (Doyle's) retained property (later purchased by Pease).123 The court upheld the prior
deed restriction as intended to be "a perpetual restriction."'' 24
Defendant Pease benefited from the restriction imposed by Doyle.
The eight acres provided her with an "unusually extensive and picturesque view.' 25 This description appears in the court's opinion, and may
indicate that Judge Maltbie had the opportunity to view the property at
issue. 12 6 Additional language in the opinion further reflects the court's
attitudes. The judge notes that the restricted tract was used by Doyle for
farming, and since its sale, "corn, hay and other crops have been raised
on it; and it is particularly adapted for use as an orchard."'' 27 The court
describes the surrounding country as "rural in its characteristics, sparsely
settled, and consist[ing] in the main of woodland and farms."' 8 This
kind of specificity and familiarity with respect to the land in question
may aid a party arguing for the validity and enforceability of a restriction. It certainly appears to have worked in Pease's favor before the rise
in use of conservation easements and other preservation tools.
Foreshadowing major concerns for the conservation easement
movement, the court in Harris stated specifically, "the fact that the
plaintiff's property would be of more value if the restriction were re-
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125.
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See id. at 591.
See id.
See id. at 590.
Id. at 591.
See id.
See Harris,66 A.2d. at 591.
Id. at 592.
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Id. at 590-91.
Id. at 591.
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moved is of no consequence."'' 2 9 While holding that the restriction at
issue was not against public policy nor void because it ran in perpetuity,
the court acknowledged potential issues in future cases involving land
restrictions. The court opined:
That does not, of course, mean that there may not be circumstances
which would render such restriction invalid ....

Under peculiar cir-

cumstances, it may be so contrary to public policy that the law would
hold it void, as where it is of no benefit to anyone and its enforcement
might seriously interfere with the proper development of the community. Changed circumstances, such as use of the defendant's property
for other than residential purposes, might produce a situation where
equity 0 would refuse to enforce even an appurtenant right of this na13
ture.
Judge Maltbie implies here that a cost-benefit analysis, depending
upon the circumstances in the future, might justify voiding the restriction
upheld in Harris.'31 Whether a conservation restriction interferes with
community development and whether the doctrine of changed conditions
warrants that a restriction be nullified, asked in the context of a costbenefit analysis, are threats to conservation and preservation instruments
no matter how well intended and drafted.
B. Construction and Enforcement Cases
In the same way that intent plays an important role in cases involving
the validity of easements or other restrictions, it also appears as a crucial
factor in conservation enforcement actions focused not on questions of
the validity of the agreement itself, but rather on the meaning and interpretation of provisions in conservation easements.
In Friends of the Shawangunks Incorporated v. Clark, a nonprofit
corporation and four of its members challenged a decision by the National Park Service under the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of
1965.132 The federal government provided matching funds to the state of
New York for acquisition of approximately 1400 acres in fee simple and
240 acres as a conservation easement in and around a significant state
park with a large natural lake.' 33 Friends contended that the defendants
did not fulfill their obligations under the Land and Water Conservation
Fund Act, which governed the federal government's funding, when they
decided to allow Marriott Corporation to expand a golf course and related facilities across the 240 acres subject to the conservation

129. Id. at 592.
130. Harris, 66 A.2d at 592.
131.
Id.
132. See Friends v. Clark, 585 F. Supp. 195, 196 (N.D.N.Y. 1984), rev'd, 754 F.2d 446 (2nd
Cir. 1985).
133. See Clark, 585 F. Supp. at 197.
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easement. 34 The United States District Court for the District of New
York framed the question in the case as whether a conversion would occur.1 35 The Conservation Fund Act, 16 U.S.C. § 460 1-8(0(3) provides:
"No property acquired or developed with assistance under this section
shall, without the approval of the Secretary [of
the Interior], be converted
136
to other than public outdoor recreation uses."'
The district court determined that no conversion would occur because "public, outdoor, recreation" activities would be increased by Marriott's use of the acreage. 37 The court stated that the public had no right
of access under the conservation easement, and expanded rights of access
once a golf course was constructed on the land.' 3s The court described
the mostly-private golf course as a "bonus to the public."'' 39 The court
explained that because the eased-lands were "not intended for outdoor,
public, recreational use there [could] be no conversion" under the Act. '40
In citing only a general portion of the language in the conservation
easement itself in its decision, the district court downplayed the role of
the document in the controversy. Instead, the court relied upon the language of the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act and the duties of
the Secretary. 4 Construing the term "conversion," the court opted for a
narrow, exclusive definition of outdoor public recreational use.142 Intent
of the grantor of the conservation easement played no role in the lower
court's decision. The district court referred briefly to language from the
document stating that the easement was acquired "for the purpose of, but
not solely limited to, the conservation and preservation of unique and
scenic areas .... but the court never mentions it again in its opinion.143
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district court.' 44 In doing
so, the appellate court cited considerably different provisions of the conservation easement and adopted a noteworthy tone. After reciting the
case's procedural history and applicable federal laws, the court commenced the substantive part of its ruling with the following passage:
The Shawangunks Range, located in Ulster County, New York, is
noted for spectacular rock formations, sheer cliffs, windswept ledges
with pine barrens, fast-flowing mountain streams and scenic water

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

See id. at 196.
See id. at 197.
Id.
Id. at 200.
See id.
See Clark, 585 F. Supp. at 200-01.
Id. at 200.
See id.
Id. at 201.
Id. at 197.
See Clark, 754 F.2d at 452.
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falls, as well as a series of five mountain lakes, the 'Sky Lakes.' Of
these, Lake Minnewaska is one, with extremely steep banks and
many magnificent cliffs
rising as high as 150 feet along its northern
45
and eastern shores. 1
The court then noted the surrounding landscape, which consists of
large tracts of open space, and the public use of the surrounding 22,000
acres by hikers and other limited recreational activities. 146 One interpretation of the disparity in the two courts' decision making rests upon the
elemental possibility that the district court cared not one whit for the
landscape at stake whereas the Second Circuit court from the outset of its
opinion expressed great respect and appreciation for the natural beauty of
the area at issue in the suit. This difference in values alone may account
for the different outcome at the appellate level.
The Second Circuit emphasized the purpose of the conservation
easement to conserve and preserve "unique and scenic areas" in its
opening section reciting the law of the case that the conservation easement provided that the fee owner
shall not develop or erect new facilities within the described area; alter the landscape or terrain; or cut trees but may operate, maintain and
reconstruct existing facilities within the easement area, including, but
not limited to buildings, roads, utilities and golf courses; provided
that (a) Any reconstruction shall be in the same location and utilized
for the same purpose as that which existed on the date hereof and that
such reconstructed
147 facilities shall be no larger in area than the facility
being replaced.
The lower court did not cite these provisions.
In its Discussion section, the Second Circuit explained that it interpreted public outdoor recreational uses more broadly than the district
court because of the "policies of the Department of Interior and the purposes of the statute" (the Conservation Fund Act). 148 The appellate court
interpreted public outdoor recreational uses to encompass uses not involving the public's actual physical presence on the property.149 "After
all," asserted the court, "Webster's Third New International Dictionary
(1971) defines 'recreation' as 'refreshment of the strength and spirits
after toil, . .

.'; surely

by exposing scenic vistas and serving as a buffer

zone between Minnewaska State1 Park
and developed areas, the easement
50
area provides such refreshment."

146.
147.

Id. at 447-48.
Id. at 448.
Id.
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Id. at 449.
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150.

Id.
Clark, 754 F.2d at 449.
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The court used a manual from the Department of the Interior as
support for its definition of public outdoor recreational uses.' 5' The Department's manual authorizes land acquisition for its scenic or natural
values.152 The court concedes that a surface reading of the Act indicates
that Congress intended primarily active physical recreation. 5 3 However,
the court opines, the Act itself as well as its legislative history reveal
broader intentions. 154
The court then refers to a Senate Report that mentions the need to
improve the "physical and spiritual health and vitality of the American
people. 1 55 In an era of law-making focused on cost-benefit analyses,
takings and individual property rights, a circuit court making references
to spiritual values is remarkable indeed. 156 The tone and import of the
court's opinion, which ascribes values to land that transcend the simple
notion of property as a base commodity, sets the opinion apart from most
legal doctrine. The Second Circuit concluded that the proposed amendment to the conservation easement approved by the Secretary constituted
a conversion.
"It is after all," stated the court, "a conservation fund
157
act."
In the last section of its opinion, the court expressly recognized the
time and expense invested by Marriott in the project.
And the court
confirmed that courts do not control the process of land planning and
development. 59 It noted that undertaking a private project like Marriott's
necessarily involved expenses that presumably would be recouped by
charging the ultimate consumer. 60 Of the cost-benefit argument, the
court responded,
"the court's duty remains to follow the law as written
16
and intended."' '

Likewise in Goldmuntz v. Town of Chilmark, the appeals court of
Massachusetts upheld the validity of the restrictions set forth in the conservation easement at issue there. 62 In Goldmuntz, the plaintiff applied
for a permit to build an in-ground swimming pool in an area near the
existing dwelling on the property.163 The Chilmark Conservation Commission notified plaintiff that building the pool would violate the conser151.

See id. at 450.
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Id.
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Clark, 754 F.2d at 450.
See id. at 452.

159.
160.
161.

See id
See id
Id.

162.
163.

See Goldmuntz v. Chilmark, 651 N.E.2d 864, 866 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995).
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vation easement.164 A land court judge ruled in the plaintiff s declaratory
judgment action that the proposed pool was a structure within the meaning of the easement, and not an improvement of the existing dwelling or
65
an accessory structure appropriate to certain passive recreational uses.,
The court supported its decision defining a pool as a structure by citing
to the town code, which also defined swimming pools as structures for
purposes of zoning set back requirements. 166
The appellate court's analysis begins with the issue of intent. "The
grantor's stated purpose," noted the court, was "to restrict the use of [the
property] and retain it predominantly in its natural, scenic and open condition .. ,,67 It found that the lower court had properly concluded
that
168
the grantor "wanted a tight rein kept on changes to the [plroperty."'
The conservation easement controlling the court's decision in
Goldmuntz contains specific and detailed prohibitions. To support its
ruling, the court relied on the provision in the eaFement restricting "[a]ny
surface use of the land, except for agricultural, farming, forest, outdoor
recreational or other purposes consistent with allowing the land and related areas to remain predominantly in their natural condition.' ' 69 Additionally, the court could have relied on another restriction in its decision
to reach the same conclusion barring construction of the pool: the prohibition of "[e]xcavation, dredging or removal of loam, peat, gravel, soil,
rock or0 other mineral substance in such a manner as to affect the sur17
face."'
The Massachusetts appellate court's decision is interesting in that it
cites the grantor's intent at some length even though the conservation
easement contains clear language restricting the construction of a swimming pool. A harder question for the court may have been an application
by the plaintiff to build an indoor pool attached to the existing dwelling.
Would that proposal have fallen in the category of "an improvement to
the existing dwelling" or an accessory structure? 7 1 The court noted that
it would allow a bathhouse near the existing swimming pond, for example, because it would be an accessory to a passive use of the property.' 72
In Clark and Goldmuntz, the courts cited intent and based their
opinions on specific and detailed provisions of the conservation ease-

164.
165.
166.
167.

See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

168.

Id, at 866.
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170.
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172.

Goldmuntz, 651 N.E.2d at 866.
Id. at 867.
Id.
Id. at 866.
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ments at issue. 73 The court in Rattee v. Commissioner likewise relied on
specific language of the restriction at issue, and the court used that language to determine the outcome in the action. 74 In the latter case, Rattee
defended against the claims brought against him by trying to persuade
the court that the agricultural preservation restriction (APR) that applied
to his property contained ambiguous language.175 An APR is a conservation restriction created by statute based entirely on protecting agricultural
uses of land. 176 In Rattee, the defendant purchased two parcels totaling
185 acres at a foreclosure sale. 177 The former owners had granted the
State of New Hampshire the APR. 178 After purchase, Rattee arranged for
the house on a 3.3 acre farmstead site exempt from the APR to be burned
down. 179 He then excavated a field in preparation for construction of a
5,500 square foot home with a 1,500 foot driveway, plans which would
have eliminated two acres of the property from agricultural use. 8 ° The
State informed Rattee that he
18 was violating the APR shortly after he applied for a building permit. 8
182
The court upheld the building restrictions contained in the APR.
The APR expressly required Rattee to seek prior approval for construction from the commissioner for the department of agriculture.'8 3 Rattee
argued that he did not need approval because although the APR contained an express provision mandating it, the
state statutes creating the
84
APR did not contain approval requirements.
In ruling in favor of the State, the court cited the state statute at issue:
The stated purpose of RSA chapter 36-D is to 'recognize the importance of preserving the limited land suitable for agricultural production to safeguard the public health and welfare by encouraging the
maximum use of food and fiber producing capabilities of the state's

173.
174.

See Clark, 754 F.2d at 449; See Goldmuntz, 651 N.E.2d at 866.
See Rattee v. Commissioner, 761 A.2d 1076, 1080 (N.H. 2000).

175.

See id.

176.
See Rattee, 761 A.2d at 1082; "The statutory purpose of an APR is 'to recognize the
importance of preserving the limited land suitable for agricultural production ... and to ensure the
protection of agricultural land facing conversion to non-agricultural uses." Id. N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. RSA Chapter 36-D, (Repealed 1985).
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See Rattee, 761 A.2d at 1078.
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agriculturally suitable land and to ensure the protection
of agricultural
85
land facing conversion to non-agricultural uses.' 1
"Thus," reasoned the court:
[W]hile the APR statute and deed both reserve the right to construct
'dwellings to be used for family living,' requiring prior approval for
such construction is consistent with the statutory purpose. Prior approval ensures that family dwellings will be constructed in a manner
that minimizes their impact on agricultural production
and prevents
186
potential abuse of the family dwelling exception.
In other cases, rather than examining the specific, detailed provisions of the easement or other restriction at issue, courts instead frame
the issues in a particular case in such a way as to shape the outcome of
the action. The importance of the way courts frame issues is evident in
Southbury Land Trust, Inc. v. Andricovich, in much the same way as in
Clark. 8 7 In Clark, the lower court emphasized a conventional definition
of 'public outdoor recreational activities' and virtually ignored the language of the conservation easement itself. 88 In reversing the lower court,
the Second Circuit relied on the agreement and the intent reflected there
to conserve natural and scenic areas. 89 Similarly in Southbury, the
court's decision depends upon how the court frames the issue. 9 There,
the court found that construction of an additional dwelling unit, separate
from the original residence, was consistent with the drafters' intent to
preserve a working farm. 19 1 The court disregarded express language evidencing the drafters' intent "to retain land or water areas predominantly
in their natural, scenic or open condition or in agricultural, farming, forest or open space use."' 192 The latter language also appears in the General
Statutes for Connecticut. The opinion states that the conservation easement at issue9 3was to be a conservation restriction within the meaning of
the statutes.

In spite of the specific language concerning the retention of land in
its predominantly natural condition, the court ruled that Andricovich
could construct a separate residence for family members on the
property. 94 The court writes: "The plain language of sections 2 (c) and
(b) of the conservation easement clearly allows for the construction of a
detached single-family home .

. .

. Clearly, the drafters wanted to pre-
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The provisions cited as

To restrict Parcel C to its agricultural and open space use, within Parcel C land, buildings and other structures shall be used for the following purposes and no other:
(b) A single detached dwelling for one (1) family and not more than
one (1) dwelling per lot, except as provided in subparagraph c below.
(c) An additional dwelling unit for one family in a dwelling or another building, provided that the same is used only as a residence for
one or more members of the family of persons directly employed in
the operation of the uses in subparagraph a above on Parcel C of [the
district] .... 196

The land trust argued that these provisions meant a single family
dwelling attached to or constructed within the existing house or another
existing farm building. 197 The land trust also asserted that the court failed
to consider the conservation easement as98a whole in rendering its interpretation of the above-stated provisions. 1
To support its decision that the conservation easement clearly provided for construction of a separate family dwelling, the court cited
Southbury's town code.' 99 As in Goldmuntz, the court turned, not to the
conservation easement itself for a definition consistent with the easement's intent, but to local ordinances. 2 00 The code defined dwelling unit
as a building or a part of a building, which the court essentially found
dispositive of the issue as to whether the defendant could construct a
separate building. 20 ' Finally, the court discussed the drafters' intent, concluding that they could have been more clear in the conservation easement if they wanted to restrict construction and that restricting ownership
to family members ensured preservation of the pastoral setting.202 Arguably, the court could have decided Southbury either way; the court's
finding of clear language in the conservation easement, and the court's
emphasis on the drafters' intent to preserve a working farm, as opposed
to the drafters' intention to preserve the property in its natural and open
condition, carried the day.
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The court in Redwood Construction Corporation v. Doornbosch
emphasizes not the actual language of the conservation easement at issue, but rather what it lacks. 2 °, There, plaintiff Redwood purchased and
subdivided a parcel. 204 One of its lots lacked public street access, so
Redwood sought to purchase an easement over an access way used by
defendant Doornbosch and other area property owners. 20 5 Before transfer
of the easement, Redwood learned that the Doornbosch's property was
subject to a conservation easement. 2°6 The easement "prohibited any improvements or changes to the Doornbosch property that would affect its
natural, open and scenic nature, or would cause damage to an environmentally-sensitive flood plain. 2 °7 It further provided that changes in the
use of the Doornbosch property could not be effected without the written
consent of the West Branch Conservation Association.
The court asserted that: "[h]ere, the restrictive covenants set forth in
West Branch's conservation easement do not expressly address or prohibit the proposed use of the access way at issue.,2 9 Rather, said the
court:
[T]he conservation easement expressly reserved to the grantors the
right to 'sell, give away or otherwise convey the Protected Property
or any portion or portions thereof, provided such conveyance is consistent with and subject to the terms of this Conservation Easement,'
and prohibited only those changes in use of the property 'as would be
detrimental to any significant open space interest, significant natural
habitat interest or other significant conservation
interest sought to be
' 21
protected by this Conservation Easement. 0
The court found that West Branch unreasonably withheld its consent
to plaintiffs purchase of the easement. Of note to land trusts and litigators is the court's finding in the opinion that "Redwood presented an unrebutted prima facie case that its de minimis proposed use of the Doombosch property would not be inconsistent with West Branch's conservation easement., 21' Read: likely, plaintiff hired a credible expert witness
who signed an affidavit that plaintiff submitted with its motion for summary judgment; defendants probably did not submit an expert opinion to
rebut plaintiffs expert in their response to plaintiffs motion thereby providing grounds for the court to declare that Redwood had presented "an
unrebutted prima facie case."
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Of particular interest in Redwood is the court's insistence on the
detail lacking in West Branch's easement, e.g. no specific provision barring plaintiffs easement purchase.21 2 The court seems to imply that express prohibition would have had to be present in order for the court to
find for the defendants. Significant increased traffic and widening of the
access road appear to outside analysis to be detrimental to both the open
space interest and natural habitat of the property.213
In contrast to Redwood, in Racine v. United States, the Ninth Circuit
expressly noted that the drafter of the "scenic easement" at issue could
214
have prohibited the challenged activities specifically in the document.
Racine involved a federal statute that authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to acquire "scenic easements" in the Sawtooth National Recreation Area in Idaho. 21 5 A second-generation landowner with a scenic
easement on his property brought suit to overturn the government's position that building structures for dude ranching violated the terms of the
easement.21 6 The easement provided, "[w]ith reference to 36 C.F.R. §
292.16(g)(1), it is agreed that only one residence and one tenant dwelling
are authorized within the easement area., 217 Section 292.16(g)(1) allows
structures that do not "substantially impair or detract" from the scenic,
wildlife and other natural values of the land.218 The section refers to dude
219
ranching specifically as permitted activity.
The court affirmed the lower court's interpretation of the restriction
in the scenic easement, saying there was only one way to read the provision consistently. 220 The court held that the provision meant: "only one
residence and one tenant dwelling will be permitted among the other
dude ranching facilities permitted under . . . [section 292.16(g)( 1)].,,221
Faced with seemingly contradictory, ambiguous language, the court emphasized that "it would have been easy for the Government's drafter to
place language in the deed prohibiting all dude ranching buildings ...
,,222

Although the court ruled for the plaintiff-landowner on the issue of
the construction of dude ranching structures, it upheld the lower cour't
denial of his motion for attorney fees.223 The court opined that the gov212.
213.
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215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
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ernment's interpretation of the easement was reasonable and that its position was "substantially justified. 224
C. The Georgetown Cases
A line of three cases, each decided between 1994 and 1997, litigated
by the same organization in one district's lower and appellate courts provide a unique opportunity to examine a developing series of opinions by
an appellate court dealing with issues concerning conservation and preservation easements. 25 These three cases involve Deeds of Scenic, Open
Space and Architectural Facade Easements held by the Foundation for
Preservation of Historic Georgetown (the 226
Foundation) and appealed to
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
In the three cases, the court notes that in controversies over the correct interpretation of a contract, ambiguity and the parties' intent play
key roles. 227 In these cases, where the court determines that the agreement is unambiguous and clear on its face, the court reasons that the
agreement speaks for itself.228 If the court finds that the easement document is ambiguous, the court seeks to ascertain the parties' intent by examining the document in light of the circumstances surrounding its execution, by examining any agreements or documentary evidence outside
the four corners of the agreement, and, if necessary, by applying traditional rules of contract construction.229 The court emphasizes in the
Georgetown line of cases, however, that ambiguity in the language of
deeds and contracts is to be construed in accordance with the intent of
the parties insofar
as it can be discerned from the language of the instru230
ment itself.
Bagley v. Foundationfor the Preservation of Historic Georgetown
was brought by the Foundation for the Preservation of Historic Georgetown against two homeowners (collectively "Bagley") to enforce the
terms of an easement that applied to Bagley's home. 23' The easement
prohibited Bagley from building any structure on his property, encroaching on any presently open space, or obstructing a view of the
building facade from the street without first obtaining written consent

224. Id.
225.
See Bagley v. Found. for the Pres. of Historic Georgetown, 647 A.2d 1110 (App. D.C.
1994); Found. for the Pres. of Historic Georgetown v. Arnold, 651 A.2d 794 (App. D.C. 1994);
Sagalyn v. Found. for the Pres. of Historic Georgetown, 691 A.2d 107 (App. D.C. 1997).
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. See Bagley, 647 A.2d at 1113.
229. See Arnold, 651 A.2d at 796.
230.
See Bagley, 647 A.2d at 1113; See Arnold, 651 A.2d at 796; See Sagalyn, 691 A.2d at
111-12.
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from the Foundation. 223' In late 1989, Bagley began to construct a twostory addition on the back of his residence to house new air conditioning
units. 233
-

When it learned in December 1989 of the addition Bagley was
building, the Foundation informed Bagley that he had violated the easement on his property by failing to obtain the Foundation's permission for
the construction. 234 In addition, argued the Foundation, the construction
itself violated the easement by increasing the footprint of the existing
house.235 Although Bagley acknowledged that he should have requested
permission to make changes to the house, still he asked the Foundation
for a special accommodation allowing him to keep the addition.236 The
Foundation took the position that it would consider alternative design
proposals for the house, but only after Bagley removed the addition.
Bagley refused.2 38
The Foundation filed a two-count complaint against Bagley in Superior Court in February 1991 alleging multiple violations of the
easement.2 39 The Foundation sought an injunction to force Bagley to
remove the addition, as well as declaratory and other relief including an
award of attorney fees and costs under the express terms of the
easement. 24 Bagley counterclaimed for $1 million in damages and reformation or rescission of the easement. 241 He argued, among other positions, that the Foundation had selectively and, therefore, unfairly enforced its easements.2 42
The Foundation filed a motion for summary judgment on both of its
claims.243 The trial court denied the motion in part but did order Bagley
to obtain a demolition permit to remove the addition. 244 It also awarded
attorney fees and costs to the Foundation. 45 While the appellate court
stayed the injunction against Bagley, the trial court declined to stay a
hearing on attorney
246 fees and costs. The trial court awarded the Foundation $78,304.85.
The appellate court then consolidated Bagley's first
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appeal concerning the restrictive easement
violation with his second ap247
peal on the issue of fees and costs.
On appeal, Bagley argued that the language of the easement was ambiguous. 4 The court disagreed, and refused to "create ambiguity where
none exists." It found instead that Bagley's arguments were altogether
unpersuasive.249 The court relied on what it determined to be the unambiguous language of the easement, and emphasized that the easement
expressly prohibited the building of additional structures on the property
and any extension of the existing building into open space.250 The court
concluded at the outset of its opinion that, at the very least, the easement
required Bagley to obtain prior written approval from the Foundation
before making any changes to his home's facade or its surrounding open
space. 251
One of the many arguments posited by Bagley during the course of
the litigation concerned a previous easement that he had donated to the
Foundation.25 2 In that easement, explained Bagley, only the front of the
house and property were subject to restrictions.253 Therefore, he argued,
he legitimately believed that the second easement was only pertinent to
the front of his house and property. 254 This argument is of some interest
here because in Arnold, discussed infra, the easement the landowner
granted to the Foundation contained restrictions that did apply only to the
front of the house.255 The easement in Arnold had been granted in 1980,
the easement in Bagley in 1988.256 The issues and outcomes in Arnold
and Bagley may reflect evolution in terms of easement drafting on the
part of the Foundation.
To decide Bagley, the appellate court relied upon the actual language
of the easement at issue.257 The court's holding hinged, in part, on Section 4(f) of the easement, which provided that the Foundation will "exercise reasonable judgment and care in performing its obligations and exercising its rights under the terms of this easement." 258 In response to
Bagley's contention that it was unreasonable for the Foundation to demand that he demolish his addition before any negotiations could take
place, the court noted that the Foundation could have entered the prop-
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erty and removed the addition itself.259 The fact that the Foundation refrained from exercising its harshest remedy for Bagley's violation
seemed to influence the court's ruling positively.
In addition to affirming the lower court's ruling on Bagley's violation of the easement at issue, the appellate court upheld the trial judge's
award of attorney fees and costs, citing specific language from Section
10(d) of the easement, which provided that: "[i]n the event [Bagley is]
found to have violated any of [his] obligations, [he] shall reimburse [the
Foundation] for any costs or expenses incurred in connection therewith,
including court costs and attorneys' fees. 26° In a sharp reprimand of
Bagley's scattershot tactics, the court stated, "Bagley cannot litigate tenaciously and then be heard to complain about the time necessarily spent
by plaintiff in response. 2 6' It continued unapologetically by stating:
In the present case, a clear violation of the easement agreement was
brought to Bagley's attention at an early date. It was or should have
been readily apparent that Bagley had no viable defense. Instead of
coming promptly into compliance, Bagley interposed various defenses and counterclaims, some of which (e.g. his 'due process'
claims, his 'selective enforcement' theory, and his demands for 'reformation' and 'rescission') were, in our view, patently frivolous.
Approximately two-thirds of the Foundation's billable hours were
addressed to discovery and litigation regardin 6Bagley's altogether
implausible defense theories and counterclaims.
Although the trial court reduced the Foundation's fee award for
some of the hours billed by the associate attorney on the case, both the
authorized payment of attorney fees for the two
trial and appellate courts
263
Foundation attorneys.
The court in Bagley found that the language of the easement was
unambiguous on its face. The court's strict adherence to the language of
the easement in Bagley is notable because the court does not rely on, or
abuse, the opportunity for interpretation of the parties' intent to reach a
particular decision. Of note to land trusts is the fact that even though
Bagley tried to strong-arm the Foundation by bringing myriad scattershot
claims and seeking one million dollars in damages, the court found Bagley's claims, indeed his efforts to intimidate, "altogether
implausible. ' 26
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In a decision that followed closely on the heels of Bagley, the Foundation appealed from a trial court's order granting summary judgment in
an action it brought for declaratory and injunctive relief to enforce an
easement granted by Arnold's predecessor in Foundationfor the Preservation of Historic Georgetown v. Arnold.265 The Foundation argued that
Arnold violated the terms of his easement by laterally enclosing a space
between two dormer windows on the roof of the dwelling and by building a seasonal awning across the patio at the rear of the house. 266
The court examined two clauses of the easement. The first prohibited Arnold from undertaking any "construction, alteration, or remodeling ... which would affect the exterior surfaces herein described, or increase the height, or alter the exterior faqade ... or the appearance of the
building .... 267 Section 1 of the easement defined "[t]he exterior sur-

face of improvements.., on the subject premises as those depicted in the
photographs attached ... to the easement and those improvements visible
from the front of the house., 268 Because the photos of Arnold's house
taken at the time of the donation of the easement, and the language of the
easement itself, referred to the front of the house only, the Foundation
was forced to agree that Section 1 did not prohibit Arnold's changes to
the premises. 269
The Foundation turned instead to a general, less-forceful second
clause, which provided that "[n]o extension of the existing structure or
erection of additional structures shall be permitted," and argued that the
enclosure between the windows and the patio awning extended the house
in terms of interior density in a way that violated the easement. 270 The
Foundation's argument depended upon interpretation of the meaning of
the word extension. If the court found that the term extension was ambiguous, asserted the Foundation, then the court could look to the appraisal that was prepared contemporaneously with the easement as an
indication that the parties intended to prohibit increased density in the
building's interior.
The court scrutinized the language of the document and began its
inquiry with a determination that the term extension was ambiguous.272
The court iterated that because the term was not defined in the easement,

265. See Arnold, 651 A.2d at 795.
266. See id.
267. Id. at 796.
268. Id.
269. See id. Land conservation organizations can take away one important lesson from Arnold:
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it could mean many things, and it could find no other language in the
easement to eliminate the ambiguity of word.2 73
Because the court found the term extension to be ambiguous, it
opened the door for consideration of extrinsic evidence as an indication
of the parties' intent.2 74 The Foundation argued that the contemporaneously-prepared appraisal evidenced the meaning of extension.275 The
court disagreed, finding that the appraisal did not evidence what both
parties intended at the granting of the easement
27 because it was prepared
solely by and for the grantor of the easement. 1
In rejecting extrinsic evidence, the court turned to traditional rules
of construction, which are common law rules governing contract interpretation. 277 The court cited the well-recognized rule that restrictions on
land use are to be construed in favor of the free use of land and against
the party who drafted the document. 278 The Foundation argued that this
common law rule should apply only to restrictive covenants, and not to
statutorily-created conservation and preservation easements. 279 The court
dismissed this argument as vague and unconvincing. 280 Because the
Foundation lost on its only argument for the appraisal as extrinsic evidence, it was hamstrung by common law rules of construction having
nothing to do with the intent of the parties.
An important doctrinal question raised by Arnold is whether traditional common law rules of construction related to real property restrictions should even apply in cases involving conservation easements or
restrictions. In any such easement, the intent of the parties is expressed as
preservation or conservation. Why, then, do courts like the District of
Columbia apply rules of construction that contradict the goals of the parties and the entire justification for a grantor's tax break? Arguably, the
well-recognized rule of construction that "restrictions on land use should
be construed in favor of the free use of land and against the party seeking
enforcement" has no business being recognized at all by courts determining 8enforcement
and defense disputes concerning conservation ease2 1
ments.
One court among the published opinions that we reviewed recognized this issue.282 In Bennett v. Comm'r of Food and Agriculture, the
273.
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Massachusetts Supreme Court upheld the plain meaning of an agricultural preservation restriction (APR) that conferred approval authority on
the Commissioner with respect to the location of dwellings on the property subject to the APR.283
Bennett sought to build a large, hilltop house on his 250 acre farm,
which was subject to an APR granted by Bennett's predecessor-ininterest. 284 The Commissioner of Food and Agriculture determined that
the location would cause erosion as well as the loss of about two acres of
farmland, and he offered Bennett five other possible building sites.285
Bennett filed suit and argued that the provision conferring authority on
the Commissioner was unenforceable under common law rules requiring
privity of estate or contract in order for a party to enforce a servitude.
The court responded to Bennett's argument by asserting that:
[W]here the beneficiary of the restriction is the public and the restriction reinforces a legislatively stated public purpose, old common law
rules barring the creation and enforcement of easements in gross have
no continuing force. In such a case, the appropriate question is
whether the bargain contravened public policy when it was made and
whether 28its7 enforcement is consistent with public policy and is reasonable.
In a footnote, the court explained further:
What we decide here does not, of course, endorse the enforcement of
all easements in gross. It does, however, prompt us to observe that
certain common law rules concerning the creation, validity, and enforcement of servitudes may no longer be sound
and that we are
288
willing to reconsider them in appropriate cases.
In cases involving the enforcement and defense of conservation
easements and other restrictive servitudes, courts should follow the Massachusetts Supreme Court's lead, especially when considering the relevance of traditional common law rules regarding the free use of land as
well as those rules requiring that real property limitations be construed
restrictively and against their drafters.
In keeping with its examination in Arnold, the court in Sagalyn v.
Foundationfor the Preservationof Historic Georgetown also relied on
rules of construction to reach its decision. 289 The court began its inquiry
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by focusing
on the language of the easement and whether it was ambigu290
ous.

In Sagalyn, second generation homeowners challenged the conservation and preservation easement encumbering their Georgetown property, which property was comprised of several different residential
lots. 2 9 1 The easement imposed several restrictions on the alteration, use,
division, and conveyance of the property, including a prohibition against
subdivision or conveyance of the property, except as a unit.2 92 It also
provided that in the event of violation of its covenants or restrictions, the
grantee could institute a suit for injunctive relief and recover costs and
attorney fees if it prevailed.29 3
When the Sagalyns purchased their property a conservation and
preservation easement already encumbered it. S4 Before they purchased
the property, the Sagalyns requested, and the Foundation granted, permission to construct a swimming pool. 2 95 After they purchased the property, the Sagalyns sought another waiver of the easement to construct a
one-story addition to their kitchen, which the Foundation denied. 96
Without the Foundation's knowledge, the Sagalyns applied for and
obtained a zoning change, which consisted of a new record lot designation for the property from multiple lots to a single lot of record, as a preliminary step towards securing a building permit for the kitchen addition
297
they desired. Even though the Foundation spoke in opposition to issuance of the permit at a hearing before the Commission of Fine Arts, the
Commission issued the permit to the Sagalyns anyway, without making
any findings related to the easement.298
The parties attempted to settle the dispute over the kitchen addition
on several different occasions without success. 299 At one point, the Foundation offered to let the Sagalyns replace their existing kitchen wall with
a glass wall if they would also agree to pay the Foundation's attorney
fees and costs to date, which amounted to about $1 1,000.00. 30 The Sagalyns refused. 30 1 To protect its rights with respect to a timely challenge
of the issuance of the building permit, the Foundation filed a complaint
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for declaratory and injunctive relief to enforce the easement. 3°2 The trial
court enjoined the Sagalyns from constructing any addition without the
Foundation's approval and referred the Foundation's request for attorneys' fees and costs to a mediator. 30 3 After mediation failed, the trial
court entered final summary judgment in favor of the Foundation, concluding that the Sagalyns had violated3 the
easement by having their mul4
tiple lots re-designated as a single lot. 0
At issue on appeal was the meaning of subdivide as used in the servitude, which read: "[t]he property shall not be subdivided, nor shall it
ever be devised or conveyed except as a unit." 30 5 The Sagalyns argued
that the term should be given its plain, ordinary, and usual interpretation
in accordance with Webster's Third New InternationalDictionary and
Black's Law Dictionary, which define subdivide as to divide into smaller
parts and subdivision as the division of a lot, tract, or parcel of land into
two or more lots, tracts, or parcels for sale or development. 3°6 The Foundation contended that "subdivide" is a term of art without any plain or
ordinary meaning. 307
Based upon the Historic Landmark and Historic District Protection
Act and local regulations, the court determined that "subdivide" could be
interpreted in a number of different ways.30 8 Both the Act and local
regulations defined "subdivide" to mean both the division of land and the
assembly of it. 309 Once the court determined that "subdivide" could mean
two different things, the court turned to rules of construction. 3 1° The
court cited the objective law of contracts, which states that the written
language of an agreement will govern the parties' rights unless its
meaning is unclear. 3 11 "[T]he first step in contract interpretation," asserted the court, "is determining what a reasonable person in the' 3 position
of the parties would have thought the disputed language meant.
It is hard to imagine any reasonable person defining subdivision as
anything other than a division of property into two or more smaller parcels. Leave it to the masters of legal wrangling, including both legislators
and lawyers, to come up with an assemblage version of the word subdivide. Notwithstanding the counter-intuitive meaning of subdivide in the
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District of Columbia as well as the court's previous ruling in Acheson, 3 13
the Sagalyn court held that the homeowners violated the subdivision prohibition of the conservation easement 3by
obtaining a zoning change that
1
assembled their multiple lots into two.
Having agreed with the Foundation's interpretation of the word
subdivide, the court partially upheld the lower court's $33,994.65 award
of attorney fees and costs under the express provisions of the
easement.3 15 The Sagalyns argued that the Foundation was not entitled to
fees and costs related to its claim for injunctive relief because the Sagalyns had agreed not to start construction of the addition until the dispute was resolved.31 6 The appellate court agreed with the homeowners
3
and ruled that the Foundation's injunctive relief claim was premature. 17
The court remanded the attorney fees and costs issue to the district court
for a determination of the proper amount of the award, which would be
reduced by amount of the fees and costs related to the injunctive relief
claim only.
The Georgetown cases provide the only opportunity to date to examine one court's approach to analyzing conservation and preservation
easements over time in the context of defense and enforcement actions.
We learn that if a court cannot readily assess the meaning of the document and the parties' intent, as it could not in Arnold, then a court may
turn to traditional common law rules. Because common law principles of
property as well as contract construction and interpretation are not consistent with the goals of conservation statutes, decisions wherein courts
rely on common law rules, are most often at odds with the original conservation purpose of an easement and the intent of the parties. Land
trusts enforcing and defending easements should provide evidence of the
plain meaning of the easement by pointing to clear, unequivocal, uncontradicted language in the document itself (which, of course, requires that
such language be drafted clearly), and, if necessary, by bolstering the
document's meaning with extrinsic evidence of the drafters' intent, such
as with an appraisal or baseline. Once a court has determined that it cannot devise the meaning of a document or the intent of its drafters from
the conservation easement or other restrictive document itself, then a
court may evaluate the document in terms of common law real property
and contract doctrine, where, as we have seen, anything goes.
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IV. PRELIMINARY FINDINGS FOR LAND TRUSTS

Considering what we have reviewed and looking ahead, land trusts
can and should anticipate confronting most or all of the issues raised to
date in cases involving conservation easement enforcement and defense.
Legal opinions to date spotlight themes that will arise in future litigation:
third-party standing; the role of carefully drafted purpose and intent
statements in trust documents and conservation documents alike; traditional common law rules involving real property rights and contract construction and interpretation; the merger and changed conditions doctrines; and how cost-benefit analyses may influence judicial decisionmaking.
In light of the outcomes so far in enforcement and defense cases,
conservation and preservation organizations with sound drafting practices and solid documents should feel confident. However, several strategies are worth considering. For example, can land trusts draft conservation documents designed to contract around some of the issues that have
arisen in litigation? Such qualifying language as "This conservation
easement shall not be subject to extinguishment by the doctrines of
merger or changed conditions" may provide ammunition in a challenge.
Inserting a provision such as "Any question as to the validity or interpretation of this conservation easement shall not be determined on the
basis of cost-benefit analysis" may force a court to limit its considerations in a particular enforcement or defense action in a way favorable to
land trusts.
Many creative drafting possibilities exist for anticipating future
challenges, at least in terms of traditional legal doctrine and court opinions to date. In addition to the suggestions described above, land trusts
should contemplate and implement the following, as appropriate:
0

Drafting of thorough and consistent conservation documents.

We see this principal play out in most of the cases that we analyzed
because in a civil action courts look first and foremost to the language
within the four corners of a conservation document. The more thorough
and consistent the document, the better the chance a court will uphold its
restrictions. Drafting for ambiguity, or amending a conservation document to resolve an enforcement issue, weakens a land trust's ability to
enforce restrictions and uphold the conservation values of its easements.
Particularly with regard to drafting for ambiguity, dangers arise for land
trusts because courts to date have turned to common law rules of property and contract to interpret conservation documents. Where ambiguity
exists in conservation documents, courts may apply common law rules
that further compromise a conservation document's purpose. 319

319.

See discussion supra Section I1l(C) for case law on this point.
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Inclusion of clear and unambiguous statements of intent and
purpose.

In cases involving conservation documents that courts determine are
ambiguous, the courts turn to the question of the parties' intent in executing the agreement at issue. Section HI of this paper addresses the role
of intent and the cases in that section demonstrate how important statements of intent and purpose can be in conservation documents.
*

Make deliberate choices with respect to picking battles; e.g. are
the permitted and prohibited uses in the conservation document
tied directly to the document's purpose section.

As evidenced by the cases that we examined in this paper, the
strength of conservation documents and the attitudes of a tribunal are
important considerations for a land trust evaluating its position for purposes of litigation. If a court chooses to look beyond the restrictive language in a document, or finds that language ambiguous, a clear and consistent statement of purpose tied to the prohibition a land trust seeks to
enforce is extremely useful.
*

Anticipate issues that may arise as a result of changed conditions and draft documents accordingly.

The court in Harrisv. Pease,320 stated that changed conditions in the
future could give rise to circumstances justifying elimination of the land
use restrictions at issue in the case. If the purpose of a conservation
easement is narrow, for example to preserve a crane rookery, a particular
endangered species of plant, or a wetlands area, it is important for land
trusts to try to think ahead 100 years or more to a changed landscape.
Will the purpose of the conservation easement still exist, or will the restrictions be voided by elimination of the purpose of the original easement? Is the goal long term preservation of the land or just the specific
ecological feature of the property? Although narrow purpose statements
in conservation documents aid land trusts' stewardship efforts and assist
in litigation when the particular purpose is at risk from landowner activity, a long view of the conservation effort is important and conservation
easements should contain language barring extinguishment by changed
conditions.
*

320.

In litigation, know your tribunal and provide detailed and scenic
visual images of the property at issue; before a receptive tribunal, present the multidimensional nature of land and our interaction with it, e.g. the ecological, wildlife, historical and spiritual aspects of a particular landscape; photo documentation can
be invaluable for resolving disputes.

See discussion supra Section 111(A).
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The Friends of the Shawangunks and Bagley cases, illustrate these
principles best. The maxim "a picture is worth a thousand words" applies
with double force to land use issues generally, and especially when the
integrity of a natural landscape is at issue as it so often is in conservation
easement enforcement and defense cases.
0

Be prepared in litigation to confront the possibility that a court
may apply a cost-benefit analysis to the issues.

The starkest example of this threat in the cases we examined is in
Gallaway.32 1 Also, the court in Harris references this issue specifically.
Land trusts should anticipate the cost-benefit issue in drafting their
documents, as suggested above, and, when relevant in litigation, be prepared to present a court with their own economic analyses of the benefits
of conserving land. Courts may or may not uphold the waiver of the costbenefit defense (which is the intended effect of the proposed language
stated above), but even so such provisions are worth including in conservation documents.
*

When it is appropriate and useful, do not hesitate to formally
mediate disputes and to seek legal remedies and attorney fees
and costs.

As we have seen in the cases discussed in this paper, courts generally uphold conservation documents. And courts will award substantial
attorney fees and costs, as in Bagley. Land trusts should feel confident as
a result of our findings, and be willing to consider litigation issues now
as a preventive measure, as well as to continue to improve their conservation documents.
CONCLUSION

Based upon our examination of the case law to date, land trusts
should be aware that courts are considering common law doctrines and
economic factors in their examination of conservation documents. While
courts are examining the intent of the parties, they also reject evidence of
the parties' intent and devise their own interpretations of documents.
Land trusts should prepare for defense and enforcement actions by formulating responses in these areas with the knowledge that a court may
not rely upon the land trust's testimony as to intent or the facts of a
situation, but may look elsewhere for guidance in decision-making.
In the evolving area of law on conservation easement defense and
enforcement, land trusts can look forward to court opinions that clarify
and illuminate the issues addressed so far in litigation. Land trusts should
also cast a wary eye toward our courts for opinions that may not comport
with the values and goals of the land trust conservation movement and

321.

See discussion supra Section 1I(A).
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the sincere intentions of landowners to preserve the natural, scenic and
wildlife values on their property. Many challenges lie ahead, like for
example establishing the rights of standing for third-parties in all jurisdictions to bring citizen actions to enforce conservation easements. Land
trusts and their legal counsel are definitely up to the task.

FOREST LAND TAXATION IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM:
STEWARDSHIP INCENTIVIZED
DAVID J. COLLIGAN*

INTRODUCTION

"Don't tax you, don't tax me. Tax that fellow behind the tree." 1
Chances are that fellow behind the tree is a private forest owner.2 These
woodland owners increasingly feel pressure due to property taxation and
urban sprawl. In the last century, property owners broke up large industrial forest tracts and abandoned marginal farms. Once abandoned farmland "on the hills," owners sold their tracts "for amenity values, recreational use, and in some cases, timber production." 3 The self-perception of
modern forest owners is evolving to a view of themselves as ephemeral
stewards of the land with a responsibility to enhance future enjoyment
and use of the forests.
Quietly, but steadily, this forest stewardship evolution caused or
coincided with a revolution in the state taxation of forests. A vast majority of the states changed their ad valorem tax rules 4 to encourage the forest owner to perpetuate forest land and5 develop forest management plans
utilizing sound silvicultural practices.
SUMMARY

Section I, of this article examines the historical revolution that created a different property tax scheme for forest land as it evolved during
David J. Colligan, State University of New York at Buffalo, J.D. 1977; a partner in the
*.
Buffalo, New York, law firm of Watson, Bennett, Colligan, Johnson & Schechter, L.L.P. He is a
former director of the New York State Forest Owners Association. He is also Chairman of Reforest
Visit his website at
Buffalo, an urban forestry initiative in Buffalo, New York.
www.forestrylaw.com. The author wishes to thank Amanda Fantauzzo, State University of New
York at Buffalo School of Law, Class of 2001, a publication editor of the Buffalo Law Review, for
her excellent research and assistance.
1. George F. Will, Morality and the 'Martini' Lunch, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 17, 1977, at 120.
See generally Thomas Lundmark, Methods of Forestry Law-Making, 22 B.C. ENVTL.
2.
AFF. L. REV. 783, 784 (1995) (relaying that "[sleventy-two percent of the commercial timberland in
the United Stated is in private ownership").
3.
See Hugh 0. Canham, New York State Forest Preserve, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
AMERICAN FORESTS AND CONSERVATION HISTORY 491 (Richard C. Davis ed., 1983).
4. In 1982, Siegel and Kerr found that 39 states possess laws that reduce property taxes for
forest lands. William C. Siegel and Ed Kerr, Update on Property Tax Laws, 88 AM. FORESTS 36,
37-38 (July 1982). See infra Table I, Forest Class or Current Use column shows that this number is
now 47.
5.
See infra Table I. Table I lists states that require management plans as a prerequisite to
obtaining property tax relief.
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the twentieth century. Section II reviews the constitutional underpinnings
of the Equal Protection Clause in both State and Federal Constitutions.
Section II then reviews how the courts have interpreted the Equal Protection Clause in permitting the passage of forest land taxation statutes.
Section III examines the incentives the new tax laws created, such as the
incentive to produce timber and to encourage non-timber benefits. Nontimber benefits include such benefits as wildlife, recreation, and aesthetic
appreciation. Section III also describes how to use yield taxes to more
fairly tax forest land. Section IV reviews how each state's law has tried
to balance the tension between local issues and state public policy. Finally, Table I 6illustrates the current forest taxation statutory schemes of
all fifty states.

I. A BRIEF HISTORY

OF PRIVATE FOREST LAND TAXATION

What a difference a century makes! At the beginning of the last
century, forty-one states had constitutional provisions requiring that the
states equally apply all property taxes.7 Ad valorem taxation is the term
that defines equal taxation of land based on property value.8 Therefore,
owners of forest land at the beginning of the last century expected to be
taxed based upon the relative value of their properties compared to other
similarly situated properties. However, the states often compared property forest land to farmland. But unlike farmland, where crops have a
usual rotation of one year 9 with annual income to pay property taxes,
forest land's timber has rotations sometimes exceeding one hundred
6. See infra Table I.
7.
Forty-one states have constitutional provisions addressing equality of taxation and/or ad
valorem taxation. These states are: Alabama (ALA. CONST. art. XI, § 211), Alaska (ALASKA CONST.
art. VIII, § 17), Arizona (ARiz. CONST. art.9, § 1), Arkansas (ARK. CONST. art. XVI, § 5(a),
California (CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 1), Colorado (COLO. CONST. art. X, § 3), Delaware (DEL.
CONST. art. VIll, § 1), Florida (FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 2), Georgia (GA. CONST. art. VII, § 1, 1 i1),
Idaho (IDAHO CONST. art. VII, § 5), Illinois (ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 2), Indiana (IND. CONST. art. X, §
1), Kansas (KAN. CONST. art. 11, § 5), Kentucky (Ky. CONST. § 171), Louisiana (LA. CONST. art.
VII, § 18), Maryland (MD. CONST. art. XV), Michigan (MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 3), Minnesota
(MINN. CONST. art. X, § 1), Mississippi (MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 112), Missouri (MO. CONST. art. X,
§ 3), Montana (MONT. CONST. art. VIII, § 4), Nebraska (NEB. CONST. art. VIII, § 1), Nevada (NEV.
CONST. art. X, § 1), New Jersey (N.J. CONST. Art. VIII § 1 1), New Mexico (N.M. CONST. art.
VIII, § 1), North Carolina (N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2), North Dakota (N.D. CONST. art. X, § 5), Ohio
(OHIo CONST. art. XII, § 2A), Oklahoma (OKLA. CONST. art. X, § 5), Oregon (OR. CONST. art. IV, §
32), Pennsylvania (PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1), South Carolina (S.C. CONST. art. X, § 1), South
Dakota (S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 17), Tennessee (TENN. CONST. art..II, § 28), Texas (TEX. CONST. art.
VIII, § 1-a), Utah (UTAH CONST. art. XIII, § 2), Virginia (VA. CONST. art. X, § 1), Washington
(WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 1), West Virginia (W. VA. CONST. art. X, § 1), Wisconsin (WIS. CONST.
art. VIII, § 1), Wyoming (WYO. CONST. art. I, § 28). The states without any such provisions are:
Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and
Vermont,
8.
The term "ad valorem" is defined as "a tax imposed on the value of property." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 51 (6th ed. 1990).
9.
See generally John H. Davidson, Conservation Agriculture: An Old New Idea, 9 WTR
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T. 20, 21 (1995) (illustrating the one year time period of crop rotation).
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years' ° with infrequently produced income from the timber harvest." At
about this time, the science of silviculture in this country was rapidly
developing and the highest level of government was recognizing wise
forest management. 12 In a seminal monograph appearing in Roosevelt's
Conservation Commission report in 1909, the director of the United
States Department of Agriculture, Fred Rogers Fairchild, criticized the
wisdom of applying traditional ad valorem taxation methods to forest
land. 13 Essentially, Fairchild concluded that ad valorem
taxation acted as
14
a disincentive to long-term timber management.
In 1924, Congress passed the Clarke-McNary Act "to study the effects of laws, methods, and practices upon forest perpetuation."' 5 In
1935, this Act funded Fairchild to thoroughly examine this subject and
issue another report. 16 The report concluded that the burdensome effect
of the property tax was a serious or insurmountable handicap to forest
perpetuation in private ownership (the "Fairchild Report").' Fairchild
succeeded in pointing out that the difference in timing between the payment of ad valorem property taxes and the receipt of income from timber
land caused a time bias, effectively inducing timber owners to liquidate
their investments prematurely, therefore, shortening production
rotations. 8 Fairchild also observed that the public recognized the need
for the protection that forests provide against floods, erosion, pollution
and scenic spoliation. 19 He concluded that while these are vitally important from the public point of view, they were less important from the
point of view of the private owner, as "the public interest requires not
only less severe cutting, but also as a rule, more expensive cultural operations and methods of cutting. ,,20
The report determined ad valorem property taxation of forest land
resulted in deforestation, shorter timber stand rotations, and a conversion
of use coinciding with the growth of suburban America. The ad valorem
taxation method encouraged both residential land development and the

10.
See generally Steven A. Daugherty, The Unfulfilled Promise of an end to Timber
Dominance on the Tongass: Forest Service Implementation of the Tongass Timber Reform Act, 24

ENVTL. L. 1573, 1600 n. 145 (1994) (illustrating the Forest Service's prescription of a rotation age of
approximately 100 years for timber production).
11.
See FRED ROGERS FAIRCHILD, FOREST TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES (U.S. Dep't of
Agric. Misc. Pub. No. 218, 7 (Oct. 1935); Richard W. Trestrail, Forests and the Property Tax Unsound Accepted Theory, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 347, 349 (1969).
12. THEODORE ROOSE"ELT, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 299, 323-25, 408-27, 431-35 (reintroduced

by Elting E. Morison, Da Capo Press, Inc. 1985).
13.
14.

See FAIRCHILD, supra note 11, at 4.
See FAIRCHILD, supra note 11.

15.
16.
17.
18.
19
20.

See id. at 5 (quoting from § 3 of the Clarke-McNary Act).
See id.
Seeid. at 6-10.
See id. at 7.
See id.
See id.
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creation of recreational subdivisions, greatly increasing the raw land's
value regardless of whether productive forests existed thereon. 2 The
pressures of suburban development caused forest owners to be unable to
justify growing timber under the resulting ad valorem tax burden. 22
As Fairchild observed, it was not within the public interest to penalize forest owners. 23 Most of the states realized that to strive for the
public policy goal of forest perpetuation, the ad valorem tax system had
to be modified to tax forest land at less than full market value.24 These
special tax laws were slow in coming because state constitutions had to
be changed in order to accomplish a different method of taxation. 25 State
legislatures did not pass the majority of state forest incentive tax laws
until the 1960's and 1970's. 26 Now, forty-seven states 27 have carved out
exceptions to traditional ad valorem taxation of forest lands in order to
induce both timber production and encourage the many non-timber related benefits that forests provide to the public.2 8
II. EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE AND PROPERTY TAXES
A. Application to Property Taxes
The last presidential election gave Americans a lesson in federal
constitutional equal protection. 29 The equal protection clauses contained
in the federal and in most state constitutions also apply to state property
taxes. "Perhaps the most widely accepted principle of equity in taxation
is that people in equal positions should be treated equally., 30 This principle is termed "horizontal equity". 31 Historically, the courts have left a
determination of fairness in taxation in the province of state
legislatures. 32 "[A] large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature
to determine not only what the interests of the public require, but what
21.
22.
24.

See Siegel and Kerr, supranote 4, at 36.
See id.
See FAIRCHILD, supra note 11. at 7.
See Siegel and Kerr, supra note 4, at 38.

25.

See id.

23.

26. See id. at 63.
27. See infra, Table I.
28. See id.
29. See generally Gore v. Bush, 121 S.Ct. 525, 530, 532 (2000) (holding that (1) having once
granted the right to vote on equal terms, the state may not, under the Equal Protection Clause of the
U.S. Constitution, value one person's vote over that of another by later arbitrary and disparate
treatment, and (2) when state courts order statewide recounts in Presidential election, equal
protection requires that there be at least some assurance that the rudimentary requirements of equal
treatment and fundamental fairness are satisfied).
30.
See John A. Miller, Rationalizing Injustice: The Supreme Court and the Property Tax, 22
HOFSTRA L. REV. 79, 125 (1993).

31.

See id.

32.

See William C. Cohen, State Law is Equality Clothing: A Comment on Allegheny

Pittsburgh Coal Company v. County Commission, 38 UCLA L. REV. 87, 99 (1990)
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measures are necessary for the protection of such interests., 33 Parties
have challenged perceived unjust property taxes by bringing Equal Protection cases.
B. The Ad Valorem Tax System
To review the constitutional challenges to property taxes as they apply to forest land taxation, one must start with a closer inspection of the
ad valorem taxation system. In a theoretically perfect ad valorem taxation system, a person who owns land served by the community pays
taxes to the community based on the value of the land owned. 34 In theory, those who own the most valuable property pay the most tax.35
The ad valorem taxation is a two part process first establishing the
value and secondly applying a tax rate expressed in either "mils' '36 or
cents per hundred dollars assessed value to arrive at the imposed tax.
"Traditionally, the base against which the rate is levied is the fair market
value of the property subject to the tax. 37
Fair market value for ad valorem taxation purposes requires a determination of the property's highest and best use. 8 Ensuring a high Iquality
valuation system demands highly skilled and professional staff. 9 Assessing forest land requires highly specialized appraisal skills requiring a
knowledge of land sales, timber markets, and timber measurement techniques. Often the valuation system applied by the taxing authority indicates that the property's current use as forest land is not the highest and
best use. This gives rise to the forest owner's perception that forest land
assessors are treating them unfairly. Further, there is an inherent problem
in valuing property that has not been subject to a recent arm's length
sale. n°
C. Rational Basis Standard
The level of subjectivity of the local assessor has created numerous
constitutional challenges that have proceeded through the courts all the
way to the Supreme Court of the United States.

33. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136 (1894).
34. James S. Wershow & Edward S. Schwartz, Ad Valorem Assessments in Florida -Recent
Developments, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 67,67 (1981).
35.
Id.
36. Miller, supra note 30, at 84.
37. Id.
38.
See William C. Unkel & Dean Cromwell, California's Timber Yield Tax, 6 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 831, 832 (1978).
39.
See generally INT'L ASS'N OF ASSESSING OFFICERS, STANDARD ON PROPERTY TAX
POLICY (1997), at http:www.iaao.org (representing a consensus in the assessing profession and the
objective of these standards is to provide a systematic means by which concerned assessing officers
can improve and standardize the operation of their offices).
40. Miller, supra note 30, at 85.
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In Cumberland Coal Co. v. Bd. of Revision,41 the Supreme Court
found that the local assessor assumed that all coal properties in the town
should be taxed at the same rate, regardless of remoteness or accessibility
of the parcel, costs of the operation of extracting the coal or the availability of transportation. 42 The Court found this over-simplified subjective approach was an intentional and systemic under valuation, which, if
proven, violates Federal Equal Protection. 43 The Court held a legislature
is not bound to tax every member or no member of a class. It may make
distinctions of degree when it has a rational basis for that distinction.
When subjected to judicial scrutiny, the Court must be presumed to rest
on a rational basis if there is any conceivable state of facts that would
support it. 44 We call this the "rational basis" Equal Protection test.
For over fifty-five years, the Supreme Court of the United States
consistently adhered to the deferential rational basis review in tax cases
that did not require "heightened scrutiny," that is, unless the taxation
scheme was "palpably arbitrary" or "invidious., 45 This heightened scrutiny shifts the burden to the state to prove a compelling state interest if a
"suspect classification" exists or the law impinges on a "fundamental
interest. 46
Then, in 1989, the Supreme Court of the United States decided the
Allegheny case, which held that a West Virginia tax assessor's practices
violated equal protection because certain properties received dramatically higher assessments than neighboring "comparable properties. 47
The Court found that the county assessor determined the appraised value
of the coal company's properties relying heavily on recent sale prices of
the coal company's properties which resulted in assessments thirty-five
times higher than neighboring "comps", 48 which had not generally been
tested for coal. 49 Additionally, the Court found that even though the
similarly situated properties were subjected to regular ten percent incremental increases in assessed valuation, it would have taken 500 years to
equalize assessments between the coal company's properties and neighboring lands. 50 The Allegheny Court implied that the Webster County
assessor's actions would not be subjected to constitutional review if he

41. 284 U.S. 23 (1931).
42. Cumberland Coal. Co., 284 U.S. at 24.
43. Id. at 28.
44. Id.
45.
See Robert Jerome Glennon, Taxation and Equal Protection, 58 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
261, 284-85 n.144.
46. See id. at 278 nn. 99-103.
47. Allegheny Pitt. Coal Co. v. County Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336, 342-43 (1989).
48.
"Comps" is a term of art referring to comparable properties used to compare the subject
tax parcel in order to prove or disapprove valuation fairness.
49. See Allegheny, 488 U.S. at 338, 340.
50.

See id. at 341-42.
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had followed the state guidelines and based all coal land assessments on
a "least valuable seam of mineral coal" standard.51
The Allegheny case called into question the ad valorem taxation system in general and the special exception statutes that allowed forest owners to elect to assess their forest properties based on methods other than
fair market value. 52 We did not have to wait long to find out if the Supreme Court would throw out the rational basis review of tax statutes
from the Cumberland Coal case. The Supreme Court issued its decision
in Nordingler53 in 1992, whereby the Court concluded that the acquisition cost assessment scheme of California's Proposition 13 has a rational
basis, and thus did not violate the equal protection clause.54 Nordingler
distinguished the Allegheny decision because in Allegheny an individual
local assessor who was not following state law caused the violation of
the equal protection law, while Proposition 13 is a statutory scheme the
voters of the State of California established.55
D. ForestLand Tax Statutes Challenges
The new forest land special tax classification laws do not appear to
apply the heightened standard of equal protection that was a concern
after the Allegheny decision. Before Allegheny, one state court using the
rational basis standard, held that challenging the valuation of timber land
for tax purposes required no judicial interference unless fraud or flagrantly excessive valuations showed an intention to discriminate. 56
In the 1969 class action suit Weissinger v. White, the Eleventh Circuit found an Alabama state statute unconstitutional because the ad valorem assessment rates ranged from nine to thirty percent.57 This case best
illustrates the effects of rational basis equal protection
on the changing
58
legal landscape in the field of forest land taxation. As a result, the legislature passed Amendment 373 to the Alabama Constitution which created four classes of property for taxation purposes. 59 Class Three in the
scheme was farm, timber, residential and historical property. In an attempt to further subdivide Class Three, the amendment treated farm and
timber property separate from residential and historic land. 60 In a followup case brought to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the court held
that Alabama was justified in the disparate treatment of one-half of the
51.
See Glennon, supra note 44, at 292 n.207.
52.
See id. at 304-05 n.265.
53.
Nordingler v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992).
54.
See id. at 28.
55.
See Erin A. O'Hara & William R. Dougan, Redistribution through DiscriminatoryTaxes:
A ContractarianExplanationof the Role of Courts, 6 GEO. MASON L. REv. 869, 907-08 (1998).
56.
See Powell v. Kelly, 223 So. 2d 305, 307 (Fla. 1969).
57.
Weissinger v. White, 733 F.2d 802, 804, (11th Cir. 1984).
58.
See id.
59.
See id.
60.
See id. at 805.
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Class Three property for two reasons: (1) individual assessment of income producing property was not administratively feasible; and (2) the
state had a special interest in preserving farm and timber land in an attempt to perpetuate certain desirable uses of its land in the face of economic pressures to convert the property to more lucrative pursuits. 6 1 The
court concluded that any disparity that is rationally related to a permissible state purpose would pass the test of constitutionality. 62 The Alabama
case is consistent with the often-articulated proposition that the Equal
Protection Clause does not preclude states from creating different statutory classifications.63
In 1997, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that a forest owner who
claimed to have devoted forty-seven forested acres near downtown
Madison to timber use but had not actually prepared the property for
planting was entitled to receive agricultural use valuation for the property.M As a result, the forest owner successfully challenged a revaluation
to $2,525,000 for tax purposes and received an assessment consistent
65
with her use of the land as forest land.
In 2000, the Supreme Court of Alabama held that the valuation based
on a "current use" as forest land as opposed to its fair and reasonable
market value was not a constitutional violation even though the property
had curbs and storm sewers the owner installed prior to the timber being
cut. The special jury returned an interrogatory finding that on the tax
record date in 1991 the property was "growing for sale timber and forest
products." 66 The Alabama Court found that using the property as a forest
on the tax date was all that mattered and the value of the surrounding
property was immaterial.6 7

E. Future Challenges
These cases generally indicate property tax laws do not violate Equal
Protection, including forest land incentive statutes. However, if there is
gross discrimination within a class or if a fundamental interest is impinged upon, court may invoke equal protection. The author found only
one state court decision holding that the statute taxing agriculture and
timber land by "current use" is unconstitutional.68

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
(2000).
67.
68.

See id. at 806.
See id. at 806-07.
See id. at 805-06.
Madison County v. Lenoir, 695 So.2d 596, 596-97, 600 (1997).
See Madison Co., at 596, 597, 600.
See Delaney's, Inc. & Springdale Stores, Inc. v. Ala., 2000 Ala. LEXIS 401, *11-12
See id.
See Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Pulaski County Bd. Of Equalization, 582 S.W.2d 942,

950 (1979).
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IH. YIELD TAX

A. New Taxation Models
Forest owners have unsuccessfully challenged the ad valorem tax
system on Equal Protection grounds. Despite this failure, a general understanding has developed that disincentives inherent in an ad valorem
tax system were not meeting the public policy goals to encourage green
space and forest land. This realization led to a borrowing of the European
model wherebY countries tax forest property based upon yields, not fair
market values.
Prior to 1976, California's forest tax scheme was such a confused
mess that three studies were conducted examining whether a new system
could effectively replace the ad valorem tax system. 70 The California
studies supported a yield tax as a form of timber land taxation for three
reasons: (1) the yield tax would not affect timber management decisions
as much as ad valorem taxes, including not penalizing owners who did
not commercially harvest their trees; (2) the yield tax would correct major inequities in pre-Forest Tax Reform Act (FTRA) system; and, (3)
collection and distribution at the state level could dispel local concerns
over loss of income because the design of FTRA was revenue neutral.7'
California
also had to pass a Constitutional Amendment before enacting
72
FTRA.
B. Severance and Productivity Taxes
Yield taxes come in two forms: severance and productivity taxes.
States charge severance taxes as either a percent of the cut timber sales
price or a tax per unit of harvested wood fiber in lieu of annual property
taxes. 73 Severance taxes have the advantages of timing tax payments with
harvest receipts and collecting the greatest amount from those with the
greatest incomes from their forest lands.
The second form of yield taxes is a productivity tax. The hypothetical value of the land, as calculated by its expected future yield, forms the
basis for productivity taxes. Productivity taxes are sometimes called
"current use" taxes as they use estimated incomes from the property
based on its current use as a forest. 74 Productivity taxes are also commonly used to tax agricultural lands which have many of the same public
policy objectives as forest tax laws, such as to encourage agricultural
69.
See William C. Unkel & Dean Cromwell, California's Timber Yield Tax, 6 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 831, 839 (1978).
70. See id.
71.
See id. at 839; see generally Forest Tax Reform Act, ch. 176, 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv. 373420 (1976) (codified as amended at CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§ 431-37 (Deering 2000)).
72. See id. at 842.
73. See infra Table I.
74.

See Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 582 S.W.2d at 948.
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production and preserve "green belts" surrounding urban areas. 75 Soil

productivity and capability form the basis of productivity taxes. These
concepts are difficult to apply in practice since the assessor requires a
great deal of knowledge in order to ascertain land values. Many states
have elected to create forest land valuation matrixes 76 that state agencies
developed to establish valuations by regions and by soil type or site index. In theory, productivity taxes incentivize the most productive use of
forest lands provided the productivity taxes do not approach the level of
the ad valorem taxes resulting in voluntary conversions.
C. Green Belt Areas
Many states have used yield taxes as a way to incentivize preservation of green space. Whether the states term the statutory scheme as open
space, green belt space, vegetated filter strips, recreational open land, or
forest land preserve areas, it recognizes the non-timber values many
owners associate with owing their land. These statutory schemes do not
penalize the land owners or forest owners who value wildlife, recreation,
and aesthetic appreciation more than timber production. They may opt
into the favorable tax schemes and enjoy the tax benefits that flow from
them. Otherwise, the same ad valorem tax pressures would subject these
owners to similar pressures as the forest owner whose primary objective
is timber production. The states tax these properties based upon a current
use theory. The state assumes the owner holds this property for timber
production purposes; therefore, whether or not the owner intends to
someday produce timber off the property, the state incentivizes them to
keep it as forest land and to manage it for future timber and non-timber
benefits. The net effect to the forest owner is that he does not have to pay
potentially higher taxes based upon commercial and residential development around the property. The cases cited in the previous section demonstrate that courts have upheld this strongly indicated public policy which
the state statutory schemes have expressed.77
IV. BALANCING STATE PUBLIC POLICY WITH LOCAL CONTROLS

A. Owner Option
Rather than mandate stewardship responsibilities upon every forest
owner within the state, most states have provided the forest owner with
the option of enrolling their property within the tax incentive program.
The forest owner may opt for this voluntary election creating the classic

75.
76.

See, e.g., N.Y. Agric. & Mkts. Law §§ 300, 304(1) (2000).
A central state taxing authority which establishes values per acre for lands in different

counties or regions using detailed soil maps, agricultural or timber product sale information, and
other relevant, objective information usually sets up matrixes.
77.
See discussion of Madison County v. Lenoir, 695 So.2d 596 (1997) and Delaney's, Inc. &
Springdale Stores, Inc. v. Ala., 2000 Ala. LEXIS 401 (2000) infra Part II. D.
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quid pro quo whereby the forest owner receives a lower tax burden in
exchange for good forest stewardship.
B. Management Plans
Many states offering forest land tax incentives have a requirement
that land owners must prepare a management plan in order to be qualified to obtain the special tax benefits. Management plans help land owners think through the issues confronting them as stewards of the land.
Consulting foresters will make recommendations within a management
plan as to wildlife enhancements and/or aesthetic appreciation strategies.
The silvacultural principles, which are now well established, are not generally known to the average forest owner unless the forest owner is encouraged to obtain professional forester advice on how to manage the
land in order to gain the benefit of the tax incentives. However, the level
78
of plan requirements vary greatly from state to state. Compare Idaho,
which merely requires a general statement of eventual timber harvest
intention, to New York, which requires detailed management plans and
the forest owner's active participation while the property is enrolled in
the program. 79
C. Time Commitment
At the outset, forest owners in most states have to make a decision at
the outset regarding their willingness to participate in good forest stewardship practiced for an extended period of time in exchange for reduced
property taxes under the various forestry incentive laws. Most states express this commitment in terms of a minimum enrollment period. 80 By
making the enrollment optional, states have essentially given the forest
owner a choice between choosing ad valorem taxation based on the highest and best use of the property or choosing tax incentivized forest ownership.
A few states have mandatory participation of all forest owners; therefore, all forest owners receive forest tax incentives. Some states, such as
California, have required forest commitments in what is called a "Timberland Preserve Zone". 81 Forest owners in California who are not in the
mandatory Timberland Preservation Zone can apply for benefits and tax
incentives but must meet three state mandated criteria. The state also
allows local communities to add two optional criteria for owners who
wish to apply, involving minimum acreage and minimum site character-

78.

IDAHO CODE §63-1701(Michie 2000).

79.
N.Y. REAL PROPERTY TAX, §480(a) (2000). See generally New York Dep't of
Environmental Conservation Form No. 81-06-5(6/89)-90 "Certificate Of Approval" (conditioning
approval and continued eligibility upon the work schedule listed on the form).
80. See infra Table I for states that have minimum enrollment periods.
81.
Unkel, supra note 67, at 848.
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istics. 82 Note, California does not permit any additional criteria for local

government permissive granting of timber land preservation zone classification.8 3
D. Acreage Requirement
Many states have maximum or minimum acreages that are eligible to
participate in the forest incentive tax program of that state. 84 Minimum
acreage requirements allow each state to establish its public policy regarding what qualifies as forest land in its state. States with low minimum acreages do not appear to be concerned with further fragmentation
of the timber land. Presumably, states with high minimum acreages have
determined that not all forest land in the state is eligible for tax incentives, or they are providing a deterrent to fragmentation. States with
maximum acreage requirements as part of their forest land tax incentive
schemes appear to recognize that owners of large tracks of timber land
are less likely to need or want state tax incentives to apply to their vast
holdings with the co-commitments to management plans and yield taxes.
E. Change of Use Penalties
85

Many states have penalties for converting forest lands to other uses.
Some states call these penalties "rollback penalties," other states refer to
them as "recapture penalties". At least nineteen states have no change of
use penalty at all. 8 New Jersey has a short two year rollback8 7 while
Pennsylvania has a seven year rollback.88 Meanwhile, New York appears
to have the most severe penalties as it has a ten year rollback feature,
plus interest. 89 If it is a full removal of the property from the RPTL Section 480(a) program, the New York land owner pays an additional penalty equal to two and one-half times the rollback amount. 90 If the land
owner attempts to withdraw a portion of the qualified property, the State
of New York exacts a penalty of five times the rollback figure. 9' This
amounts to a penalty of fifty times the current year's tax savings! Other
states having relatively heavy penalties include Hawaii, Washington,
Pennsylvania, Vermont and California. 92 In states which have voluntary
participation in the forest incentive programs, the level of participation is
often correlated to the penalty feature alone. For instance, Louisiana has
82.

See id. at 853.

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

See id.
See infra Table I.
See infra Table I.
See infra Table 1.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-23.8 (West 2000).
72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5490.5a (West 2000).

89.
90.
91.
92.

N.Y REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 480(a) (McKinney 2000).
Id.
Id.
See Siegel & Kerr, supra note 4, at 62.
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eighty percent and Florida has one hundred percent participation.9 3 New
York, meanwhile, has only four percent of the eligible land enrolled in
the RPTL 480(a) Program.
F. ParcelEligibility
Most states try to balance state public policy as expressed in its forest taxation law against local interest in maintaining and preserving income and other benefits derived through the property tax system. States
that have forest incentive laws often establish some local control, such as
forcing the land owner to register the property on an annual basis 95 or
requiring the forest land owner to petition local government to include
timber land for special zoning designation. 96 By establishing state standards for which properties qualify, the state effectively overcomes local
resistance to "down zoning ' '97 or removal of property from local tax rolls
completely, resulting in tax shifts to remaining R roperty from those owners qualifying for the forest land tax incentives.
Some states have built provisions into their forest tax incentive laws
to help the local communities. For instance, Alabama has a yield tax
premium of approximately fifty percent on both hardwood and softwood
log sales exported from the state. 99 This disincentive to perform value
added processing of the raw timber outside the state helps the local
communities retain jobs and is an attempt to stem the tide of rising log
exports that many states are experiencing. Other states, such as Arkansas,
have imposed a $.15 per acre surtax on all forest land to help defray the
costs of fire protection of those timber stands.1°° Courts have upheld the
cost of fire protection as a property tax component with respect to forest
land after a court challenge. Michigan and Wisconsin have a requirement that in order to be eligible for tax incentives, property cannot be
posted, which is one reason cited for low enrollment in those states 102
G. School Taxes
Traditionally, most school districts in this country rely either solely
or in large part upon property taxes generated within the district bounda93.
Id.
94.
Joint Report of the New York State Dept. of Env't Conservation and Bd. Of Equalization
and Assessment on The Forest Tax Laws (Sections 480 & 480a of the Real Property Tax Law) 2

(Dec. 1993) [hereinafter Joint Report, The Forest Tax Laws].
95.

See id. at 2.

96.

See Unkel, supra note 67, at 853.

97.

See id.
See JOINT REPORT, THE FOREST TAX LAWS, supra note 92, at 4.

98.
99.
100.

101.
(1928).
102.

ALA. CODE § 9-13-82 (2000).
ARK. CODE ANN. §26-61-103 (Michie 2000).

See generally State v. Pape, 174 P. 468 (1918); Chambers v. McCollum, 272 P. 707
See Siegel & Kerr, supra note 4, at 63.
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ries. 0 3 A great deal of tension has developed at the local level between
school districts who rely on property tax revenues as their sole source of
funding and forest owners who are raising trees that will never attend the
local schools. A series of cases that are unrelated to forest tax incentives
may resolve this tension and should have a profound impact on how
states fund local school districts. Essentially, three "waves" of cases have
swept across the United States, challenging the local funding of schools
through levies on local real property tax base. 1°4 The first wave challenged the state statutes based upon an equal protection theory that the
poorer districts did not fair equally compared to the more wealthy districts because they had less tax base to support their educational programs. The Supreme Court rejected this view that wealth was a suspect
classification because education was not a fundamental interest. °5 The
second wave of cases found that, although the Federal Constitution did
not protect education, certain State Constitutions' equal protection
clauses specifically mention education; therefore, the local school districts across the state were entitled to be funded on an equal basis. 0 6 The
third wave of cases all rely solely on the education clause of state constitutions. These cases have held that the state has been responsible
through its actions for a substantial portion of the0 7 under funding of
poorer districts resulting in a constitutional violation.
These new school tax cases challenging local taxation should be a
great relief to forest land owners. Now, through centralized state school
funding, the states can equitably distribute property tax levies throughout
the state. Forest owners will pay their fair share of the school taxes regardless of what percent of the local town's tax base the forest land represents. School districts in poor rural areas will be assured that their education funding will be equal to the wealthier districts within the state
regardless of property tax base and receipts of yield taxes from forest
lands. It is fortunate that trees versus school children will no longer be a
source of local tension.
CONCLUSION

Essentially, there are three methods to choose from to encourage
private forest ownership: regulations, incentives, and voluntary management.1°8 All three methods are blended together in the various state laws
to advance public policy objectives. As the Fairchild Report stated, "[t]he
ideal method of taxing forests is that which will require a just contribu-

103.
See generally Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State of New York, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS
1, 36-40 (2001) (discussing New York State's school aid distribution system).
104.
Campaignfor Fiscal Equity, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS at 9-17.
105. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18 (1973).
106.
See generally Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976).
107.
See Campaignfor Fiscal Equity, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS at 14-17.
108.
See Lundmark, supra note 2, at 792.
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tion from forest owners, while being of such form as will not place a
special obstacle (beyond what any just tax must impose) in the way of
best use of the'' forests
and the forest lands from the viewpoint of the
9
public interest."
There is probably no such thing as an ideal law, but a good forest
taxation law should include four essential elements: (1) the law should
base all assessments upon the productive capability of the land; (2) the
laws should compute the assessment values on a statewide basis; (3) the
state law should include some rollback taxes or other penalties so that the
properties do not get prematurely withdrawn; and, (4) the statutes should
protect local public interest without sacrificing too much state control
over the process to ensure equity and fairness.
The last century has witnessed a tax revolt and constitutional upheaval in forest taxation. The individual forest owner now has an incentive to be a forest steward who is managing his forest for future generations to enjoy the many resulting benefits.

109.
110.

supra note 1I, at 9-10.
See Siegel & Kerr, supra note 4, at 63.
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3.22%
5%
NO

YES
YES
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YES
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MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION SPECIAL
INVESTIGATIONS-A PRIMER
CHARLES W. NEWCOM*

INTRODUCTION

This article is designed to provide attorneys representing mining
companies and contractors doing work on mine property with a primer
for dealing with Mine Safety and Health Administration ("MSHA")'
special investigations. MSHA special investigations pose particularly
complex and sensitive problems for company counsel. Such an investigation may give rise not only to increased civil, or even criminal, liability
for the company, but also civil and criminal liability for individual managers.
It is also important to note that, although not addressed separately in
this article, the concepts addressed herein are, in large measure, equally
applicable to accident investigations. MSHA regulations provide that
certain events occurring on mine property including, among other events,
the death of an individual or the injury to an individual "which has a reasonable potential to cause death" are to be immediately reported to
MSHA. 2 As one can appreciate, an accident with serious injuries, or a
fatality, is a situation where potential liability is great and these circumstances3 almost always lead to serious citations and a later special investigation.
Special investigations are a "preliminary" which may lead to greater
corporate liability, individual managers' civil liability, and, in extreme
circumstances of conscious misconduct, criminal liability for both the
*

Member, Sherman and Howard, L.L.C., Denver, Colorado. J.D. Harvard Law School

(1974); B.A. Kansas State University (1970).
1. The Mine Safety and Health Administration is a part of the United States Department of
Labor and is charged with enforcement of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977. Federal
Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, Pub.L. No. 95-164 § 302, 91 Stat. 1290 (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 557(a) (1977)).
2.
See generally 30 C.F.R. Part 50 (2000). An "accident" is to be immediately reported to
MSHA by telephone. 30 C.F.R. § 50.10. It is then at MSHA's discretion whether or not to conduct
an immediate on-site investigation. Particularly where a fatality or a serious, potentially disabling,
injury has occurred, MSHA virtually always conducts an immediate on-site investigation. The
accident investigation will usually begin the next or second working day after the accident,
depending upon the proximity of MSHA offices to the mine site. 30 C.F.R. § 50.2 (h)(1-12) defines
"accident" as one of twelve discrete events, including ten which do not necessarily involve any
personal injury.
3. It is certainly prudent whenever an incident is immediately reported that company counsel
be involved in assisting mine personnel in dealing with MSHA's accident investigation.
429
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company and individuals. It is thus essential that mine operators proceed
with great care as to any citation, or accident, which may lead to a special investigation.
I. MINE ACT LIABILITY

Liability for violations of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of
1977 ("the Mine Act")4 can be significant. The Mine Act provides that
each violation of an applicable regulation, or the Mine Act itself, may
lead to a civil penalty against the mine operator.5 The maximum for that
civil penalty is currently $55,000.6 While most citations have proposed
penalties of a few hundred dollars and, on occasion, only $55.00, 7 those
citations arising from a fatality, serious injury, or which are found to be
caused by a high degree of negligence or an "unwarrantable failure" will
often be assessed much closer to the maximum allowable penalty.
In addition to mine operator civil liability, the Mine Act also provides for corporate criminal liability 8 and, of particular significance here,
civil and criminal liabilit' for individual directors, officers, or agents of a
corporate mine operator. That liability allows for the same level of penalties against an individual as a corporate operator would face.
For civil liability to attach, a director, officer, or agent of a corporate
mine operator must have "knowingly authorized, ordered, or carried out"
an action or failure to act which would subject the corporate mine operator to a civil penalty.' ° This liability may arise for either a violation of
a mandatory health or safety standard or any other provision of the Mine
Act itself."
In evaluating whether some action has been taken "knowingly,"
MSHA takes the position that it does not have to show "bad faith or evil

4.
Mineral Lands and Mining Act, 30 U.S.C. § 801 et seq (2000). For an overview of the
Mine Act, see, e.g., Stephan A. Bokat & Horace A. Thompson III, eds., OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY &
HEALTH LAW, Chapter 26, "The Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977" (The Bureau of
National Affairs, Inc. and American Bar Association 1988).
5. 30 U.S.C. § 820(a) (2000).
6. Id. The Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-410, §
535, 104 Stat. 890 (1990), amended by, Pub. L. No. 104-134, Title III § 31001(s)(1), 110 Stat. 1321373 (1996) and Pub. L. No.105-362, Title XIII, § 1301(a), 112 Stat. 3293 (1998) (allowing for
automatic periodic increases in civil penalties with inflation). Thus, the maximum civil penalty is
presently set at $55,000. See 30 C.F.R. § 100.3(a) (2000).
7.
MSHA Civil Penalty Regulations at 30 C.F.R. Part 100 (2000). See also 30 C.F.R. §
100.4(a) (allowing for a single penalty assessment of $55.00 for minor violations).
8.
30 U.S.C. § 820(d) and (f). It should be noted that by operation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3571 and
3581, the maximum criminal fines may be as high as $500,000 for a corporation and $250,000 for an
individual, depending upon the nature of violation involved.
9. 30 U.S.C. § 820(c).
10. Id.
11.
Id.
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purpose or criminal intent."' 2 MSHA's position is that the term "knowingly" is to be defined as in contract law "where it means knowing or
having reason to know [and that a] person has reason to know when he
has such information as would lead a person exercising reasonable care
to acquire knowledge of the fact in question or to infer its existence."' 3
Nevertheless, cases have consistently included the concept that before
individual civil penalties can be issued, there must be some showing that
the action of a director, officer, or agent of a corporation "involve[d]
aggravated conduct, not ordinary negligence."' 4 Under these cases,
"knowing" conduct must involve more than a lapse in judgment or a loss
in concentration. 5 Nevertheless, because the standard for individual civil
liability encompasses not only what the individual knew but also what
the individual reasonably should have known, caution dictates that
whenever a violation of the Mine Act has been alleged by MSHA and a
special investigation follows, the matter must be treated with the utmost
care and seriousness.
The Mine Act also provides for criminal liability for the operator of
a mine and any director, officer, or agent of a corporate operator where
the mine operator, director, officer, or agent "willfully violates a mandatory health or safety standard, or knowingly violates or fails or refuses
to comply" with certain orders issued under the Mine Act.' 6 Criminal
liability may arise where action occurs which involves "intentional disobedience" or "reckless disregard" of a mandatory health or safety standard or applicable provisions of the Mine Act. 17 Reckless disregard has
been defined as "closing of the eyes to or deliberate indifference toward"
requirements which the defendant "should8 have known and had reason to
know" about at the time of the violation.1
Whether evaluating the risks of civil or criminal liability, issues of
intent and knowledge are central. Issues of intent usually, and necessarily, involve subjective evaluations. Whenever MSHA seeks to undertake

12.

MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, MSHA HANDBOOK #PH97-

1-3 4-xxxvi (1997). This Handbook is available on MSHA's website at http://www.msha.gov/.
13.
Id.
14.
E.g. MSHA v. Wyoming Fuel Co., 16 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1618, 1630 (1994)(citing MSHA v.
Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 14 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1232, 1245 (1992)). Accord Freeman United Coal Mining

Co. v. Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 108 F.3d 358, 363-364 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
15.

Id.

16. 30 U.S.C. § 820(d). A violation of a standard is "willful" if done:
[E]ither in intentional disobedience of the standard or in reckless disregard of its
requirements. Reckless disregard means the closing of the eyes to or deliberate
indifference toward the requirements of a mandatory safety standard, which standard the
defendant should have known and had reason to know at the time of the violation. The
term willfully requires an affirmative act either of commission or omission, not merely
the careless omission of a duty.
U.S. v. Jones, 735 F.2d 785, 789 n.6 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 918 (1984). See also U.S. v.
Consolidation Coal Co., 504 F.2d 1330, 1335 (6th Cir. 1974).
17. See Jones, 735 F.2d at 789.
18. Id.
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a special investigation, it is essential that in-house, or outside, counsel be
involved in evaluating how to proceed. Even though mine management
may feel it acted properly and in good faith, that will not be the.end of
the matter. The issue in a special investigation ultimately boils down to
the conclusion reached by a special investigator and the investigator's
superiors in the MSHA internal review chain as to whether any "knowing" or "willful" misconduct has occurred. In such circumstances, it is
valuable, if not critical, that counsel be involved in assisting both the
company and individual managers in the investigation. The investigation
is essentially an adversarial proceeding, or certainly should be treated as
such. Failure to take advantage of assistance of counsel may lead to an
incomplete or misdirected defense of the company and/or an individual's
position.
II. MSHA

CRITERIA FOR A SPECIAL INVESTIGATION

MSHA's Special Investigations Procedures Handbook describes
criteria for undertaking a special investigation.19 The "special investigation" is the mechanism MSHA uses to evaluate whether to propose extraordinary penalties. It is important to note that the Mine Act does not
reference "special investigations," and it contains no criteria for evaluating whether a special investigation is appropriate. MSHA will make an
initial evaluation as to whether there is some basis for concluding a
"knowing" or "willful" violation may have occurred. If that conclusion is
"yes" or "maybe," a special investigation will follow.
Where there has been a mine accident, a complaint of possible advance notice of an inspection,2 ° false reporting of information,2' or misrepresentation regarding equipment's compliance with Mine Act requirements,22 the circumstances will23be evaluated to determine whether a
special investigation is appropriate.
Additionally, other citations issued to a mine operator, independent
will be evaluated. Particularly
of these circumstances,
24 those citations
....
issued along with an imminent danger closure order, citations desig-

19. Supra note 12, at 4-xxxvii.
20. Giving advance notice of an inspection may also lead to criminal sanctions. 30 U.S.C. §
820(e). Presumably that sanction would only apply to a government agent, not a mining company or
one of its agents.
False statements, representations, or certifications may lead to criminal penalties. 30
21.
U.S.C. § 820(f). This may apply to records required to be kept pursuant to MSHA regulations or to
statements made in special investigations, among other things.
22. 30 U.S.C. § 820(h).
23. Supra note 12, at 4-xxxvii.
24. Imminent dangers may lead to an immediate, self-executing closure of the affected area of
the mine. 30 U.S.C. § 817(a) (2000). Only persons needed to correct the danger may enter affected
area. 30 U.S.C. § 817(a), as provided in 30 U.S.C. § 814(c) (2000). "Imminent danger" is defined at
30 U.S.C. § 8020) (2000).
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nated by an unwarrantable failure, 25 or citations which involve working
in violation of an order of withdrawal 26 will draw specific focus in determining whether a special investigation should occur. While not all of
these citations will lead to a special investigation, increasingly, in recent
years, the norm is for these matters to lead to a special investigation.2 7
It should also be highlighted that MSHA is not precluded from conducting a special investigation into other alleged violations that fall outside these parameters. Moreover, it is not required to conduct a special
investigation of every alleged violation of a mandatory health or safety
standard or other provision of the Mine Act that meets these criteria.
MSHA has a great deal of administrative discretion in determining which
matters it will pursue to a special investigation.
III. THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
A. Early Company Investigation

Where an accident has occurred, and an attorney has participated in
the accident investigation, a thorough factual investigation will be undertaken at the same time as MSHA's initial accident investigation.
However, where the attorney has not participated in the accident investigation or, non-accident events have occurred which may give rise to a
special investigation under MSHA's criteria, it is prudent to undertake an
early factual investigation of the situation. Failure to do so may significantly limit the ability to mount a successful defense.
Depending upon the circumstances surrounding the citation and the
availability of mine personnel, this early investigation may be conducted
either through an on-site investigation by the attorney or by telephone in
coordination with safety personnel and mine management. Particularly,

25.
The legal standard for an unwarrantable finding has long been set. The Senate Report to
the Mine Act specifically approved a prior decision finding an unwarrantable failure under the
predecessor of the Mine Act, the Coal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1969. See S. Rep. No. 181, at
32, reprintedin 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3432, which cited with approval under Zeigler Coal Co., 84 1. D.
127, 135 (1977), 1MSHC 1518, 1524 (IBMA No. 74-37, 1977) which stated:
[T]hat an inspector should find that a violation of any mandatory standard was caused by
an unwarrantable failure to comply with such standard if he determines that the operator
involved has failed to abate the conditions or practices constituting such violation,
conditions or practices the operator knew or should have known existed or which it failed
to abate because of lack of'due diligence, or because of indifference or lack of reasonable
care. The inspector's judgment in this regard must be based upon a thorough
investigation and must be reasonable.
Decisions as to an unwarrantable failure necessarily involve multiple fact questions as to the
judgment of supervisory personnel.
26. The Mine Act provides that withdrawal orders may be issued for failure to timely abate a
citation, 30 U.S.C. § 814(b), repetitive, unwarrantable failure violations, 30 U.S.C. § 814(d),
citations following a pattern of violation notice, 30 U.S.C. § 814(e), and for imminent danger
situations, 30 U.S.C. § 817(a). Additionally, untrained miners are to be withdrawn from work until
their training is completed. 30 U.S.C. § 814(g).
27. See MSHA Special Investigation Procedures, supra note 12, at 4-xxxvii-4-xxxix.
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should cost be an issue, or if there are significant uncertainties as to
whether a special investigation might occur, much can be done by telephone. Document collection can readily be coordinated and interviews
can often be conducted by telephone, depending upon the nature of the
situation.
Early investigation and evaluation is important, not only to begin
making judgments as to approaches, but also to ensure information is not
lost. MSHA's internal guidelines allow for at least thirty days for processing and evaluation as to whether a matter should be pursued for special investigation. 2 8 MSHA's Manual does not specify how soon an investigation should commence. In recent years, in view of the significant
increase in the number of special investigations, it has been rare, at least
in the western United States, for special investigations (especially in nonaccident situations) to occur less than six months after a citation is issued. Nine to twelve months is probably a more common time period
between issuance of a citation and MSHA's beginning special investigation interviews of managers. MSHA inspectors will have always made
notes of their evaluation of a situation leading them to issue a citation.
While some managers and safety representatives take notes during the
course of inspections, many do not. Often the notes taken may not necessarily be very detailed. Even if the inspector noted concern about the
situation at the time it was observed, the seriousness of the potential citation may not have been disclosed until the end of the inspection day, or
perhaps even later. Even a week or two after a citation is issued, memories will have begun to fade. If fact gathering does not begin for several
months, much information may be lost. Company personnel should have
at least the broad outlines of their defense prepared before MSHA begins
contacting the company or individual managers for interviews, which
may not occur until months after the citation was issued.29
B. Ethical Issues
Since a special investigation necessarily involves not only determinations as to more serious corporate liability, but also decisions as to
managers, ethical issues as to representation will often arise for counsel.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that lawyers not represent a client if the representation of that client is directly adverse to
another client. 30 Moreover, since a corporate mine operator can only act

28. Supra note 12, at 4-xxxviii.
29. MSHA regulations allow for a conference on citations to discuss the citation and the
company's reasons for reducing the severity of the citations. Federal Mine Safety & Health Act 30
C.F.R. § 100.6(c) (2000). The conference must be requested within 10 days after the citation is
issued: 30 C.F.R. § 100.6(b). Where a conference has occurred, added information will presumably
have been collected. However, that may not necessarily have been done from the perspective of
litigation defense.
30. Colorado Rules of ProflI Conduct R. 1.7(a) (2000).
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through its directors, officers, and agents a lawyer representing the corporation must carefully evaluate whether s/he can represent not only the
corporation but also individuals.
Generally, counsel will begin this process representing a corporate
client. A lawyer representing a corporate entity is obligated to proceed
"as is reasonably necessary in the best interest" of the corporation in a
situation where an officer, director, or agent is engaged in action that
may give rise to a violation of law that might be attributable to the corporation. 31 Dual representation of directors, officers, or employees/agents is
allowable depending upon the circumstances.3 2 Assuming the situation is
one in which counsel initially becomes involved on behalf of a corporate
entity, it is ethically mandated that a judgment be made, and reevaluated
on a ongoing basis, as to whether the lawyer can represent not only the
corporate entity, but also individuals associated with the corporation.
Determining whether multiple representation of both the corporation
and one or more corporate agents can occur involves a fact intensive
evaluation of a number of issues. Most prominent among these are judgments as to the potential culpability of the corporation, potential culpability of individual managers, corporate requirements, and allowable
approaches as to indemnification of corporate agents. Additionally,
judgments need to be made as to the potential for civil versus criminal
liability, since it is doubtful that joint representation would ever be undertaken where it was thought there was a serious risk of criminal liability.
Other than noting the necessity for this evaluation and the broad requirements of the canons of ethics, no clear guideline can be provided.
Counsel must review the applicable canons of ethics, company policies
and practices, the facts of the particular citation(s), and make a judgment
as to the appropriate approach for handling the particular representation.
Certainly, if the circumstances are such that the corporation is considering discipline, if not discharge, of a manager involved in the events
leading to the citation(s), joint representation will likely be inappropriate.
In that situation, the corporation will likely be considering, if not pursuing, an argument that corporate negligence should be reduced, and thus
the penalty lessened because of supervisory misconduct. 34 Also, an indi-

31.

Colorado Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.13(b).

32.

Colorado Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.13(e).

33.

Colorado Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.13(a).

34.
situation.
operation
exercised

The efficacy of such an argument will be highly dependent on the facts of the particular
The Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Commission has ruled that where a mine
is (a) prudent in selecting and training a foreman [or other manager], who had in the past
good judgment, and (b) has an adequate overall safety program, then a foreman's acting

"aberrantly" and engaging in "wholly unforeseeable misconduct" will give rise to a defense which, if
proved, can reduce the level of negligence attributable to the mine operator, and, thereby, reduce the
civil penalty. MSHA v. Nacco Mining Co., 3 F.M.S.H.R.C. 848, 850 (1981). Recently, the
Commission noted this defense "has been applied sparingly" and it refused to apply Nacco to reduce
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vidual may for his/her personal reasons prefer separate representation
and, depending upon the circumstances and corporate indemnification
policies, the Company may be obligated to finance such a request.
I would also add a personal word regarding multiple representations
based upon my own experience. If an initial decision in favor of joint
representation later proves to be an error, the only "penalty" is that the
lawyer will be obligated to withdraw, both from representing individuals
and from representing the corporation on the particular matter at hand.
There is no loss of privilege to communications occurring prior to the
withdrawal from representation. Where corporate indemnification policies provide protection for the individual and there is no reason to expect
the corporation may either wish to discipline a manager for actions taken
or omitted or argue that the conduct of an individual officer, director, or
agent was improper and cannot, or should not, be attributed to the corporation, my preference is to err on the side of joint representation. I say
this even though this approach may later give rise to a necessary withdraw from all representation on the particular matter.
The reason for this approach is that, even at larger mines, the
workforce tends to be close knit and first line supervisors often identify
closely with their more senior managers and the mining company itself.
If mine supervisors have separate representation from the corporation, it
may ensure that a particular lawyer represents the company throughout
the dispute to its resolution, but it will not necessarily serve the overall
interests of the corporation in,having an effective management team. If
good managers have to find their own independent counsel, even if they
are assisted in that by corporate counsel, it will necessarily foster some
degree of "we" and "they" mentality which will not be productive, longterm, for the mine. Obviously, where it is known early in an investigation
that a particular manager has engaged in plainly inappropriate conduct,
not only will corporate counsel be unable to represent that individual, the
attorney may also be involved in advising the corporation as to whether
misconduct engaged in by the manager warrants demotion or even termination from employment. Where, however, as is most often the case, the
worst that may be said about a manager is that a lapse in judgment or
attention led to the circumstance now being specially investigated by
MSHA, the overall interests of the corporation may best be served by
"hanging together" rather than "hanging separately". In assessing the
interests at play and applicable ethical standards, the potential advantages
to the corporate client and its managers in a joint representation should
be carefully evaluated, even if it leads to the lawyer's accepting some
risk that if facts dramatically change, withdrawal from all representation
in the matter at a later date might be required.

the negligence of a mine operator and, thereby, vacate an unwarrantable failure finding. MSHA v.
Capitol Cement Corp., 21 FMSHRC 883, 893-95 (1999).
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Necessarily, judgments as to joint representation should only be considered by outside counsel. In-house attorneys actively involved in handling special investigations are in a different posture. Rarely, if ever,
would in-house counsel be in a position where s/he would want to undertake representing not only the corporation but also individual officers,
directors, or agents.
C. A Special Investigation Checklist
In preparing for a special investigation, counsel should evaluate a
number of factors both before and during the investigation.
1. Issues of Representation
As described above, ethical issues must be addressed at the outset
and as the matter progresses, in connection with any special investigation. A continuing evaluation of whether counsel can represent not only
the mining company, but also individual supervisors must occur. It is
also important to determine what representation role counsel will provide
with respect to particular company witnesses. That, of course, will bear
upon issues as to the applicability of attorney-client privilege to communications that occur in the interview process.
2. Witnesses
Information must be gathered as to the potential witnesses to the alleged violation. This may include both management and nonmanagement employees. Depending upon the issues raised by the citation(s), it may be appropriate not only to interview personnel accompanying the inspector but also personnel working in the area during the
shift when the citation was issued and personnel who may have worked
in the area on one or more prior shifts. Additionally, where issues of
equipment condition or maintenance are involved, it is likely that the
maintenance personnel last involved with the equipment will have pertinent information to supplement the information equipment operators may
have.
As a list of witnesses is developed, interviews should be conducted
to determine what information each witness may have related to the circumstances surrounding the citation(s) at issue. As a part of this interview process, counsel should also be evaluating whether it will be appropriate to undertake representation of one or more individuals. Independent of representation issues, counsel should advise those witnesses of
their rights vis-A-vis an MSHA special investigator in an interview.35

35.
Witnesses are not required to participate in an interview with a special investigator. If a
witness does participate in an interview, it is certainly in the witness' interests to have the assistance
of counsel. Without the assistance of someone familiar with the investigation process, and the
litigation that may follow, the witness may not make a complete or clear defense of the situation.
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It should also be added in regard to witnesses that when an MSHA
special investigator contacts mine management about a special investigation, the investigator may be willing to disclose the names of those
managers the investigator wishes to interview. The investigator will not
disclose non-management interviewees. Moreover, some investigators
will only disclose names of management witnesses after the investigator
has first attempted to contact the company manager to determine whether
the manager is willing to talk to the investigator without the assistance of
counsel, or assistance of some other company representative.
3. Document Gathering
The range of potential documents will obviously depend upon the
nature of the underlying citation. Categories which may be pursued,
however, include (a) notes made by company personnel during the inspection leading to the citation, (b) notes made by the manager(s) working in the area where the citation was issued during the shift when the
citation was issued and, often, prior shifts, (c) pre-shift and on-shift inspection records which may have been completed for the area where the
citation arose or equipment in question was located, and (d) maintenance
records for any equipment that may be involved in the citation.
It is critical that once documents are collected, they be retained. Independent of what decisions may be made with regard to personal interviews, company records may be subpoenaed if not voluntarily
provided.36
4. Should the Individual Managers Submit to an Interview?
As information is gathered, a decision must be made about whether
to advise a manager to be interviewed. The approach here will depend
both upon the comfort level of the manager and the circumstances. Individual managers are not obligated to participate in an interview nor, for
that matter, are hourly employees. A range of factors, including the apparent direction of the investigation, information that the witness may
have, the witness' comfort level with the process, and the anticipated
reaction of MSHA to a refusal to be interviewed, should be considered in
addressing this issue. While not articulated by MSHA, my sense of the
investigation process is that if an individual refuses to participate in an
interview, MSHA will draw a negative inference from that refusal which
may increase the risk of a penalty being proposed. That alone, however,

36. While no survey has been conducted, anecdotal information from discussing these issues
with other practitioners would suggest to the author that most commonly, counsel representing
mining companies, and managers, during special investigations provide the investigator with
company records as requested by the investigator. Different issues as to access may arise in a
situation in -which an individual supervisor is asked to produce any notes which he may have made.
Those issues should be addressed on a case by case basis.
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should not lead a person to participate in an interview. Finally, it should
be added that generally, though not always, if an individual is unwilling
to be interviewed, that should lead to closer consideration of whether
separate representation may be appropriate for that individual.
Before the witness actually meets with the MSHA investigator, the
lawyer should also spend time preparing the witness for the interview.
This will, in large measure, be comparable to preparing a witness for a
deposition or trial testimony. Although this process is in many respects
less formal than deposition or trial testimony, advance preparation of a
witness is just as important before a meeting with a special investigator.
5. Should a Witness Agree to Provide a Written Statement or to be
Tape Recorded?
I always counsel against witnesses agreeing to be tape-recorded. I
have, over my 27 years of practice, heard too many witnesses unintentionally misspeak, whether they misunderstood a question, misheard a
question, or simply misspoke. Where a tape recording is made, unless
counsel knows at the time that a misstatement has been made, no correction can be made, as a practical matter, and later efforts to make a correction may be of only marginal utility. If someone misspeaks in the
nervousness of the interview, he should not have a tape recording held
against him.
While the conclusion will vary depending upon the circumstances,
my own view is that if a witness is submitting to an interview, it will
generally also be best to agree to give a written statement. Again, it is
critical to evaluate the particular circumstances before agreeing to give a
written statement. If an interview is conducted, however, utilization of a
written statement ensures the opportunity to correct any errors that may
have been made in the investigator's preparation of the statement and
also insures obtaining a copy of what has been provided to the special
investigator. Absent that, the special investigator may be unwilling to
provide a copy of interview notes or any interview memorandum generated during the course of the interview.
6. Lawyer Conduct in the Interview
MSHA special investigators expect to conduct the interview themselves. Should a circumstance arise in which the witness wishes to confer
with counsel or should the interview be taking an inappropriate direction,
counsel can and should intervene, confer with the witness, and determine
what steps to take. Absent that, the primary role of counsel is to protect
the witness from overreaching, provide clarifying information as appropriate, and review the statement with the witness before it is finalized to
assist with clarifications and corrections.
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7. Post-Investigation Statement of Position
Whenever counsel has participated in a special investigation, it is
important to do a post-investigation statement of position to the special
investigator. This will provide both factual and legal argument, together
with other available information mitigating the issuance of any individual penalties. The letter should request that it be included in the file. It
will provide a statement of position for evaluation by more senior managers of MSHA as MSHA evaluates the file to determine what actions, if
any, to take.
CONCLUSION

Special investigations create especially sensitive problems for mining companies and their managers and counsel. While this article provides thoughts about the process and steps to evaluate, each special investigation must be evaluated on its own merits. Careful attention to the
facts of the situation, the presentation of those facts, and the individuals
involved (both from the company and MSHA) is necessary and will invariably lead to tailoring the particular approach. "Rules" suggested
herein may often find exception in the unique circumstances of a particular investigation. Nevertheless, these broad guidelines should provide
counsel with a start to the process.

THE FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1977:
IS IT SUFFERING FROM A MID-LIFE CRISIS?
KAREN L. JOHNSTON*

INTRODUCTION

Compliance and enforcement with federal law and regulations regarding safety and health in the workplace in the United States have historically followed the proverbial "stick" approach. Whether this traditional approach has been successful or whether better philosophies exist
to achieve workplace safety and health, particularly in the U.S. mining
industry, is the focus of this paper. Change is inevitable in light of ongoing federal budgetary concerns and against the background of improvements in technology, attitudes, and reduction in fatalities within the
mining industry. Labor, industry, and government leaders should initiate
the change by embracing proven concepts based on incentives and selfregulation.
The Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (the "Mine Act"),'
as enforced by the Mine Safety and Health Administration ("MSHA"),
an agency within the Department of Labor, regulates every aspect of
safety and health in the U.S. mining industry. The Mine Act's sole
statutory goal is the protection
of the U.S. mining industry's most pre2
cious resource-the miner. The Mine Act evolved from the predecessor
1969 Coal Act, 3 which was amended in 1977 to include within its jurisdiction all mines in the U.S., and recently celebrated its thirtieth year in
existence. The Mine Act had its genesis in catastrophic disasters, which
killed hundreds of U.S. miners between the turn of the century and the
mid- 1970s.4
5
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (the "OSH Act")
was enacted by Congress to ensure the protection of employees in general industry from the increasing dangers created by industrialization.6
*

The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Laura E. Beverage and L. Joseph

Ferrara, members of Jackson & Kelly PLLC, in preparing this article. This article is based in part
on a prior study of this topic, which was presented at Minesafe International 1996 Conference by
Laura E. Beverage.
1. 30 U.S.C. §§801 etseq. (1994).
2. 30 U.S.C. §801(a) (1994).
3. Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-153.
4.
See, e.g., Senate Comm. on Human Resources, Federal Mine Safety and Health
Amendments Act of 1977, S. Rep. No. 95-181, at 1-4 (1977).
5.
29 U.S.C. §§651 etseq. (1994).
6. 29 U.S.C. §§651 etseq. (1994).
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The OSH Act is administered by the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration ("OSHA"), also part of the Department of Labor. OSHA
develops and issues standards, conducts investigations and inspections,
issues citations, and proposes penalties for non-compliance by employers. 7 The OSH Act regulates industries affecting interstate commerce,
other than mining, but does not apply to the government. 8 Comparison of
these two Acts and these two agencies is helpful in understanding the
breadth and depth of the Mine Act's jurisdiction and MSHA's authority.
The charge as we move forward into the new millennium is to determine whether the philosophical underpinnings of safety and health
legislation, particularly those affecting mining, enacted thirty years ago
still reflect current enforcement needs, and to evaluate alternative means
of promoting safety and health in the workplace with more goal-oriented
programs which recognize incentives for voluntary compliance.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
AND THE MINE ACT

A. Agency Organization
Since its inception, the Mine Act has developed into a formidable enforcement mechanism. MSHA, an enforcement arm of the U.S. Department of Labor, is headed by Assistant Secretary of Labor Dave D.
Lauriski, who serves under the Secretary of Labor Elaine L. Chao.
MSHA is divided into two enforcement branches, one for Coal and
one for Metal/Nonmetal (including stone, sand and gravel) mining, each
headed by an Administrator. Three divisions-safety, health, and technical compliance-report to the Administrators. There are national offices
of assessments, standards, regulations and variances, educational policy
and development, and technical support. The MSHA enforcement units
are comprised of eleven Coal District offices, six Metal/Nonmetal District offices, and numerous field offices, which are headed by District
Managers and field office supervisors, respectively.
The Mine Act operates through a "split enforcement model" under
which MSHA promulgates and enforces rules and regulations governing
mine safety and health. Enforcement disputes arising under the Mine Act
are heard by a separate governmental agency created by the Mine Act,
but funded separately from the enforcement agency. This quasi-judicial
agency is the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission
("Review Commission"), composed of five members. 9 The Review
Commission's administrative law judges are assigned to hear contested
cases initially. The Review Commission may then review the judges'
7.
8.
9.

29 U.S.C. §655 (1994).
29 U.S.C. §652(5) (1994).
30 U.S.C. §823 (1994).
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decisions if two or more of its members vote to grant discretionary review. The Review Commission's importance extends beyond its resolution of individual cases, due to its broad authority to formulate national
policy and to act as a check on the enforcement zeal of the authorized
agents of the Secretary by reviewing the lawfulness of the Secretary's
enforcement actions.1 ° MSHA is represented in contested cases by the
Solicitor of Labor in the national office or in one of the Regional Solicitor' s offices.
B. Mine Safety and Health Act Summary
The Mine Act is a strict liability statute, meaning that enforcement
actions are authorized, regardless of fault, for any violations of the Mine
Act or its implementing regulations, including those committed by a
mine operator's employees. This is true even when the violation occurs
as a direct result of an employee's failure to follow a supervisor's order,
or as the result of any other purposeful or idiosyncratic employee behavior. 1 Because of its strict liability nature, defenses such as diminution
of safety, lack of exposure or access to a hazard, and dual operator liability are ineffective. An operator's challenge to an alleged violation
will not postpone the time set by an inspector to terminate or correct the
allegedly violative condition or practice.
The Mine Act prescribes minimum health and safety standards with
great specificity and directs the Secretary of Labor to make those standards more stringent as technology and identified hazards warrant and to
improve safety and health.12 Under §506 of the Mine Act, federal preemption of state mine safety and health laws is not recognized except
where federal law is more stringent than state law.1 3 Thus, every state
may have its own dual enforcement program which may be redundant or
contradictory to federal law.
MSHA has broad authority to conduct warrantless inspections at
mines. The agency carries out essentially three types of inspections: rou-6
tine,14 spot,' and those conducted pursuant to a miner's complaint.
MSHA is required to conduct at least two routine inspections annually
for surface mines and four inspections for underground mines.' 7 These
10. See, Secretary of Labor v. Thunder Basin Coal Co., 510 U.S. 200 (1994).
11.
30 U.S.C. §820(a) (1994); See, Asarco, Inc. - Northwestern Mining Dep't v. Federal Mine
Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 868 F.2d 1195, 1198 (10th Cir. 1989).
12. 30 U.S.C. §811 (1994).
13.
30 U.S.C. §955 (1994).
14. 30 U.S.C. §813(a) (1994).
15. 30 U.S.C. §813(i) (1994).
16. 30 U.S.C. §813(g) (1994).
17.
30 U.S.C. §813(a).
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"twos and fours" are conducted regardless of the mine's compliance efforts as reflected by its violation history and accident and incidence rates
compiled annually by the agency. The Mine Act also directs the Secretary to investigate the causes of "accident[s]" and "other occurrence[s]
relating to health and safety."' 8
The Mine Act and its regulations require an operator to report, investigate, and maintain records pertaining to all accidents, injuries and
illnesses.' 9 Annual statistics regarding accident and incidence rates are
compiled by the agency using this data.
The Mine Act's enforcement scheme is cumulative in nature, with
penalties and the potential for withdrawal orders (cessation of work in an
affected area) increasing with higher gravity and negligence findings.
These "special findings" are made in connection with every enforcement
action taken. A violation is "significant and substantial" if the hazard
presented by the violation has serious or grave potential consequences
based upon the particular facts surrounding that violation. There must
exist a reasonable likelihood that the hazard contributed to will result in
an injury or illness of a reasonably serious nature. 20 A violation is considered to be the result of "unwarrantable failure" (a high degree of operator fault) when the violation occurs as a result of the operator's "aggravated conduct, constituting more than ordinary negligence." 2' These
important definitions are not found in the Mine Act. Rather, the definitions have evolved through litigation in contested cases.
An additional component of the Mine Act's cumulative enforcement
scheme is known as "excessive history." Each time a violation is assessed by the MSHA Office of Assessments, MSHA calculates the overall history of violations for the mine for a preceding 24 month period. A
mine is placed on excessive history when the number of violations per
inspection day, as calculated by MSHA, is 2.1 or more. 22 A designation
of excessive history of violations affects the amount of penalty assessed
for routine, non-significant and substantial violations and can result in a
significant financial impact on a mine operator. An operator who is not
on excessive history can expect a single penalty assessment amount of
$55 for this type of routine minor violation; an operator on excessive
history can be assessed a penalty ranging from $66 to $55,000 per routine minor violation. 23 This aspect of the Mine Act's enforcement scheme
can result in a mine operator paying increasingly onerous penalties for
relatively minor violations, despite the fact that the operator may have an
18.
30 U.S.C. §813(b) (1994).
19. 30 U.S.C. §813(d) (1994); 30 C.F.R. Part 50 (2001).
20. Secretary of Labor v. Cement Div., Nat'l Gypsum Company, 3 FMSHRC 822, 825 (Rev.
Comm. 1981).
21.
Emery Mining Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 9 FMSHRC 1997, 2004 (Rev. Comm. 1987).
22. 30 C.F.R. § 100.4(b) (2001).
23.
30 C.F.R. §100.4(a)(2) (2001).
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excellent incident and injury rate (demonstrating the effectiveness of the
operator's safety program). An excessive history is not necessarily indicative of an unsafe mine operation, but MSHA relies on history to justify increased penalties, without taking into consideration other mitigating factors.
1. Summary of MSHA's major enforcement tools
Provision of

Enforcement Action Taken

the Mine Act
§814(a)

If the Secretary believes a violation exists, a
citation must be issued, setting a reasonable
abatement time.24

§814(b)

A withdrawal, or closure, order may be issued
for the area affected by the violation for a failure
to abate, or correct, the violation within the time
prescribed.25

§814(d)

A citation for a significant and substantial
("S&S") violation, caused by the operator's unwarrantable failure to comply with a standard,
commences a "withdrawal order chain" each
time thereafter a violation resulting from an unwarrantable failure to comply is observed.

26

An

intervening "clean" inspection (i.e., no unwarrantable failures) breaks the withdrawal order
chain.
§814(e)

If an operator is identified as a "pattern violator," all violations characterized as "S&S" result
inin withdrawal orders until an intervening
27
spection reveals no "S&S" violations.

§814(f)

A withdrawal order will be issued for failure to
comply28 with respirable coal dust concentration
limits.

§814(g)

A withdrawal order will be issued for failure to
provide mandatory training required under the
Mine Act.29

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

30
30
30
30
30

U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.

§814(a) (1994).
§814(b) (1994).
§814(d) (1994).
§814(e) (1994); 30 C.F.R. Part 104 (2001).
§814(f) (1994).
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A withdrawal order will be issued for a condition or practice that can be expected to cause
death or serious physical harm before it can be
corrected, regardless whether the condition or
practice violates a standard or rule.3 °

2. Summary of the Mine Act's civil and criminal penalties
Provision of

Potential Penalty

the Mine Act
§820(a)

An operator of a mine in which any violation
occurs is assessed a civil penalty of no more
than $55,000 per violation. The civil penalty
formulas consider criteria such as gravity, negligence, size of operator's 31
business and good faith
in achieving compliance.

§820(c)

An operator or corporate officer, director or
agent (one who supervises all or part of a mine
or miners 32) who "knowingly" authorizes, orders
or carries out a violation or refuses to comply
with an order may be fined civilly up to $55,000
and/or charged criminally ($25,000 fine and up
to one year imprisonment for first offense).33

§820(d)

An operator or corporate officer, director or
agent who "willfully" authorizes, orders or carries out a violation or refuses to comply with an
order may be fined up to $25,000 and or up to
one year imprisonment (first offense), or up to
$50,000 fine and up to 5 year imprisonment
(second offense).34

§820(e)

Any person who gives advance notice of inspections is subject to criminal fine up to $1000
and/or six months imprisonment.3 5

29.
30 U.S.C. §814(g) (1994).
30. 30 U.S.C. §817(a) (1994).
31.
30 U.S.C. §820(a-b),(i) (1994); 30 C.F.R. §100.3(b-g) (2001).
32. 30 U.S.C. §802(e) (1994).
33.
30 U.S.C. §820(c) (1994). In the event that the violation results in a death, the criminal
fine may be increased to $250,000. 18 U.S.C. §3571(b)(4) (1994). If no death results, it may be
increased to $100,000. 18 U.S.C. §3571(b)(5) (1994).
34.
30 U.S.C. §820(d) (1994). In cases where the "operator" is determined to be an
"organization," the criminal fine may be increased to $500,000 for misdemeanors that result in a
death. 18 U.S.C. §3571(c)(4) (1994). If no death results, it may be increased to $200,000. 18
U.S.C. §3571(c)(5) (1994).
35.
30 U.S.C. §820(e) (1994).
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Any person who knowingly makes false statements, representations or certifications in any
application, report, plan, record or other document required to be maintained or filed under
the Act is punishable by fine of up to $10,000
and/or imprisonment of up to 5 years.36

II. COMPARISON OF MSHA WITH ITS SISTER AGENCY, THE
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, AND THE OSH
ACT

A. Major Provisionsand Aspects of the OSH Act and Agency Organization
It is instructive to compare MSHA, and its administration of the
Mine Act, with its sister agency, OSHA, and its administration of the
OSH Act.
There are some similarities between MSHA and OSHA. For example, the OSH Act operates under a split enforcement model similar to the
Mine Act, with a three-member independent quasi-judicial
Commission.

An employer cited for an OSHA violation may request a

review of a violation or penalty assessment by an administrative law
judge assigned by the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission.
The OSHA enforcement units are comprised of ten regions and
eighty-five area offices throughout the United States, which are headed
by Area Directors and field office supervisors in charge of compliance
officers. Compliance officers are authorized to take enforcement actions
based on evaluations of gravity and negligence similar to those taken
under the Mine Act. OSHA compliance officers have authority to conduct investigations and inspections, issue citations, and propose penalties
for non-compliance by employers. 38 An inspector may characterize citations as "other-than-serious," "serious," "willful," and "repeat," based on
the specific facts surrounding the violation. The minimum penalty for a
repeat or willful violation is $5,000, and the maximum is $70,000. The
maximum penalty for each other-than-serious or serious violations is
$7,000. A failure to abate violation can result in assessment of a penalty

36. 30 U.S.C. §820(f) (1994). In this case, the criminal fine may be increased to $250,000
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3571(b)(3) because violations of § 10(f) are classified as felonies. 18 U.S.C.
§3559(a)(5) (1994).
37. 29 U.S.C. §651 (1994).
38. 29 U.S.C. §655 (1994).
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of up to $7,000 a day.39 OSHA's "egregious" penalty policy initiated in
1991 has resulted in record-high fines by counting each separate employee exposure to a hazard as a separate violation meriting a fine.
OSHA prioritizes its compliance goals in order to conserve its resources and conducts three basic types of inspections: programmed, unprogrammed, and monitoring. OSHA prioritizes the various types of
inspections as follows: 40
*

First priority: imminent danger

*

Second priority: fatality/catastrophe investigations

*

Third priority: complaints/referrals investigation

*

Fourth priority: programmed inspections

With the present number of inspectors employed by OSHA and the
number of sites covered, OSHA visits many worksites only once during a
ten-year period. 41 This is contrasted by MSHA's statutory mandate to
inspect surface mines two times per year and underground mines four
times per year.

42

B. ComparisonsBetween the Mine Act and the OSH Act
Key differences between the Mine Act and the OSH Act include:
*

The OSH Act is not a strict liability statute. Therefore, defenses
such as employee misconduct or lack of exposure to hazard may
be successful.

"

The OSH Act contains no minimum mandatory inspection requirements.

*

OSHA has no general mandatory minimum training requirements but does have specific requirements in some standards.

*

OSHA has no warrantless inspection power; warrants must be
obtained if the business will not waive the warrant requirement.

*

The OSH Act provides no withdrawal order authority without
first obtaining an order from a federal court, and then only in the
case of an imminent danger.

39.
29 U.S.C. §666 (1994); New OSHA Civil Penalties Policy, OSHA Fact Sheet No. OSHA
92-36 (1/1/92).
40.
Field Inspection Reference Manual, I.B.3, OSHA Instruction CPL 2.103 (Sept. 26, 1994).
41.
HERITAGE FOUNDATION, A BUDGET FOR AMERICA, 245 (Angela M. Antonelli et al. eds.,
2001).
42.
30 U.S.C. §813(a) (1994).
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*

OSHA recognizes state primacy of approved enforcement programs, eliminating dual enforcement roles of state and federal
agencies.

*

Contest of a violation issued by OSHA effectively stays the requirement for abatement until after a full adjudication of the
merits of the enforcement action.

*

The OSH Act applies criminal liability to an employer in cases
where a death occurs as a result of a willful violation. It has no
civil penalty authority against individuals, i.e., agents, officers or
directors.
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43

C. MSHA/OSHA Budget Comparisons
FY2000

MSHA

FY 2000 Budgets

$228 million

OSHA

$382 million

Private SectorEmployees Covered Total

357,000

111,000,000

PrivateSectorEmployees
Coveredper Inspector

388

89,516

Dollars Spent per
Employee Covered

$638.00

$56.00

Sites Covered

13,902

4.0+ million

Dollars Spent per
Site Covered

$16,400.00

$74.00

Number of FederalInspectors

920

1,240

In terms of pure dollar amounts, MSHA's overall budget authority
for FY 2001 increased to $242.2 million, an increase of $14.2 million
over FY 2000. OSHA's overall budget authority for FY 2001 also increased, by $44 million, to a total budget authority amount of $426 million. 44
D. Overview of OSHA Policy Initiatives
In the mid-90s, OSHA announced that an effective and credible enforcement program provides the cornerstone for safe workplaces. As
evidence of that resolution,
the 45
agency began assessing increasingly
• •
higher penalties against violators. At the same time, OSHA's leaders
pledged to improve targeted inspections and focused inspections and to
involve workers and employers in the process of workplace safety by
providing mechanisms for involvement and incentives. In furtherance of
these efforts, OSHA underwent an evaluation which produced a report
entitled The New OSHA-Reinventing Worker Safety and Health. 6 The

43.
HERITAGE FOUNDATION, supra note 42, at 245.
44.
Budget
authority
data
available
from
MSHA
at
<http://www.dol.gov/dolUsec/public/budget/msha2000l .htm>
and
from
OSHA
at
<http://www.dol.gov/dolU-sec/public/budgetlosha20001 .him>.
45.
74 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-8 (Apr. 19, 1994); 106 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-I (Jun. 6,
1994).
46.

NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, THE NEW OSHA - REINVENTING WORKER SAFETY

AND HEALTH (May 1995).
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report focuses on alternative philosophies to traditional coercive compliance through industry "partnerships" with the agency. (MSHA has yet to
undertake such an introspective evaluation.)
The New OSHA-Reinventing Worker Safety and Health incorporates a number of suggested proposals for revamping OSHA, recognizing
that, historically, OSHA has been driven by statistics and rules and a
"one size fits all" approach in terms of enforcement and inspection efforts. The report lauds efforts by OSHA and industry to shift responsibility for ensuring the safety and health of workers to employers, managers
and workers, and to provide special incentives to employers who initiate
effective worksite safety and health programs which identify hazards and
ensure safety awareness. Incentives provided by OSHA to employers
who adopt the partnership approach include:
"

assignment of lower priority for enforcement inspections (i.e.,
reduced inspections);

*

assignment of higher priority for technical assistance;

*

penalty reductions that could be as great as 100%.

OSHA has discovered through these few initiatives, initially undertaken experimentally, that shifting more responsibility to employers allows them to decide how they want to be regulated. If employers choose
to implement safety and health programs that (in a sense) self-regulate
their workplaces, the ultimate result has been greater protection for their
workers, and less "red tape," paperwork, and enforcement action by
OSHA. As a result of the demonstrated benefits of these initiatives to
industry, workers, and the government, the OSHA Strategic Partnership
Program for Worker Safety and Health (OSP) was adopted by the agency
on November 13, 1998. 47

While not predominant throughout general industry, the partnership
initiative has slowly increased in popularity in the latter half of the
1990s, with OSHA entering into partnership agreements on a national
and regional basis. Recently, OSHA and the Associated General Contractors of America entered into a formal partnership agreement which
will allow contractors with the best safety records to avoid targeted inspection lists. The agreement sets forth specific, objective criteria which
the contractor must satisfy in order to attain "blue" status (e.g., injury/illness rate which is 10% below the construction industry average;
institute a comprehensive site specific written safety and health program;
provide necessary orientation and training; no willful or repeat serious
violations in the last three years; no fatalities or catastrophic accidents in
47.

OSHA Directive No. TED 8-0.2 (Nov. 13, 1998).
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the past three years which resulted in serious citations). Once the criteria
are met, among other benefits, OSHA agrees to conduct unplanned inspections only under specific circumstances and not to target the site for
a planned inspection within the next twelve months.48
OSHA's innovative use of partnership agreements has enabled those
participating employers in general industry to implement effective safety
and health programs within the workplace, increasing worker protection,
with diminished concern of governmental enforcement activity. Conversely, the programs have enabled OSHA to better focus its enforcement activities and resources on those employers whose safety records
demonstrate an increased need for government oversight.
III.

WHAT'S WRONG WITH U.S. SAFETY AND HEALTH REGULATION,

PARTICULARLY THE MINE ACT

The two principal safety and health Acts in the U.S. stem from a
troubled history of labor-management conflict, serious industrial safety
and health problems, and relative industry and government neglect. It is
not surprising, therefore, that these remedial statutes (and their predecessors) were cast in a punitive mold during the period 1966 - 1977.
Whether that mold retains its utility for the 21 Century has been the
subject of recent and on-going debate. We suggest that a new regulatory
direction is needed.
A. The Regulatory System Lacks Flexibility
By and large, the voluminous standards issued by the enforcement
agencies are too rigid and prescriptive. Regulated enterprises are afforded little flexibility to devise methods of compliance that may work
best for them under the circumstances of their operations. Worse still, the
Mine Act itself is an extremely rigid statute whose structure precludes
many of the creative enforcement directions currently being initiated
under the somewhat looser regime of the OSH Act.
The tremendous quantity and detail of these bodies of regulation are
fairly mind-boggling. Indeed, one of OSHA's "reinvention" priorities is
eliminating some 1,000 pages of redundant and unnecessary
regulations. 49 All of this reflects paternalistic government at its most
intrusive. In the 1970s, it was assumed by some (and, of course, still is)
that government does know best and that inflexible prescription is the
only means of achieving betterment. It is true that progress has been attained in reducing accidents, injuries, disease, and fatalities. The former

48.

OSHA and Associated General Contractors Form Partnership to Improve Safety in

Construction, OSHA Trade News Release (Dep't of Labor Jan. 9, 2001).
49.

Fleming, S.H., Chartinga New Course Toward Workplace Safety and Health, Vol. 7 Job

Safety and Health Quarterly 9, 10 (1996).
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Assistant Secretary of Labor for Mine Safety and Health, J. Davitt
McAteer, testified before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee
on Education and the Workforce, Subcommittee on Workforce Protections, to the recent accomplishments of the mining industry over the past
decades, noting that the past five years have been the safest on record for
the U.S. mining industry and that the U.S. mining industry is at the forefront of mine safety among major producing countries in the world. 50
The relative fatality rates per million tons of coal produced in several
coal producing countries fills in some of the details. For example, in
1996, China's fatality rate was 7.29, Russia's was 0.66, India's rate was
0.47, followed by South Africa and Poland at 0.23. The U.S.'s rate was
far lower than any of these countries at 0.04.51 The OSH Act and Mine
Act have played an important role in that progress. However, the progress has also been due to such factors as the social maturation of industry, a growing appreciation by labor and management of the importance
of safety and health in stable employment and production, and increased
automation of industrial processes with concomitant reduction of associated risks.
Moreover, the public resources available for the implementation of
the current enforcement models are not likely to expand. On the contrary,
they will probably contract. Accordingly, in an environment wherein
progress continues to be achieved, it is time to question seriously the
paternalistic underpinnings of the present law.
B. The Regulatory System is not Sufficiently Performance-Based
Related to the above problems is the fact that too few safety and
health standards are performance-based. If the fundamental goal is, as it
should be, the result of improved safety and industrial hygiene, the obsessive concern with how the results are achieved makes little economic
sense. Good performance speaks for itself, and good government should
recognize results.
In testimony that was as timely several years ago as it is today, Michael E. Baroody of the National Association of Manufacturers summa-

50. A Review of Mine Safety & Health: The State of the Industry Today: Hearing Before the
House Subcomm. on Workforce Protections,Comm on Educ. and the Workforce, 107th Cong. (Sept.
14, 2000) (statement of J. Davitt McAteer, Asst. Secretary for Mine Safety and Health, U.S. Dept. of
Labor).
51.
A Review of Mine Safety & Health: The State of the Industry Today: HearingBefore the
House Subcomm. on Workforce Protections,Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 107th Cong. (Sept.
14, 2000) (statement of Bruce Watzman, Vice President, Safety and Health, National Mining
Association); Eckholm, Erik, Dangerous Coal Mines Take Human Toll in China, N.Y. Times, June

19, 2000.
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rized this problem well in 1995, while testifying on regulatory reform
legislation:
The shortcomings of our present regulatory system are not limited to
the absence of a rational method for setting regulatory priorities.
Major problems also are evident in the way in which health, safety,
and environmental regulations are developed, structured, and implemented.... [Among other things,] ... [algency rules tend to be rela-

tively inflexible, reflecting a penchant for command-and-control
specification, rather than a performance-based orientation. This results in regulations that are far less cost-effective than they could be,
and it frequently precludes the adoption of ... management practices

that would actually be more
52 protective and less costly than the actions
required under the rule.
C. The Mine Act is Premised on an Outmoded Concept of Strict Liability
As previously noted, this concern applies only to the Mine Act. Strict
liability is a punitive concept that is wrong for two reasons: (1) strict
liability deters exemplary performance-no matter how hard it strives,
the operator will be held responsible for all violations, even those in
which it was not at fault; and (2) strict liability exempts miners from
meaningful responsibility for safety and health in mines. Safe mines
must be a priority, not only to operators, but to miners alike. Placing the
responsibility for an unsafe act where it actually belongs in each case,
including with miners, is a more powerful means of ensuring responsible
attitudes by all.
D. The Regulatory System Excessively Relies Upon Governmental Enforcementfor Compliance
This problem, present under both Acts, is especially acute with respect to the Mine Act, with its scheme of mandatory inspections ("twos
and fours"). Under the Mine Act, compliance is not encouraged through
meaningful self-audit or self-regulation. Rather, compliance is forced
through an adversarial system of governmental inspection often followed
by an even more adversarial system of litigation. Recently, however,
OSHA has made a positive move in the direction of compliance through
meaningful self-audit via implementation of its FinalPolicy Concerning
the OccupationalSafety and Health Administration's Treatment of Voluntary Employer Safety and Health Self-Audits ("Final Policy on SelfAudits")."

52.
Regulatory Reform Legislation: Why Is It Needed? What Should It Provide?: Hearing
Before the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works), 102nd Cong. (March 21, 1995)
(statement of Michael E. Baroody, Nat'l Assn. of Manufacturers).
53. Final Policy Concerning the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's Treatment
of Voluntary Employer Safety and Health Self-Audits, 65 Fed. Reg. 46,498 (July 28, 2000).
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OSHA believes that "[v]oluntary self-audits, properly conducted,
may discover conditions that violate the [OSH] Act so that those conditions can be corrected promptly and similar violations prevented from
occurring in the future., 54 OSHA acknowledges the benefits to worker
health and safety that may be derived from voluntary self-audits. Consequently, OSHA adopts the position in the Final Policy on Self-Audits
that compliance officers will not routinely request voluntary self-audits
at the initiation of an inspection, nor will OSHA utilize a self-audit, obtained through legal means or by employer submission, to either focus or
expand an inspection. The Final Policy on Self-Audits provides that violative conditions identified in qualifying self-audits will not be used as
the basis for issuing citations to the employer where the violative condition was corrected prior to the inspection and the employer has taken
steps to avoid the recurrence of the condition.
In addition, the Final Policy on Self-Audits provides for a "safe harbor" for employers, wherein a qualifying self-audit may be used as evidence of good faith in those situations where the corrective steps have
been undertaken but not completed at the time of the inspection, instead
of used as evidence to support a willful violation (on the basis that the
employer had knowledge of the violative condition, as demonstrated by
the self-audit, and allowed it to exist). Moreover, where a qualifying selfaudit is deemed evidence of good faith, the employer may expect to receive a corresponding reduction in penalty assessments. It is this type of
innovative means of enforcement that will increase worker safety and
health by encouraging employers to periodically re-evaluate the work
environment without fear of repercussion or unduly stringent enforcement action being taken against them.
E. The Regulatory System is Unduly Punitive
Both statutes enforce their mandates almost entirely through punishment rather than incentive. Violations receive citations and violators
are subjected to penalties. On a national basis, the penalty amounts proposed by these agencies are large. For example, according to MSHA
statistics, in FY 1999 MSHA proposed $24.4 million in penalties. Based
on OSHA data for FY 1998, the most current data available from the
agency, federal OSHA and the state OSHA programs proposed almost
$108 million in penalties. Too little attention has been given under either
statute to methods of encouraging, assisting, and rewarding successful
performance.

54.

See id. at 46,502.
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F. Lack of ProperAssessment in Developing Regulations
Like most other federal agencies, MSHA and OSHA do not sufficiently conduct reliable risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis in
promulgating rules or allocating regulatory priorities. A classic example
of this problem was afforded by OSHA's unhappy experience in the past
year when it attempted to regulate, in one fell swoop, musculoskeletal
disorders, or repetitive motion injuries. OSHA published the Ergonomics
Rule in the Federal Register on November 14, 2000, 55 and it was immediately widely denounced by industry. The regulation was repealed by
President Bush on March 21, 2001, when the President signed into law
S.J. Res. 6, marking the first time the Congressional Review Act 56 has
been put to use.57 The Ergonomics Rule was repealed because OSHA
had failed to establish a sound basis for its sweeping regulatory action
and failed to demonstrate that the uncertain benefits of the rule came
anywhere close to justifying the tremendous costs to employers, including financial costs of implementation and compliance.
The science underlying OSHA and MSHA regulations is not always
submitted to the crucible of independent peer review. Thus, agency actions are not always based on the best (or even good) science. In many
cases, these agencies inadequately state the actual health and environmental risks involved in their proposed regulations. They sometimes
target risks looming larger in their minds than in reality. Public participation in the regulatory process is often not very meaningful.
IV. QUANTITATIVE

REVIEW

Available data on fatalities and injuries, MSHA budget expenditures, and the declining number of mines and miners, all underscore the
need for MSHA reform. In a 2001 report, The Heritage Foundation, a
conservative think-tank, articulated the case for a dramatic restructuring
of the Federal mine safety and health program by such means as elimination of MSHA and absorption of its functions by an enlarged OSHA:
Both the number of American workers involved in mining and the
injuries associated with it have declined significantly in recent years,
calling into question whether there is any rationale for a separate

55.
OSHA Final Rule on Ergonomics, 65 Fed. Reg. 68,261 (Nov. 14, 2000).
56.
Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 801, et seq. (2001). The CRA is Subtitle E of
Title II (The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act) of the Contract With America
Advancement Act of 1996, Public Law 104-121. Under the CRA, Congress has placed upon itself
the responsibility to ensure that regulations promulgated by federal agencies are necessary and
accomplish what they are intended to in the most cost-effective and least burdensome manner. Until
Congressional review of the Ergonomics Rule, the CRA had not been used to overturn a single
regulation in the five years since the law went into effect.
57.
Statement by the President, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (March 20,
2001).
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agency dedicated to the safety and health of miners ....
MSHA is
funded at $228 million in FY 2000 and has over 2,300 employees,
about 920 of whom are inspectors. According to government
sources, these numbers translate into a ratio of about one inspector for
every four coal mines and every 41 metal/nonmetal mines. In contrast, OSHA received $382 million in FY 2000 and has around 1,240
inspectors enforcing health and safety standards in over 4.0 million
non-mining worksites. Whereas MSHA is required by law to inspect
underground mines four times a year and surface mines two times a
year, OSHA visits many worksites only once during a ten-year period. Therefore, MSHA spends about $16,400 per year for every
mine under its jurisdiction and over $638 per year for every miner
employed in the industry, while OSHA spends
58 around $74 per covered worksite and less than $56 per employee.
The Heritage Foundation asserts that MSHA should be restructured into
an office within OSHA, modeled after OSHA's Construction Safety Office. The Heritage Foundation further advocates phasing out the Federal
Mine Safety and Health Review Commission and having Mine Act cases
adjudicated by the Occupational Safety and Health Review

Commission.59
A. FatalityData
Since the 1970s, fatalities, injuries and illnesses in the U.S. have
dramatically declined. Based on the Department of Labor's Bureau of
Labor Statistics ("B.L.S.") Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries
("C.F.O.I."), from 1970 to 1999, American workplace fatalities have

been reduced from an estimated 13,800 to 6,023. Mining fatalities during
the same period have been lowered from approximately 600 to 121.
From 1970 to 1999, the overall American workplace fatality rate dropped
from 18 per 100,000 workers to approximately 5.5 per 100,000 workers.
Occupational fatalities by industry in 1999, based on the B.L.S.'s
1999 C.F.O.I., placed mining at approximately 2% of fatalities, behind
construction (20%), transportation (17%), service (12%), agriculture
(13%), manufacturing (12%), retail trade (8%), government (9%), and
wholesale trade (4%). Thus, in terms of the actual numbers of fatalities
experienced, these other industrial sectors are all more dangerous than
mining. Average mining employment in 1999 (about 535,400 employees,
including oil and gas extraction workers) accounted for only .5% of all
industry employment. Because of the relatively low number of miners
employed, the 1999 mining fatality rate of about 22 per 100,000 employ-

58.
59.

HERITAGE FOUNDATION, supra note 42, at 245 (2001).

See id.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:3

ees was high. Nevertheless, the numbers of mining fatalities are still low
compared to the rest of industry.
The improving conditions in the U.S. mining industry were testified
to by Joseph A. Main of the United Mine Workers of America. Main's
testimony paints a picture of dramatically improved working conditions
by noting that in the 30-year period prior to the enactment of the Federal
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 19,144 miners were killed in
the nation's coal mines. In the 30-year period following enactment of the
1969 Coal Act, there were 86% fewer coal mining deaths. In the
metal/nonmetal mining industry, 3,889 deaths were recorded in the 23year period prior to the Federal Metal and Non-Metallic Mine Safety Act
of 1966; in the same period following passage of the Metal and NonMetallic Mine Act, there were 40% fewer deaths.6 °
B. Injury/Illness Data
Since the early 1970s, the U.S. non-fatal occupational injury and illness rates have also declined. According to the B.L.S.'s Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses for the years 1995-1999, the total injury/illness rate for private industry per 100 full-time workers declined
during the period 1995 to 1999 from 8.1 to 6.3. The mining incidence
rate during that same period fell from 6.2 to 4.4.
Mining also compared well to other important industrial sectors in
the period 1995-1999. In sum, these data show that fatalities, injuries,
and illnesses in mining have greatly decreased. Since the early 1970s, the
fatality rate in mining has fallen nearly 75% and the injury/illness rate
has dropped by one-third in the past five years.
C. Employment Data
The numbers of mining operations and miners employed have drastically declined since 1970, yet MSHA's budget and personnel have continued to remain at both steady and high levels. In a February 1996,
speech at a Washington mining safety and health workshop, Representative Cass Ballenger (R-NC), who has introduced important OSHA and
MSHA reform bills, emphasized the economics of regulation. He noted
that in 1977, when MSHA was started, there were 20,000 mines subject
to the Mine Act, employing nearly 500,000 miners. In 1995, those numbers had dropped to 14,000 mines and 370,000 miners (including a 40%
reduction in underground mines). Most recent figures available (for
1998) show that these numbers have continued to decrease: 13,876 aver-

60.
A Review of Mine Safety & Health: The State of the Industry Today: Hearing Before the
House Subcomm. on Workforce Protections,Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 107th Cong. (Sept.

14, 2000) (statement of Joseph A. Main, Administrator, Dept. of Occupational Health and Safety,
United Mine Workers of America).
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age total active mining operations and 357,315 average number of miners working at active mining establishments. 6' Yet MSHA's budget and
personnel have grown and continue to grow. When these factors are considered together with the striking success in reducing fatalities and injuries in mines, discussed above, seeking continuing improvement through
new directions in the character, cost-effectiveness, and methods of regulation is both a rational and timely enterprise.
D. Lack of Direct CorrelationBetween Cited Standardsand Causes of
Accidents
The top-cited standards under the Mine Act do not necessarily correlate well with the leading causes of injuries and fatalities. In recent
years, the most frequently cited MSHA standards address combustible
accumulations (coal mining) and guarding (metal/nonmetal mining).
Neither of these areas are the leading sources of most fatalities, injuries,
and illnesses. In coal, the leading cause of fatalities is fall of roof or back
and powered haulage; in metal/nonmetal, the leading cause of fatalities is
powered haulage. The leading cause of non-fatal injuries in coal and
metal/nonmetal is handling of materials. 62 Moreover, the lack of significant analysis as to whether compliance with the frequently cited standards could have prevented particular accidents or illnesses makes judging actual effectiveness difficult.
V. LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY REFORM: PROSPECTIVE AND
POLITICS

Regulatory reform continues to be a major focus of attention on
Capitol Hill. To date, however, legislative success has largely eluded
proponents of reform. President Clinton had threatened to veto any
measures that would, in his Administration's view, compromise workers'
safety and health protection. However, with the Bush Administration
demonstrating a new openness toward regulatory reform, the chances for
enactment of a major reform bill seem to be looking brighter. Given the
number of serious proposals on various Congressional tables in the past
and a fair amount of bipartisan support for some form of regulatory improvement, it is likely that reform initiatives will be advanced and some
reform measure will be seriously considered.

61.
Statistics obtained from National Mining Association website, Summary of Selected U.S.
and World Mining Statistics, <http://www.nma.org/SMB%20intlsummary.pdf>.
62. Based on accident classification statistics from MSHIA for FY 1999 and FY 2000, MSHA,
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Injury
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Worktime

<http://www.msha.gov/ACCINJ/ALLMINES.HTM>.
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A. Testimony in CongressionalOversight Hearings
Even in the waning months of the Clinton Administration, Congress
demonstrated its increased interest in reforming the Mine Act and MSHA
by holding oversight hearings. On September 14, 2000, the U.S. House
of Representatives Committee on Education and the Workforce, Subcommittee on Workforce Protection, held a hearing at which representatives of industry, labor and the agency testified. Representatives of industry articulated a common goal of moving toward regulatory reform
and a less onerous enforcement environment. 63 One of the suggested
reforms included discarding the current system of mandated "twos and
fours" inspections and, instead, focusing the inspection resources on
those mines whose safety records demonstrate a need for on-going enforcement oversight (i.e., a targeted enforcement model more similar to
that utilized by OSHA). A novel approach to enforcement was suggested
by L. Joseph Ferrara, Esq., former General Counsel of the Review
Commission, in the concept of development of a class of minor violations and eligibility criteria that would designate "abatement-only" status
to violations, avoiding the need for the oftentimes onerous paper enforcement action and penalty, especially the excessive history criteria,
and the accompanying litigation. Other reasonable, workable reforms
suggested included the provision for petitions for modifications of health
standards and an increased openness to and acceptance of the use of personal protective equipment, in conjunction with engineering and administrative controls.
VI. WHAT IS TO BE DONE-NECESSARY REFORMS OF THE SAFETY AND

HEALTH LAWS
From all that we have surveyed, the indicated paths of needed
change emerge clearly. The U.S. must turn away from the prescriptive,
paternalistic, bureaucratic, and punitive models of regulation that the
Mine Act and OSH Act encapsulate. What may have worked in the
1970s will continue to be increasingly counterproductive in the 21'
Century.
In the field of occupational safety and health, impressive strides
have been made since the 1970s in reducing accidents, injuries, and illnesses in the American workplace, particularly in mining. Indeed, mining
is now one of the safer industrial sectors, judged by those criteria. Certainly, the OSHA and MSHA programs have played a role in this im-

63.
A Review of Mine Safety & Health: The State of the Industry Today: Hearing Before the
House Subcomm. on Workforce Protections,Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 107th Cong. (Sept.
14, 2000) (statement of Bruce Watzman, Vice President, Safety and Health, National Mining
Association); A Review of Mine Safety & Health: The State of the Industry Today: Hearing Before
the House Subcomm. on Workforce Protections, Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 107th Cong.
(Sept. 14, 2000) (statement of L. Joseph Ferrara, Esq., Jackson & Kelly PLLC).
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provement. But it is appropriate to ask whether it is still necessary in the
2000s to employ the hammer of the 1970s. Can more be achieved if new
methods of regulation are tried?
We suggest the following direction as mining moves into the Third
Millennium:
"

Greater industry self-regulation: In the 21' Century, government cannot do it all. Government cannot afford to do it all. If
these premises are accepted, then it follows that the private
sector should be encouraged to do more through greater selfregulation. This can be accomplished by such tools as development of individualized "plant codes"; safety and health audits
by certified private parties as an alternative to government inspection; confidential self-auditing by affected operators that
can be carried out without threat of "self-incrimination" or penalization.

*

Greater use of scientific risk assessment, prioritizing of riskreduction goals, and employment of cost-benefit analysis:
OSHA and MSHA must balance better the societal and economic cost of regulation with anticipated benefits.

*

Greater flexibility in regulation: The prevailing rigidly prescriptive model should be shifted to a performance-based system. The government should pursue improvement through focus
on actual outputs and results-not detailed, prescribed schemes
of achieving those results.

"

Independent peer review: Risk assessments and the claimed
scientific bases for regulations should be subjected to independent peer review so that proposed regulation is based on the best
available science.

"

Incentives rather than punishment: There must be far greater
emphasis placed on providing incentives for improved performance and a de-emphasis on the punitive philosophy that animates the present Acts. This can take forms such as government
consultation, assistance and training to achieve better resultsrather than punishment through penalties. At the governmental
inspection level, a history of good performance should lead to
lessened government intrusion. (On the flipside, such an approach would mean that government could better focus its attention on the most problematic enterprises and scofflaws.)
Violations, if not serious or repeat, should trigger prompt correction, not penalties.
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Jettisoning strict liability in the Mine Act: The Mine Act
should proceed on a fault-based system, where the highest levels of operator achievement are rewarded. The mine operator
should be responsible for putting forth its best efforts to achieve
results, but should not be held accountable for every unavoidable, unpredictable incident.
To accomplish much of this reform in the mining arena, the Mine
Act must be legislatively overhauled in dramatic fashion. Its present rigidity is blocking creative avenues for further improvement.
CONCLUSION

There is growing pressure in the U.S. to alter the predominant
regulatory model. This seems particularly appropriate in the occupational
safety and health field. The mining industry is contracting and consolidating. American industry as a whole faces increasingly vigorous world
competition. Resources available for the public sector are constrained as
never before. The enlightened American business has learned that poor
safety and health practices, and the attendant losses, can spoil the bottom
line.
The stem parental government must relax its grip on responsible industry participants and reserve its "stick" for woodshedding those who
demonstrate unwillingness to achieve expected and realistic results. It is
also likely that the regulatory agency of the future will have to make its
case more convincingly that its regulations stem from reliable and prioritized risk assessment, have been subjected to the crucible of cost-benefit
analysis, and are founded on "good" science.
As we await the next batch of regulatory reform bills to be proposed
in Congress, it is good to consider what lies on the horizon. The answer
to this paper's topic is, we suggest, that the Mine Act is in need of substantial reform in order to enable regulation of the mining industry to age
gracefully while at the same time bringing the U.S. enforcement model
into the 21 Century.

ADDENDUM TO PROTECTING THE BOUNDARY WATERS
CANOE AREA WILDERNESS: LITIGATION AND
LEGISLATION
RICHARD A. DUNCAN

The authors wish to add a short addendum to this reprint of their
original 1999 article. It discusses first a lawsuit involving the Boundary
Waters Canoe Area Wilderness ("BWCAW") which was not included in
the original article as it did not result in any published judicial opinions
but which, given the continuing controversy over its subject matter--Air
Force training flights over national parks and wilderness--is worthy of
further mention. Second, we bring the reader up to date on the political
fortunes of the prime movers behind the 1995-1998 truck portages controversy culminating in federal mediation and legislation.
THE SNOOPY MOA LITIGATION

In 1988 a coalition of environmental groups brought suit under the
National Environmental Policy Act,1 ("NEPA"), challenging the United
States Air Force's establishment and steadily increasing use of the
Snoopy Military Operations Area ("MOA"). This MOA covered northeastern Minnesota including the southern portion of the BWCAW and
served primarily an Air National Guard unit based in Duluth, flying F-4
jets.2
Various military units used Snoopy MOA prior to 1975. In 1975,
when the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") officially charted
Snoopy MOA, neither the FAA nor the Air Force prepared an Environmental Assessment ("EA") or an Environmental Impact Statement
("EIS"), despite the fact that NEPA had been on the books for several
years.3 The Air Force belatedly prepared a short EA in 1977, finding no
significant environmental impact based upon assumptions of limited use
of the area by Air Force trainers, flying above 10,000 feet.4 The 1977 EA
gave no consideration to the effects of jet fighter overflights on the
BWCAW and its visitors. Indeed, there was no5 recognition that Snoopy
MOA overlay a federally designated wilderness.

I.

42 U.S.C. § 4321, et seq. (2000).
2.
Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness v. Temple, No. 3-88-423 (D. Minn. 1989).
3.
Complaint for Temple, Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness v. Temple, No. 3-88423 (D. Minn. 1989) (No. 3-88-423).
4. Id.
5. Id.
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The use of Snoopy MOA began to increase dramatically after 1983,
when the Air Force unit in Duluth shifted its mission from high level
reconnaissance to a low level fighter-interceptor mission.6 From 1983 to
1988, the number of sorties flown leaped from 153 to over 1,100, and
increasingly BWCAW visitors complained of Air Force "sky jockeys"
flying low over canoe country. 7 A 1988 visitor use survey of BWCAW
visitors conducted by the Forest Service showed that over one third of
wilderness visitors who returned the surveys complained of aircraft noise
8
as a disturbance to their wilderness experience.
The litigation sought to compel the Air Force to complete an Environmental Impact Statement for Snoopy MOA, and to enjoin Air Force
overflights pending completion of such a study. 9 The case proceeded to a
day long evidentiary hearing, including expert testimony on the adverse
impacts of modern aircraft noise on the wilderness experience by, among
others, Bill Worf, the principal draftsman of the Forest Service's Wilderness Act regulations,' and Dr. Miron (Bud) Heinselman, a retired Forest
Service ecologist.'
After the hearing but before any final court ruling the parties settled,
largely through the intervention of the Minnesota Air National Guard.
The Air Guard sensed that a compromise by which the boundaries of the
Snoopy MOA were modified to exclude the BWCAW would meet its
need for training air space without jeopardizing the quietude and solitude
of the wilderness experience. On Halloween 1989, the district court filed
a stipulated settlement order which contained the following material
terms:12

1. Pending reconfiguration of the Snoopy MOA, the Air Force
"will operate no air combat training flights below 18,000 feet Mean
Sea Level ('MSL') over the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness."
2. The boundaries of Snoopy MOA would be moved south of the
BWCAW.
3. The Air Force "recognize[s] that the federal actions of establishing Military Operations Areas and scheduling ongoing air combat

6.
7.
8.
9.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

See George Nickas, Exploring the implementation of the 1964 Wilderness Act by the
10.
Forest Service, The Bureau of Land Management, and the National Park Service, at

http://www.wildwildemess.org/wi/nicka.htm.
11.

Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness v. Temple, No. 3-88-423 (D. Minn. 1989).

12.
Order, Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness v. Temple, No. 3-88-423 (D. Minn.
1989) (No. 3-88-423).
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training operations are subject
to the requirements of the National
'
Environmental Policy Act." t
In light of the continuing controversy over aircraft overflights of national
parks and wildernesses, notably civil aircraft over the Grand Canyon and
military aircraft over Colorado, it is significant that, yet again, the
Boundary Waters was on the leading edge of wilderness policy and litigation.
CURRENT POLITICAL CURRENTS
The November 2000 elections, and other changes, have affected
some of the primary political figures who played roles in the recent Congressional legislative controversy over the BWCAW.
Department store heir Mark Dayton 14 defeated Senator Rod Grams15
(R-MN) in his effort to win re-election to the United States Senate.
Grams' effort to again divide the typically Democratic northern Minnesota vote over wilderness and public lands issues failed in 2000.16 Dayton won handily in northern Minnesota and statewide.
Senator Paul Wellstone (D-MN) continues his service in the
Senate. 7 His current term expires in early 2003; he had announced earlier that he would not serve for more than two terms, however, he has
now announced that in light of the close political balance in the U.S.
Senate, he will seek re-election in 2002.18
Representative Jim Oberstar (D-MN) easily won re-election to the
House of Representatives to his 14th term by winning nearly 70% of the

vote in Minnesota's 8th Congressional District.' 9 The 66-year-old Oberstar retains his powerful seat as the ranking Democrat on the House
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee.
And Representative Bruce Vento (D-MN), the long-time champion
of the BWCAW, died on October 10, 2000, from malignant mesotheli-

13.

Id.

14. See Gregory L. Giroux and Adam Graham-Silverman, Quirky Minnesota Voting has some
Incumbents
on
edge,
Congressional
Quarterly,
Nov.
4,
2000,
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A 15880-2000Nov4?language=printer.html.
15.
See Tremendous Victory for Choice in Minnesota: Dayton defeats anti-choice incumbent,
wins
U.S.
Senate
seat,
Nov.
8,2000,
at
http://www.naral.org/mediaresources/press/pr 10800_dayton.html.
16.
See Amy Radii, Environmental Issues Lead Senate Debate, Oct. 16, 2000, at
http://news.mpr.org/features/200010/16_radilasendebate/.
17. See Paul Wellstone, at http://www.senate.gov/-wellstone/Biography/biography.htm.
18.
See Minnesota Senator to seek 3rd term, at http://jsonline.com/election2000/ap/jan01/apwellstone-senatO 11701 .asp.
19. See Election results, at
http://news.mpr.org/features/199908/01 newsroom-campaign2000/8thdistrict.shtml.
20.

See James L Oberstar,at http://wwwa.house.gov/oberstar/bio-ober.htm.
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oma, a rare lung cancer associated with exposure to asbestos. 21 His
elected successor, Representative Betty McCollum (D-MN), a strong
environmentalist, has 2 ledged to carry on Vento's legacy of protecting
the Boundary Waters.

21.
See Oberstar expresses great sadness at the passing of Bruce Vento, at
http://wwwa.house.gov/oberstar/ventodeath.htm.
22.
See Lori Sturdevant: Another woman whose campaign fell short of St. Paul mayor's
office, Sept. 27, 2001, at http://www.startribune.com/viewers/qview.php?slug=LOR27&templateprint-a.

